Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AMB) 



Origins

The exact origins of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (hereinafter “AMB”) are difficult to ascertain due to the organization's very loose structure. As such, there are various stories about the AMB’s origins, most of which situate the group's origins in the West Bank, the location of the majority of the group's operational strength since its founding. One authoritative account attributes the AMB’s founding to a group of activists in Balata Camp near the city of Nablus in the West Bank in September 2000. However, other sources report that the armed group was formed in al-Bireh on 16 October 2000 by about fifty men.
Another account states that the Brigades were created on 2 November 2000 in the Gaza Strip, even if the name of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades was adopted later.
Lastly, other sources state that the movement was created in Gaza and Hebron, not in Balata. Regarding the reasons behind the AMB's creation, sources suggests that the group was formed by grassroots Fatah activists aimed at countering the growing political popularity of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, both of which had launched armed attacks against Israeli targets in the early days of the second Intifadah.
The extent of the links between AMB and Fatah is rather unclear. Even though several analysts present AMB as Fatah’s armed wing, top Palestinian Authority (hereinafter “the PA”) leaders have denied such an allegation. Sources have confirmed this claim, stating that Fatah - as an organisation - never controlled AMB; however, the same source adds that local Fatah leaders and certain individuals in the PA did exercise some control over AMB on the basis of the financial and material aid they provided. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that the leadership demographic of the two movements differ significantly: while AMB was founded and run by grassroot leaders, many of which were leaders during the first Intifadah and who were mostly marginalised from formal political positions in the PA; the leadership of Fatah, who were running the PA at the time of the AMB’s founding, were mostly drawn from the PLO leadership in exile in Tunis until their repatriation in 1994.

AMB also stood in opposition to many of the PA’s strategies when it came to dealing with Israel, its internal governance practices in the areas of the West Bank and Gaza governed by the PA under the Oslo Accords, and the leadership and direction of Fatah and the PA by the “old guard,” the founders of the Palestinian national movement and other leaders of various guerrilla movements who have lived most of their political lives in exile.

With the onset of the second Intifada, the AMB sought to fulfil what it saw as Fatah’s core objectives through armed resistance, while Fatah leadership, who was running the PA, continued to seek a negotiated settlement with Israel. Additionally, command and control of the group was decentralised. According to local sources, it was clear that as of 2002, Arafat did not have control over AMB cells, but did command influence. However, as Israeli assassinations of cell leaders escalated and younger, inexperienced, and less well-connected leaders took over, Arafat’s influence also waned over individual cells.
 

Location / Main area of operation

AMB is only present in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The places were they have the highest number of members are the West Bank cities of Nablus and Ramallah, the refugee camps in the surrounding areas, as well as the Governate of Jenin,   where Zacharia Zubeidi, one of the most high profile al-Aqsa commanders, resides and has recently agreed to demobilize and disarm.
The AMB limited its armed operations against Israeli military and settler targets in the West Bank and Gaza until early 2002.  However, since then, this armed group has expanded their military actions to Israeli territory.  While some accounts attribute the shift to Israel Defence Forces assassination of AMB leader Raed Karmi on 14 January 2002, other accounts suggest that the AMB was concerned about the growing amount of popular support for Hamas’ suicide bombing campaign against Israeli civilians, and felt it needed to emulate this strategy in order to maintain and gain popularity.  
 


Objectives

AMB has two objectives: the first one is the resistance against the Israeli occupation and the fight for the creation of a Palestinian state.  Specifically, this armed group asks for a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, as well as the recognition of the right of return for the Palestinian refugees. This objective is embraced by the mainstream AMB cells.  However, some marginal cells also have claimed their opposition to the existence of Israel.
AMB’s second objective is to fight against corruption in Fatah’s movement and to demand for reforms. For instance, during the second Intifada, members of this group demonstrated against corruption, and kidnapped alleged corrupted Fatah officials, as well as made public statements and raids against the Palestinian Authority. However, there have been allegations that certain members of this movement have used it for achieving personal gains or for gaining influence within the Fatah movement.
 

Number of Members


According to the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF), the AMB has, as of the beginning of 2007, 800 full-time operatives. The same source adds that approximately 30% of these operatives are also paid recruits of the PA security organisations, particularly Preventive Security and General Intelligence.

 

Type : Transnational

AMB is a transnational non-state armed group since its armed operations occurred in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.

