Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 

Origins

Joseph Kony founded a movement precursory to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) , the United Holy Salvation Army, in 1987. The movement changed identity again in 1989 before it settled on the designation LRA in 1992.
After joining the rebel group, Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA), in 1987, Kony broke away from his division in November 1987 to carry out independent operations with his followers. His troops at first included remnants of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), a group that Kony had approached in the past to create an alliance. Afterwards, the force was consolidated with a faction of UPDA fighters who had refused to give up their arms after the rebel group signed the Gulu Peace Accord with the government in 1988. The group first operated under the name United Holy Salvation Army, then later as the Uganda Democratic Christian Army/Movement, until finally settling on the name "Lord's Resistance Army."
The LRA took root during the unrest in northern Uganda following the accession to power of current president Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M). The NRA/M overthrew President Tito Okello in a coup d'etat in 1986. The shift of power reactivated deep-rooted historical tensions, partitioning the country along a north-south dividing line. NRA/M’s leaders were believed to come exclusively from southern tribes; while, in contrast, president Okello and his predecessor Milton Obote originated from the north and were depicted as agents of northern tribes.

Among other root causes for the creation and resilience of insurgencies in the north, analysts also point to the militarization of Uganda’s political scene following its successive violent power struggles since independence, the absence of adequate institutions to channel political participation, and the unequal economical situation of the north.

Originally, pockets of resistance mobilized into organized groups that capitalized on the anti-government sentiment of many northerners. The return to Acholiland of thousands of undisciplined and restless soldiers from the Obote and Okello governments’ UNLA Force created a fertile recruiting base for these rebel movements. The foremost rebellious groups formed were the Uganda’s People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) and the Acholi-dominated Holy Spirit Movement (HSM).
The defeat of the HSM – crushed by government forces in 1986 – followed by the peace deal between the government and the UPDA in 1988, left a power vacuum among fractured northern resistance movements. This group of resistance movements is said to have been “…catalytic in the [subsequent] formation of the LRA”. Its members proposed to fight evil spirits afflicting Uganda by waging a war against the morally impure NRA soldiers. The millenarian discourse made references to a mixture of Western military organization, traditional Acholi religious practices, and messianic Christian fervor.
Kony, a relative to HSM’s founder, Alice Auma “Lakwena," modeled the LRA after this unique combination of cult and military organization.

 

Location / Main area of operation

The LRA long operated exclusively in northern Uganda from bases in southern Sudan. In 2003, the movement led an offensive in the Teso and Lango regions, in eastern Uganda. The LRA has also operated in Sudan, in an area stretching east to west from Yei, through Nimule, to Magwi. Following the beginning of a period of collaboration between the Ugandan and Sudanese governments against the LRA, the bulk of the group has, since late 2005 to early 2006, settled around Garamba National Park in the northeast Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Objectives

The LRA claims that God guides its struggle through prophet and movement-leader Joseph Kony. Kony has refined the stated objectives of the LRA over time which were originally inspired in an early period by the HSM’s messianic project. In this initial period of existence, the LRA’s political project was limited to overthrowing the government and promoting a radical form of Christianity by establishing an independent state in northern Uganda (the Nile Republic), which would be governed on the basis of the Bible’s Ten Commandments. However, between 1989 and 1992, the movement reshaped part of its identity against the background of a deficient economy in the northern districts of Uganda and of resentment for past-unaddressed atrocities committed by ill-disciplined NRA detachments. The LRA has put aside its exclusive religious emphasis and calls for the defense of the northeast population, particularly Acholis, from the government of President Museveni.
The group generally favors civilian soft targets and rarely seeks to engage Ugandan military forces. This orientation was adopted after civilian populations mobilized into government-sponsored “Bow and Arrow” civil-defense units to fight the LRA in 1991-92.
The Ugandan government and media (both Ugandan and international) commonly accuse the LRA of lacking a clear political agenda, a charge that many ex-combatants and civilians have endorsed.
Furthermore, the LRA members’ extremely violent and, at times, erratic behavior has contributed to undermining the movement’s credibility, often characterized as a barbaric and insane cult. Tim Allen, however, notes that the LRA has made efforts to articulate statements of demands. The circulation of manifestos and pamphlets over the Internet and in print form, as well as the brief existence of an LRA radio station, illustrate his point.

