The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) 

Origins

The NDFB was created on 3 October 1986. Originally called the Bodo Security Force (BSF), it was renamed the National Democratic Front of Bodoland 25 November 1994. The Bodo – also called Boro - constitute one of the largest tribal people of the Brahmaputra valley of Assam. Analysts agree that the Bodo have felt their identity threatened by many factors, including: an increased sentiment of cultural assimilation; the immigration of non-Bodos into their traditional areas; and an increased economic marginalization.
This feeling of a threat to their identity fuelled the creation of a Bodo movement for a “homeland,” carried by several organizations and armed groups. The All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU), created in 1967, started the movement for a separate Bodoland state within India. It worked along with the Plains Tribals Council of Assam (PTCA), created by the Bodo leadership as a means to pursue a union territory for the Bodos. However, the ABSU found that the efforts of the PTCA were insufficient and thus,withdrew its support to the organization in 1979.
During the 1980's, the Bodo movement was very active through the organization of strikes, railway blockages, hunger strikes, etc. The students also supported the mass movement, led in Assam by the All Assam Students Union (AASU), for the detection and the eviction of non-Assamese from the state and for a greater level of autonomy. Many believed a new era of tranquillity would be ushered in with the signing of the Assam Accord in 1985, which gave the AASU more representation in the formation of the new government. However, these merely served to fuel the fires, as the government expressed that it would not change its policies towards the Bodo tribes.

By the mid-1980’ the movement became more radical with the creation of armed groups. In 1986, the BSF was created under the leadership of Ranjan Daimary and began launching attacks against. Similarly, the armed wing of the ABSU, the Bodo Volunteer Force (BVF) started to carry out insurgency campaigns; as a result, rivalry developed between the BSF and the BVF and persists today. The BSF was renamed to the National Democratic Front of Bodoland in 1994. The BVF was similarly renamed to the Bodo Liberation Tiger Front (BLTF).

 

Location / Main area of operation

According to some sources the NDFB has temporary camps in Meghalya and in Arunachal Pradesh. The group allegedly also has camps in Bangladesh, Myanmar and Bhutan. Its area of influence is mainly the Bodo-inhabited region in Northern Assam on the Indo-Bhutan border in the districts of Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Nagaon, Nalbari, Barpeta, and Kamrup. The NDFB has also been active in the Garo Hills and Jaintia Hills region of Meghalaya, and in the Karin Anglong district in Assam.

Objectives

The NDFB adopted a constitution 10 March 1998; the following are the objectives listed in the constitution:

• “Liberate Bodoland from the Indian expansionism and occupation;
• Free the Bodo nation from the colonialist exploitation, oppression and domination;
• Establish a Democratic Socialist Society to promote Liberty, Equality and Fraternity; and
• Uphold the integrity and sovereignty of Bodoland.”
  Others have summarized the group’s principle objective as separation from India and the creation of a fully independent country for the Bodo people. Through the above objectives, the NDFB demands an independent socialist Bodo state, free from outside presence and exploitation from mainland India or Assam. It was with the BSF that the demands for a separate national state of Bodoland were first expressed.

The other demand of the NDFB is regarding the script of the Bodo language. Currently the Bodo language is written in Devnagri script; the NDFB, whose members are mostly Christians, prefer to use the Roman script.
In order to achieve these goals, in parallel of its wide-ranging insurgency campaign, the NDFB launched a violent campaign of ethnic cleansing and religious persecution against non-Bodo communities.

 

Number of Members

Sources vary on the number of the NDFB cadres. Before the crackdown on the NDFB camps in Bhutan in 2003, it was reported that the group had around 3,500 cadres, of which 1,500 were fully trained and armed. In 2005-2006, after the Bhutanese counterinsurgency operations – leading to waves of arrests, internecine killings and surrenders - the group allegedly had between 1000 and 2000 cadres. Currently there are approximately 30 women among the NDFB cadres; the NDFB issued calls in 2002 for women and students to become active participants in the struggle.

Type : National

The NDFB is a national NSAG, since it has been limiting its military operations to Indian territory.

