Tamil People's Liberation Tiger (TMVP/Karuna Group) 



Origins

The TMVP is a splinter group of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It was formed in March 2004 in the eastern part of Sri Lanka under the leadership of Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (alias “Colonel” Karuna), who was previously a LTTE’s military chief in that region. Muralitharan states that his reason for secession is the alleged concentration of the LTTE’s leadership on the hands of northerners, while easterners were, in his view, disproportionately sent to the battlefield.

Location / Main area of operation

This armed group operates in the eastern part of Sri Lanka and in particular, in the districts of Ampara, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee. According to a Human Rights Watch Report, the group also carried out armed operations in the Vavuniya district located in the north of Sri Lanka in 2007.


Objectives

The objective of this group is purportedly to defend the rights of Sri Lankan Tamils from the east provinces. Unlike the LTTE, this armed group accepts that this goal can be achieved within a united Sri Lanka. The fact that both the Karuna group and the LTTE seek to be the representatives of Sri Lankan Tamils from the east provinces have led to military confrontations between the two groups since the formation of the former.

 

Number of Members


Analysts consider that this group had an estimated 6,000 armed members when it was formed in March 2004. Nevertheless, following a month of armed confrontation with the LTTE, Karuna disbanded his forces and escaped with a small number of cadres. The group as since been reactiviated but it's current strength is unknown, though one analyst suggests an estimated 300 to 700 members.

 

Type : National

The TMVP is a national armed group as its military actions have been limited to the Sri Lankan territory.

Conflict Status : Active

Despite the group leader’s statement expressing the movement’s transformation into a political party, conflicts with the LTTE continue to be reported. Additionally, it must be noted that one main issue surrounding the formation and subsequent development of the Karuna group has been whether the Sri Lankan government has supported it. The LTTE has several times declared that this support does exist but both the Sri Lankan government and Karuna have denied these allegations.
On the other hand, international duty holders have found that in certain instances such ties had existed with respect to some Sri Lankan officials. For instance, Allan Rock, the Special Advisor to the United Nations Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict on Sri Lanka found, after a visit to Sri Lanka in November 2006, that “there is credible evidence that certain elements of the Sri Lankan army may have aided [the Karuna faction to abduct children].” Nonetheless, certain NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, claim that such ties are wider.
While it is impossible to give a definitive answer regarding ties between the TMVP and Sri Lankan officials, it is apparent that the formation of the Karuna group has had important military consequences in the armed conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. Specifically, analysts agree that the formation of the Karuna group weakened the strength of the LTTE in the eastern provinces of Sri Lanka and facilitated the regaining of important parts of territory in those regions by the Sri Lankan government forces.

 

Structure of the organization

The Karuna group is composed of a military and a political wing. In an interview with The Sunday Times Online in March 2007, Karuna recognized the existence of both wings and added that the armed wing’s objective is to “give protection to [their] political activities as well as defend [them] against the LTTE.”
At the beginning of May 2007, the Karuna group reportedly split, with Karuna and his deputy Pillaiyan disputing money and the command structure. Pillaiyaan was alleged to have been running an extortion racket when some of the abductions and extortion schemes were run without the knowledge of Karuna. Karuna apparently ordered Pillaiyaan to give the money in his possession and submit accounts.
Pillaiyan fled from Batticaloa with 350 of his followers to Trincomalee where Karuna loyalists began entrenching themselves. It is reported that subsequent clashes between the two factions took place in the east of Sri Lanka. According to certain media reports, Sindujan, a military leader loyal to Pillaiyan was killed by Karuna supporters. About one week later, a Karuna group spokesman Azad Mowlana told the media that Karuna and Pillayan met face to face and reconciled their dispute. In an interview with the Daily Mirror, the spokesman added that an agreement had been reached under which Karuna would remain the overall leader, and Pillaiyaan would be the military chief. Speaking to the same newspaper, an un-named spokesman of the Pillaiyaan faction said that all decisions in regard to military and civil matters would be decided by a Central Committee formed of the group’s senior officials; that the Karuna group would operate in Batticaloa region, while Pillaiyaan would be operating in Trincomalee; and that the Pillaiyaan faction would “wait and see” how this system works. A few months after the incident, it is viewed that the split appeared to be healing and no further incidents have been reported by the media.
On 2 November 2007, a UK Home Office statement announced that Karuna had been arrested in London by UK authorities; currently, he is being held in immigration detention. Some press reports state that Karuna followers are in a state of confusion as uncertainty exists as regards the future of their maximum leader.
 

Leadership

The leader of this armed group is Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (alias “Colonel Karuna”), who joined the LTTE in 1983 and was that group’s commander for the eastern Batticoloa-Amparai districts. As mentioned above, he was detained on 2 November 2007 by UK authorities in London.
As mentioned above, Pillaiyan served as Karuna's deputy until his defection in May 2007 when he led the faction opposed to Karuna. Under the agreement reached in mid-May 2007, he will be the group’s military chief.
Other leaders of the group are Pathmini and Sinnathamby, the Secretary and Treasurer of the group, respectively. The latter is reported to be recovering from injuries sustained when his vehicle was bombed.
 