Conflict Status : Active

AMB carried out several armed attacks through 2007.  For example, on 10 April 2007, this armed group launched a rocket attack in the Gaza Strip,   and on 17 April 2007, AMB members claimed responsibility for a shooting attack in the West Bank. In April 2007, in a communiqué, AMB members reaffirmed their support of the armed resistance.  However, they added that if a ceasefire is struck between Hamas and Israel, then AMB would also abide by it.
Some AMB cadres have been demobilised, disarmed, and reintegrated into the Palestinian security sector (PSS).  In late 2005, a process was initiated to integrate AMB cadres, but this was suspended with the Hamas electoral win in 2006.  Recent efforts in the summer and fall of 2007 to amnesty Israeli-“wanted” members of the AMB saw the successful integration of approximately 400 cadres into the PSS and suspension of their AMB activities. Integration into the PSS is seen by AMB cadres as recognition of their contributions to the struggle against Israel.  
Finally, the AMB has conducted joint operations with the armed wings of the PFLP and Hamas on occasion.  Operational cooperation appears to have ceased after Hamas’s electoral win in 2006.
 

Structure of the organization

This movement is constituted by a set of cells in Palestinian cities.  According to most analysts, these cells lack a central command and control, are self-financed, and do not have direct relations with Fatah as an organization.    Each cell is, according to the majority of sources, organised around a local leader.   
Nevertheless, Israeli and the U.S. administrations present a different account.  According to the two countries, AMB is a structured movement with a clear hierarchy and were under Yasser Arafat’s control before his death.  
 

Leadership

As analysed in the previous section, according to most accounts AMB is a non-structured movement without a central leadership and thus, there are several local leaders who independently run their cells.  Due to the ongoing conflict, local leaders are regularly killed or arrested in Israeli military operations and are then replaced by new, younger, cadre leaders.
However, according to Israel, AMB has a central leadership: Yasser Arafat before his death and Marwan Barghouti before his detention. Israel claims AMB was created in order to pressure the country while avoiding any link with the Palestinian Authority. The U.S also claimed that all the actions of this movement were linked to Arafat.   
As analysed above, the extent of the links between AMB and Fatah is rather unclear.  In addition to aforementioned information,   it should be noted that while AMB cadres in Gaza were loyal to Mohammed Dahlan, who stood in opposition to Arafat during the latter years of his life, AMB cadres in the West Bank maintained their loyalty to Arafat. Barghouti’s alleged role in AMB is equally unclear; for instance, the communiqués issued by al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades do not mention him as a leader of the movement. For its part, Israel blames Tawfiq al Tirawi, the head of the Palestinian General Intelligence, and Fuad al Chubaki,   to be also prominent leaders of AMB; both were arrested by Israel in 2002.

 

External aid/Third party involvement

Most sources state that the Lebanese movement Hizbullah and Iran have provided funding to AMB, in particular to its northern West Bank cells. A press source cites a senior member of AMB recognising that Hizbullah has provided financial support to AMB since shortly after the outbreak of the second Intifadah in September 2000. Israel and the U.S. also have named Hizbullah, as well as Syria and Iran, in helping AMB.  Specifically, they maintain that Hizbullah would provide military assistance and funding to AMB, as well as use the organization to launch attacks against Israel. The Palestinian Authority also alleged that Hizbullah has abetted AMB to attack Israel.  
There is, however, an alternative account suggesting that funding from Hizbollah and Iran - which was directed to AMB northern West Bank cells in particular - became problematic as the funds were tied to specific operations, which pressured the AMB to move beyond its own strategy.  
 

External effects of the NSAG's armed activities

No information is available in this respect.

 

Funding

AMB funding comes from various sources, both internal and external.
Regarding internal sources, an authoritative source reports that the AMB received indirect funds from Arafat in order to co-opt and control various AMB cells and leaders rather than to finance armed operations. However, because Fatah refused to provide regular support, AMB cells sought other sources of funding.  Some cells engaged in criminal activity in order to fund their activities, particularly as younger cell leaders took control.  Additionally, individual PA security organisation leaders and Fatah leaders were known to provide patronage funds to individual AMB leaders and cells in order to obtain political influence.  
Moreover, it is reported that the AMB also received funds from Palestine Islamic Jihad.   Israel claims that AMB has also received funding for the Palestinian Authority (PA), specifically citing the operation “Defence Shield” in 2002 in the main West Bank cities: Israeli security forces found letters from AMB to the PA asking for funds. However, the PA and Fatah movement denied the allegation. Similarly, a European Commission mandated  an investigation of allegations of misuse of European funds by the Palestinian Authority; this investigation did not find evidence that these funds were used to finance "terrorists." As to external sources, most analysts consider that the Lebanese movement Hizbullah and Iran have provided funding to AMB, in particular to its northern West Bank cells. Specifically, Israel and the U.S.   named Iran for its financial support to AMB.

 

Relationship with the international community

AMB is listed as a terrorist organization by both the European Union and the United States.

Books

  • Balencies, J-M & A. de La Grange (2005), “Les Brigades des Martyrs d’al-Aqsa," in Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelles at 94 (Paris : éditions Michalon).
  • Baud, Jacques (2003), Encyclopédie des terrorismes et violences politiques (Paris: Lavauzelle).
  • Cordesman, Anthony H. (2005), The Israeli-Palestinian War: Escalating to Nowhere (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), available at link.