Conflict Status : Active

The nature of the conflict that involves the NDFB is quite complex as it can be divided into three levels:
1 NDFB vs. the state
2 NDFB vs. other tribes
3 NDFB vs. non-tribal groups

The NDFB regularly conducts acts of insurgency, targeting the symbols of governance. The group has often participated in acts of sabotage, such as the planting of explosives on railway tracks, trains, as well as hit-and-run tactics against the Indian security forces. The NDFB has targeted non-Bodo communities in the western and lower regions of Assam, for instance, Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Darrang, Barpeta and parts of Nalbari. The Bodo communities have also been targeted. The NDFB reportedly has been killing former cadres of the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), but also members of other organizations like the ABSU. In 2003, the “Operation All Clear” was carried out against the camps of several northeast Indian groups by the Bhutan military which considerably weakened the NDFB. The casualties and loss in weapons reported was the “highest among the three insurgent groups in Bhutan.”
The group did not actively engage in any peace talks until 2004. A six-month ceasefire was unilaterally announced by the NDFB on 8 October 2004. However, the government did not reciprocate the ceasefire, as it continued to use considerable force against the NDFB. Meanwhile, the Assam government released Giovanna Basumatary, the NDFB General Secretary, in order to open a channel of communication with the group’s top leadership reportedly based in Bangladesh. Discussions followed, which resulted in the signing of a tripartite ceasefire agreement in May 2005 with the NDFB, the Government of India and the government of Assam. This agreement stipulated that the Centre, the State Governments, and the NDFB would stop operations for a period of twelve months, starting 1 June 2005. Furthermore in accordance with the agreement, the NDFB cadres were supposed to remain within the boundaries of their “designated camps.”
However, the ceasefire has been marred by several problems. Allegations of violation of this “Memorandum of Suspension of Operations” have been made by both sides. Furthermore, only 200 NDFB cadres have remained within the confines of three of the camps established; consequently, approximately 700 cadres have been moving freely in the countryside. Both sides accuse each other of lengthening the peace process for diverse reasons.
Despite these obstacles, on 27 May 2007, the Indian government and the NDFB met in New Delhi where both sides stated that they would lengthen the ceasefire agreement. NDFB General Secretary Basumatary stated “the cease-fire has been extended, that talks were held in a cordial atmosphere and the talks for political issues will go on, it will continue. The peace process will continue.”
 

Structure of the organization

There is limited information available regarding the military and political structure of the group. Its armed wing is called the “Boroland Army” While the political front is represented by the People’s Democratic Party. However, other sources refer to the PDP as being “defunct.”

 

Leadership

The leadership of the NDFB has been continually changing since 2002 as some of the principle leaders have either been arrested or have surrendered to the authorities. Thus, there is a void in the leadership of the organization. The NDFB is principally led by the “Chairman” and founder Ranjan Daimary, also known as D R Nabla and his role in the organization is reportedly the most significant. Dhiren Boro is the ‘Vice-President” while the Bodoland Army is led by “Lt. Col” B Susranggra.

External aid/Third party involvement

The Assam Chief Minister Prafulla Kumar Mahanta stated in July 2000 that he had evidence pointing to the fact that the Bhutan Government was in cooperation with the NDFB and other organizations. Before the 2003 crackdown on the camps by the Bhutan military, it was reported that there were 30 NDFB camps in Bhutan. The intensive counterinsurgency campaign against the group in 2003 led to the destruction of many NDFB camps; however, it was alleged in 2005 that the NDFB was trying to rebuild its Bhutanese bases. Furthermore, in 2000, the Chief Minister of Assam claimed that the NDFB was channelling money through the “Bhutanese diplomatic pouch to their leaders based in Southeast Asian capitals.”
It is reported that the NDFB has received backing from the Bangladesh government and that it uses Bangladesh as a transit point for arms. The Indian authorities recovered a list indicatingthat the location of two camps in the Khagrachari and Tangail districts of Bangladesh. Bangladesh has also allegedly sheltered several members of the NDFB. The NDFB reportedly also appealed to China to give some of its member’s shelter during the military crackdown in December 2003; however, it is currently unclear whether such sanctuary was given. The Indian government has also expressed concern over the fact that the NDFB has trained with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) cadres in Pakistan. The connection was confirmed by the NDFB Vice-President Boro in January 2003. It is also reported that the NDFB has camps in Burma/Myanmar.
The NDFB uses partnerships with other NSAGs to its advantage as the group endeavours to have “closer relation, mutual understanding and mutual cooperation among…struggling forces of the Northeast region” with the objective of fighting “against the common enemy i.e. India. ” The NDFB has previously collaborated with the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), a group that opposes non-Assamese domination in the state. In 1999, the ULFA and the NDFB created a committee that enabled them to establish a united armed front, through which they have launched joint attacks. It has also been reported that the ULFA and NDFB with the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO) formed a group called the Gorkha Bhutan Liberation Front (GBLF) in 2003. Moreover, the NDFB and the Dima Halam Daoga (DHD) are alleged to have engaged in activities of extortion together.