 

Number of Members

Estimates of the number of members vary substantially, as the size of the LRA has fluctuated over time. Moreover the movement’s main bases have been located outside of Uganda, in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Most estimates indicate that the force grew to an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 combatants between 1994 and 1999.
It is uncontested that the LRA forces have been decimated in recent years as the group numbered 2,000 in 2000, according to some sources. In 2004, the LRA capabilities were further reduced due to death, desertion, and defection of senior commanders following negotiations, military pressure, and offers of amnesty. More recent estimates give the LRA 1,500 to 2,000 members. This, however, includes women and children that do not partake in military activities. Combatants may only account for an estimated 300 to 700 persons.

 

Type : National

The LRA is a national non-state armed group. Although the LRA has bases in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, most armed attacks are planned to take place in the territory of Uganda.

 

Conflict Status : CeaseFire

The Ugandan government and the LRA began peace talks in Juba, Sudan on July 14 2006. The first ceasefire accord was signed on 26 August 2006 and was repeatedly renewed subsequently. This was followed by the conclusion of a permanent ceasefire agreement on 23 February 2008. The parties agreed that the peace talks would follow a five-stage negotiating framework: (1) cessation of hostilities; (2) comprehensive solutions to the conflict; (3) reconciliation and accountability; (4) formal ceasefire; and (5) disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR). The parties signed agreements addressing the five points on the agenda, the signing of which is supposed to be crowned by the signature of a final peace agreement. LRA negotiators have, however, insisted that the ICC indictments against their leaders be dropped before they sign the final peace agreement.

 

Structure of the organization

Joseph Kony is the head of the LRA military, political, and spiritual structure. Kony devolves a great deal of decision-making command to lower levels of the hierarchy. This gives the LRA its distinctive ‘loose’ structure, whilst at the same time giving fighters clear parameters for action through the use of spiritual indoctrination which is simply a broad mandate to fight in the north.
The responsibility of the implementation of operations is shared among the group’s high command. Orders are claimed to be issued by the “Spirit," passed through Joseph Kony who acts as a “Holy Messenger," and are then given to the “Holy Chief” (the army commander). These messages are then translated into operational orders when passed on to the military high command. They are subsequently passed down to the divisions, brigades, and subordinate units.

The LRA is constituted of five brigades (Stocree, Sinia, Gilva, Shila and Control Altar). Operations rest on decentralized and extremely mobile units; fighters infiltrate an assigned area in units of 100 to 160 and break into groups of between 10 and 20. These guerrilla tactics facilitate the command and control of large territories with few fighters.
The group heavily relies on the abduction of young civilians, “…enabl[ing] Kony to maintain his grip on the LRA.” These abductees are then used as fighters, porters, and sexual slaves. Observers have alleged that an important strategy of retention of abductees has been to require them to commit atrocities against civilians to demonstrate their loyalty; these atrocities then create fears of revenge and accountability which discourage the younger members from defecting.
The Lord's Resistance Movement (LRM) operates as the group's external political wing; but it is known that the LRM has close to no influence on the LRA and is not authorized to speak on its behalf. Currently the LRM is based in Kenya.

 

 

Leadership

The leadership of the LRA is closely related to the figure of Joseph Kony. Kony was born in 1961 in Odek, in the southeastern Gulu district, to a family of peasant farmers. He dropped out of school after six years of primary education and became a traditional healer like his father and brother. In 1987 he joined the UPDA’s Major Benjamin Apia’s “black battalion” in Gulu district as a “spiritual mobilizer”. Kony reportedly claims that he is guided by God to save the Acholis, that he has spiritual visions, and that he is possessed by a variety of spirits who guide the LRA strategy. However, he rarely speaks publicly of the spiritual aspect of his struggle, and elaborates little when asked. These spiritual powers are believed to be genuine by many LRA members and instill fear and respect.
The issuance of arrest warrants for five of LRA’s “senior leaders” by the International Criminal Court provide clues about the remaining leadership of the movement. The warrants include Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen.
Raska Lukwiya was killed in battle by the UPDF in 2006.
 