 

Articles and Chapters

  • Usher, Graham, “Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On," 32.2 Journal of Palestine Studies (2003), at 21-41.
  • Legrain, Jean-François, “Les Phalanges des martyrs d'al-Aqsa en mal de leadership national," 176 Maghreb-Machrek (2003), at 11-34.

 

Reports and resolutions of intergovernmental organizations

  • EU Council, Common Position 2006/380/CFSP of 29 May 2006, Official Journal of the European Communities L 144/25, 31.5.2006.

Governmental reports

  • CRS Report for Congress, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, Washington DC, 25 August 2006, available at link
  • Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, EU funding to the Palestinian Authority: Commissioner Patten responds to a letter from Mr. Laschet, MEP, Brussel, 21 January  2003, available at link.
  • Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, Statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee on EU budgetary assistance to the Palestinian Authority, 19 June  2002, available at link.
  • Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Israel v. Marwan Barghouti- Ruling by Judge Zvi Gurfinkel, 12 December 2002, available at link.
  • Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism, Washington DC, 28 April 2006, available at link.
  • U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Fact Sheet Office of Counterterrorism, Washington, DC, 11 October 2005, available at   link (last visited 09 March, 2007).


 

Reports of think tanks and non-governmental organizations

  • Council of Foreign Relations, “Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Palestinian nationalists," 31 October 2005, available at www.cfr.org/publication/9127.
  • International Crisis Group, Who Governs the West Bank? Palestinian Administration under Israeli Occupation, Middle East Report N°32, 28 September 2004, available at link.
  • The Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF) and the Graduate Institute for Development Studies (2006), Government Change and Security Sector Governance: Palestinian Public Perceptions, available at link.
     

Press Information (in chronological order)

  • “Arafat’s New Army,” Yediot Aharonot, July 27, 2001.
  • “Brigades use conflict to hone deadly skills,” The Age, 12 March 2002, available at link.
  • “Secular and deadly, the rise of the Martyrs Brigades,” Salon, 19 March 2002, available at link.
  • “U.S. is unsure about role of Arafat in bomb attacks,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, 14 April 2002.
  • “Profile: Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades,” BBC News, 1 July 2003, available at link.
  • “Arafat is said to fund truce foes,” The Boston Globe, 23 July 2003. 
  • “Fatah denies militant “funding,” BBC News, 8 November 2003.
  • “Arafat accepte une refonte des services de sécurité après des enlèvements,” Agence France-Presse, 17 July 2004.
  • “Analysis: For the first time, the pressure is from within," The Guardian, 19 July 2004.
  • “Gaza turmoil as leaders battle for power,” The Times, 19 July 2004.
  • “Ces groupes qui jettent le trouble au sein du Fatah,” L’Humanite, 20 July 2004.
  • “Arafat faces generational crisis,” Christian Science Monitor, 21 July 2004.
  • “Al-Aqsa sets out Palestinian reform plan, disengagement deal conditions,” Al-Hayat al-Jadidah in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 27 July 2004.
  • “Palestinian Militants Face Off As Rifts Between Factions Grow,” The New York Times, 2 August 2004.
  • “Hizbullah is involved in West Bank, says Israel,” The Guardian, 15 October 2004.
  • “Les radicaux tempèrent les espoirs de paix; Les extremists islamistes du coté palestinien et les faucons du Likoud coté israélien menacent de torpiller la relance du dialogue,” Le Figaro, 10 February 2005.
  • “Al-Aqsa: We identify with Iranian remark,” Israel News, 11 June 11 2005, available at link .
  • “Hezbollah giving financial aid to Palestinian militants,” Al Hayat in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 23 July 2006.
  • “Palestinian militants fire three rockets at Israeli targets,” Ma'an News Agency in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 10 April 2007.
  • “Palestinian al-Aqsa Brigades deny differences inside Fatah, support Mahmoud Abbas,” al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Website in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 14 April 2007.
  • “Al-Aqsa Brigades claims responsibility for wounding 4 Israelis near Ramallah,” Ma’an News Agency in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 17 April 2007.
  • “Palestinian Gunmen Agree to Amnesty Deal,” USA Today, June 2007, available at link

 

Interviews

Internet resources

  • Jean-François Legrain, Internet et histoire : les Brigades des martyrs d'Al-Aqsa, Les pages Internet comme sources de l’histoire du temps présent, available at link.
  • Nativ Online, From Clandestine Army to Guardians of Terror: The Palestinian Security Forces and the Second Intifada, available at link.
  • The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Terrorist Supporting States, available at link .
  • The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, The “Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades” available at link
     

Statements of the armed group

  • Byanat al-Kataeb (translation into English: The communiqués of the Brigades) link.



 

Agreements involving armed groups