Sources also claim that the NDFB and Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) shared bases located in Mymensingh, one of the districts of the Dhaka division. These two groups have allegedly collaborated in the taxing of coal exports to Bangladesh or abduction of people for ransom.
The NDFB has also established a working relationship with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah (NSCN-IM), a group in neighbouring Nagaland. There are also sources that report that there is a nexus between the NDFB and the NSCN-Khaplang.
 

 

 

External effects of the NSAG's armed activities

The conflict with the NDFB has taken its toll on the civilian population in north-eastern state of Assam. The attacks launched by the NDFB against non-Bodo people - mainly Santhals and Muslims - have contributed to the problem of internally displaced people in Assam. In May 1996, more than 250,000 persons were displaced as a result of Bodo large-scale attacks on ethnic Santhals. In 1997, most of these refugees returned to their homes but were again forced to flee after renewed fighting involving the NDFB in 1998. While thousands have returned to their homes, retaliation from Santhals and other non-Bodo communities has, in turn, resulted in significant displacement of the Bodo population from areas where they are a minority.
The situation in the district has improved considerably since 2003 and many of the displaced people have begun returning home. However in 2005, more than 100,000 Santhals remained displaced in 32 camps. An unknown number of Bodos are also living in three relief camps. Muslims of Bengali descent also have been victims of attacks and were forced to flee in similar camps. Approximately 25,000 Muslims were yet to be rehabilitated.
These ethnic clashes and the attacks against the non Bodo communities have led to the creation of several other armed groups representing an additional threat for the security in the region.

 

Funding

The NDFB allegedly funds itself through kidnapping for ransoms, extortion, and looting; tea companies in the districts of Derange and Sonitpur, for example, appear to be regularly looted by the NDFB. The NDFB also collects a “Bodoland tax,” from the residents in the Lower Assam region. Another source of financing for the NDFB comes through the illegal selling of wood.

 

Relationship with the international community

There is little information available on the relationship between the NDFB and the international community. The NDFB does not seem to be very visible on the international scene. The group itself states on its website that “The struggle of NDFB and the Boro people and their sufferings are little known to the international community.”
The group seems to believe that the international community and, more particularly the U.N., should play a role in the settlement of the conflict. In a recent interview, the leader of the NDFB stated that the NSAG would “laud the initiatives of the international community leading into the recognition of the Boro people as a part of international community and the pressure put on India to de-colonize the Boroland and the entire Region. We would like the international community to draw attention of the Special Political and De-colonization Committee of the United Nations.” In 2001, the group had appealed to the mediation of the UN as a precondition for peace talks. However, the involvement of international NGOs in the conflict in Northeast India has been limited. Ajai Sahni has described it as being at an “incipient stage,” largely due to the fact that the Indian government tried to discourage international interventions, whether indirect or direct.
 

Books

• Chaklader Snehamoy (2004), Sub-Regional Movement in India, (Kolkata: KP Bagchi and Co).
• Smith Martin (1999) Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (Dhaka: The University Press).

 

Articles and Chapters

• Kumar, Praveen. “External Linkages and Internal Security: Assessing Bhutan’s Operation All Clear.” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28, No.3, July-September 2004.
• Egreteau, Renaud. Instability at the Gate: India’s Northeast and its External Connections. Occasional Paper, No. 16. France: French Research Institute in India, 2006.
• Latimer, William Scott. “What Can the United States Learn from India to Counter Terrorism?” Naval Postgraduate School. March, 2004, available at,
  link
• Sudhir, Jacob George. “The Bodo Movement in Assam” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No. 10 October. (1994), 878-892
   

Reports and resolutions of intergovernmental organizations

• Alert 2007. “Reports on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peace-building.” January 2007, available at link
• Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 “India.” 2004, available at link
• Global Security Org. “Indian Separatist Groups Appeal China to Grant Temporary Shelter.” 29, December 2003, available at
  link rity.org/military/library/news/2003/12/mil-031229-irna01.htm
• Global Security Org. “The National Democratic Front of Bodoland.”, 2007, available at link
• Jane’s Foreign Report. 2005.”India’s Counterinsurgent Policy,” 28 April.
• Kumar, Arnaud. 2006. “Assam: Ex-Rebels Turn Kingmake.” South Asia Analysis Group, 7 June 2006, available at
  link