External aid/Third party involvement

There are no claims as to the existence of external aid or third party involvement with respect to this armed group.

External effects of the NSAG's armed activities

Since its beginning, the Sri Lankan armed conflict has produced considerable refugee flows. According to UNHCR statistics, around one million people have left Sri Lanka since the beginning of the conflict. Furthermore, UNHCR statistics show that the refugee population coming from Sri Lanka between 1995 and 2004 remained high, with estimates placing the number around or above 100,000 people each year. Nevertheless, there is no current information available as to how many of these refugees have resulted from the armed actions involving the Karuna group.

 

Funding

When the group split in the beginning of May 2007, reports of extortion and ransom rackets were made public as the two factions argued over the funds originating from these activities.
Significantly, under the agreement concluded between the two factions in mid-May 2007, the group's newly-created Central Committee will decide on financial situations, among other issues.
 

Relationship with the international community

This group has been approached for engagement mainly on issues related to the non-recruitment and non-use of child soldiers.
In regards these matters, it should be noted that after a 10-day mission to Sri Lanka in November 2006, Allan Rock, the Special Advisor to the United Nations Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict on that country found that the Karuna group “abducts children in the Government-controlled areas of the east.” During the visit, the Karuna group “undertook to publish formal policy statements forbidding underage recruitment and to release children who may be in its ranks”; and “agreed to work with the UNICEF in an effort to trace the whereabouts and arrange the release of those abducted children whose families have notified UNICEF.”
As of October 2007, the Karuna group is not included in the lists of terrorist organizations of either the United States or the European Union.
 

Books

  • Balencie, J-M & De La Grange (2005), A., Les Nouveaux Mondes rebelles, (Paris: éditions Michalon).
  • Clarance, William (2007), Ethnic Warfare in Sri Lanka and the UN Crisis (London: Pluto Press).
     

Articles and Chapters

  • Bruce Matthews, “In pursuit of an 'interim administration' in Sri Lanka's North and East: opportunity or 'peace trap'?”, in 93 The Round Table 75.
  • Wickremesekera, Channa, “Peace through Military Parity? The Tamil Tigers and the Government Forces in Sri Lanka,” in Daniel P. Marston et al (2006), A Military History of India and South Asia (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), retrieved from Praeger Security International Online link.

 

Reports and resolutions of intergovernmental organizations

  • EU Council, Common Position 2006/380/CFSP of 29 May 2006, Official Journal of the European Communities L 144/25, 31.5.2006.
  • Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 13 August 2007, UN Doc. A/62/228.
  • United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “After Two Decades of War, Sri Lanka is on the Mend,” 130 Refugees 5 (2004).
  • United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2004 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, at 479 available at link
  • United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka, April 2004, available at link
     

Governmental reports

 

  • U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Fact Sheet Office of Counterterrorism, Washington, DC, October 11, 2005, at link (last visited 17 August, 2007).

Reports of think tanks and non-governmental organizations

  • Human Rights Watch, Return to War: Human Rights under Siege, Vol. 19 No. 11(c), August 2007, available at link
  • IISS Armed Conflict Database, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTEE), available at link
  • National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Colonel Karuna Faction, available at link
  • South Asia Terrorist Portal, Sri Lanka, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, at link
     

Press Information (in chronological order)

  • Gopalakrishnan, Ramesh, “Profile: Colonel Karuna,” BBC, 03 May 2004, link
  • “Sri Lanka: Combats entre factions rebelles rivales,” Agence France Press, 30 December 2006.
  • “Enhardie par la victoire, l’armée srilankaise va intensifier la guerre,” Agence France Presse, 21 January 2007.
  • “L’armée srilankaise revendique la prise de trois bases tamoules,” Agence France Presse, 24 February 2007.
  • “We Are Ready to Fill Political Vacuum in East: Karuna,” The Sunday Times Online, 11 March 2007, available at www.sundaytimes.lk/070311/News/115news.html
  • “A date with a renegade rebel tiger,” (Buerk, Roland), BBC, 04 April 2007, link
  • “Karuna split “resolved”, BBC Sinhala.com, 13 May 2007, link
  • “Dispute With Pillayan Settled: Karuna Spokesman”, Daily Mirror, 14 May 2007, available at link
  • “UK detains breakway Tamil Leader,” BBC news, 3 November 2007, available at link
  • “Karuna’s men – their travails”, Asian Tribune, 18 November 2007, available at link
     

Interviews

Internet resources

 Sri Lankan Think thanks

  • Centre for Policy Alternatives, available at link
  • International Centre for Ethnic Studies, available at link
  • Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, available at link

News

  • BBC Sinhala, available at link
  • The Lanka Academic, available at link

Governmental Sources

  • Secretariat for coordinating the peace effort, available at link

 

 

Statements of the armed group

Agreements involving armed groups