External aid/Third party involvement

The government of Sudan is widely said to have provided support to the LRA in the form of delivering military material (mainly small supplies of small arms), training, and assistance in setting up bases in southern Sudan. The animosity between the Sudan and Ugandan governments has led to mutual accusations of support for a rebel force through which each government wages war by proxy. Indeed, it is alleged that the Ugandan government supported the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and that Khartoum retaliated by deciding to assist the LRA. Allegedly, the LRA has since engaged in fighting the SPLA on behalf of the Sudanese regime.
The support from Sudan’s government was a turning point that allowed the LRA to drastically expand its capacity. The aid supplied from (approximately) 1993 to 2000 created a renaissance of the movement. In March 1994, the movement multiplied its military operations and led heavier attacks. In 1999, relations between Kampala and Khartoum improved, leading to a decrease in the intensity of the support to the LRA. This coincided with the end of the civil war in Sudan; a sign of this rapprochement was the signature in 2002 of an agreement granting Uganda’s armed forces the authorization to take military action against LRA sanctuaries in southern Sudan. In July 2004, the collaboration between both governments shifted as Khartoum authorized, in a protocol, Ugandan forces to cross the so-called “red line,” located about 120 kilometers from the Uganda-Sudanese border, beyond which the army was not previously allowed. The U.S. State Department suggests in its most recent Country Reports on Terrorism (2006) that the LRA does not seem to benefit from Khartoum’s support anymore.
In fact, since July 2006, Khartoum’s involvement in the conflict has changed, as southern Sudan's Vice-President has acted as a mediator for the peace talks between Kampala and the LRA.

 

 

External effects of the NSAG's armed activities

The conflict between the LRA and the Ugandan government has contributed to the erosion of relations between Uganda and some of its neighboring countries. Diplomatic relations were cut off with Sudan in 1995 after mutual accusations of support to proxy militias, but re-established in 2000 (see above section “External Aid / Third Party Involvement). In addition, The LRA’s settlement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in late 2005 triggered an escalation of tensions between the governments of Uganda and the DRC. In particular, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni threatened that the Ugandan army would cross the DRC - Ugandan border if Congolese authorities did not expel the LRA from its territory.
Population displacement has not had major effects outside the borders of Uganda, as most displaced persons have stayed within the country’s territory. However, there have been higher numbers of displaced persons reports within southern Sudan, particularly around Yei, in late 2006, early 2007.
 

Funding

Little is known about the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)’s current funding. The long history of supplies coming from Sudan was, from 1993 to 2000, a viable alternative to direct funding but it is now claimed to have ended (see above-section “External Aid / Third Party Involvement). The looting of food and valuables from rural populations constitutes a current source of funding that allows the LRA to meet basic needs. Frank Van Acker hypothesizes that: “…the rebellion could tap into the economic and political resources of a large diaspora of Acholi with a history of strained relations with the Museveni government.” Indeed, in the past. some exiles in the UK have attempted to collect cash donations for the Lord’s Resistance Movement. Distinctive from other conflicts in the region, few of northern Uganda’s resources could be sold for arms and sustain the LRA.
 

Relationship with the international community

As of December 5 2001, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is on the Terrorist Exclusion List and on the Other Terrorist Groups List of the US government. The lists are ancillary to the Foreign Terrorist Organizations List.

Books

• Allen, Tim (2006), Trial Justice: the International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army (London: Zed Books).
• Balencie, J-M & de la Grange, A. (2005), Les Nouveaux Mondes rebelles (Paris: éditions Michalon).
• Behrend, H. (1999), Alice Lakwena & the Holy Spirits (Oxford: OUP)
• German, Richard & Taylor, Elizabeth (2004), “Uganda," in Szajkowski, Bogdan (ed) Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World 492 (London: John Harper Publishing).