 

Governmental reports

• Eastern Command. “National Democratic Front of Bodoland.”, 2006, available at link
   

Reports of think tanks and non-governmental organizations

• Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. “Child Soldiers: CRC Country Briefs.” 30 May 2003, available at,
• East-West Center. Insurgencies in India’s Northeast: Conflict, Co-option and Change. East-West Center, July 2007, available at,
  link
• Geneva Call and the Program for the Study of International Organizations. “Armed Non State Actors and Landmines.” 2006, available at link
• Institute for Conflict Management “National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB).” 2001, available at,
  link
• International Campaign to Ban Landmines. “Bhutan,” 2002, available at
  link
• International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Bhutan,” available at link
• International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database. “Non State Armed Groups,” 2003, available at link
• Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. 2006
  link
• MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. “National Democratic Front of Bodoland,” 2007, available at link
• National Democratic Front of Bodoland. “News”http://www.geocities.com/ndfb2001/news.htm
• North Democratic Front of Bodoland. “The Constitution.”http://www.geocities.com/ndfb2001/the-constitution.htm 
• Refugee Watch. “Refugee Watch.” Issue No. 23, December, 2004, available at link
• South Asia Terrorism Portal “Survey of Conflicts and Resolution in India’s Northeast,” 2001, available at link
• South Asia Terrorism Portal. “National Democratic Front of Bodoland.,” 2001, available at link
• South Asia Terrorism Portal, “South Asia Intelligence Review Weekly Assessments & Briefings.” Volume 1, No. 25, 6 January 6, 2003, available at link
• South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Assam Assessment 2006.,” 2006, available at link
• South Asia Terrorism Portal. “South Asia Intelligence Review: Weekly Assessments & Briefings.” Volume 5, No. 46, 28 May 28, 2007, available at,
  link
• South Asia Terrorism Portal., “Incidents Involving National Democratic Front of Bodoland.,” 2007, available at, link
• Terrorism Knowledge Base. “National Democratic Front of Bodoland” 30 September 2007, available at link
  
   

Press Information (in chronological order)

• “Nine Killed in Assam Attack,” BBC News, August 5 2001, available at link
• “Create BTC by August or we shall resume Bodoland stir: ABSU,” The Sentinel, 6 August 2002, available at link
• “Unhindered Terror,” Frontline, July 5, 2002, available at link
• “Assam Village Attack leaves 23 Dead,” BBC News. October 27 2002, available at link
• “India In Truce with Bodo Leaders,” BBC News, 25 May 2003, available at link
• ‘‘Territories of Fear’,’ Frontline, Volume 20, Issue 24. 5 December 2003, available at link
• “Indian Rebels Offer to Quit Bhutan.,” BBC News, 17 December, 2003, available at link
• “Militant Groups.,” The Frontline, Volume 21 - Issue 01, 3-16 January 2004, available at link
• “India Frets over Pakistan Bangladesh-Nexus.,”Asia Times, 6 March 2004, available at link
• “Glimmer of Hope for Starving Refugees in India’s Northeast.,” One World South Asia, 10 June 2004, available at link
• “Rebels Strike Terror in Indian Northeast, Kill 59,” People’s Daily Online, 4 October 2004, available at link
• “Gogoi Welcome Truce Call,” The Hindu, October 15 2004, available at link
• “NDFB Offer Accepted,” The Tribune. 15 October 2004 available at link#2
• “NDFB Leaders Desert Sinking Ship,” The Tribune, 16 October 2004, available at link
• “North East: Assam: Historic Record Accord with Bodo,” India News Online 30 May 2005, available at link
• “An Uneasy Calm,” Frontline, Volume 22-Issue 14, July 2 2005, available at link
• “The View from New Delhi,” Frontline, 3 March, 2006, available at link
• “Submit demands to Center, Militants told,” The Hindu 28 April, 2006
  link
• “A Day at the Rebel Camp,” Kangla Online, 15 July 2006, available at, link
• “Police Skeptical of BSF’s Claim on UANF Camps,” Shillong Times, 3 September 2006, available at link (last visited December 17, 2007).
• “Fresh ban on 2 Assam outfits Truce with NDFB extended,” The Tribune, 28 May 2007, available at link
• “In Conflict Zone, A Battle to Secure Education,” India Together 14 August 2007, available at link

 

Interviews

Internet resources

Statements of the armed group

Agreements involving armed groups