Articles and Chapters

• Doom, Ruddy & Vlassenroot, K., “Kony’s Message: a New Koine? The Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda," 98 390 African Affairs (1999), at 5-36.
• Lamwaka, Caroline, “Civil War and the Peace Process in Uganda 1986-1997," 4 2 East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights (1998), 139, available at link
• Piquemal, Leslie, “La guerre au nord de l’Ouganda: une ‘solution militaire’ sans issue ?," 1 209 Afrique contemporaine (2004), at 141-161.
• James Bevan, ‘Fuelling Fear.’ in Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business (2006) Oxford University Press. pp. 273-293

Reports and resolutions of intergovernmental organizations

• International Criminal Court, Warrant of Arrest Unsealed Against Five LRA Commanders, 14 October 2005, Press Release ICC-20051014-110-En, available at link
• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Division of External Relations (2006), The State of the World’s Refugees 2006 (Oxford: OUP).
• United Nations Security Council, Document (3 October 2005) S/2005/620, available at link

 

Governmental reports

• US Embassy in Kampala & US Agency for International Development Mission in Kampala (1997), Kampala, Gersony, R., The Anguish of Northern Uganda, available at link
• US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, Washington DC, 30 April 2007, available at link
• US Department of State, Pattern on Global Terrorism 2003: Appendix C – background information on other terrorist groups, Washington DC, 29 April 2004, available at link
• US Department of State, Terrorist Exclusion List, Washington DC, 15 November 2002, available at link

 

Reports of think tanks and non-governmental organizations

• IISS Armed Conflict Database, Non State Armed Groups, Uganda (LRA), available at link
• Liu Institute for Global Issues & Human Rights and Peace Centre Makerere University (2003), The Hidden War: the forgotten people: war in Acholiland and it's ramifications for peace and security in Uganda, available at link
• Institute for Security Studies, Lomo, Zachary & Hovil, Lucy (2004), Behind the Violence: the war in northern Uganda (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies), also available at link
• Institute of Development Policy and Management, Van Acker, Frank (2003), Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army: the new order no one ordered (Antwerp: University of Antwerp).
• Conciliation Resources, Nyeko, B. & Lucima O., ‘Profiles of the Parties of the Conflict,' in Protacted Conflict, Elusive Peace: initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda, Accord Publication Series N.11, 2002, available at link
• International Crisis Group (2006), A Strategy for Ending Northern Uganda’s Crisis, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N.35, 11 January 2006, available at link
• International Crisis Group (2007), Northern Uganda Peace Process: The Need to Maintain Momentum, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N.46, 14 September 2007, available at link
• International Crisis Group (2004), Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict, Africa Report N.77, 14 April 2004, available at link
• International Crisis Group (2006), Peace in Northern Uganda?, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N.41, 13 September 2006, available at link
  
   

Press Information (in chronological order)

• “Counting the Gains, Losses of Juba Peace Talks," The Monitor, 9 March 2008, available at link
• “Kampala and Khartoum Resume Ties in August," The East African, 16 July 2001, available at link
• “LRA an International Problem," New Vision, 18 November 2005, available at link.
• “LRA rebels back in Garamba Park," The New Vision, 27 March 2007, available at link
• “Uganda army ‘kills senior rebel’," BBC News, 13 August 2006, available at link
• “Uganda Cuts Ties with Sudan," The Associated Press, 23 April 1995.
• “Uganda: Juba Talks Close as LRA Tables Fresh Demands," The Monitor, 2 March 2008, available at link
• “Uganda: LRA peace talks kick off," IRIN, 14 July 2006, available at link
• “Uganda, Rebel LRA Signs Permanent Ceasefire Agreement in Juba," Sudan Tribune, 24 February 2008, available at link
• “Ugandan leader breaks silence," BBC News, 28 June 2006, available at link.
   

Interviews

Internet resources

• Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, Lord’s Resistance Army, 22 May 2002, available at link
• Institute for Security Studies, Uganda – Security Information, available at link
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), available at link
   

Statements of the armed group

Agreements involving armed groups