The Chin National Front (CNF)/ 

Origins

The Chin National Front (CNF) and its armed wing, the Chin National Army (CNA), were funded in the late 1980’s to fight for the political rights of the Chin ethnic group.
The Chins, also known as the Zomis, are said to be a Sino-Tibetan people of Mongolian descent. They lived in an independent territory, “Chinland,” until they were annexed by the British in 1895. Chinland, the “historical homelands of the Chin people,” is located in western Burma/Myanmar, where it borders India in the Northeast and Bangladesh in the Southeast. According to the Unrepresented Peoples and Nations Organizations (UNPO) Chinland encompasses what is currently Chin State and the Sagaing Division in Burma/Myanmar, the Mizoram and Manipur States of India, and the Chittangon Hill Tracts of Bangladesh.
With Burmese independence from Britain in 1948, the Chin territory was legally entitled to become an independent sovereign state and Chinland was among the co-founders (with Kachin, Shan and Burman representatives) of the 1947 Constitution or “Panglong Agreement,” a union based o-n equal status with other nationalities in Burma/Myanmar.  The first political organization claiming the independence of Chinland, named the Chin National Union, had already been formed in 1933 and merged into the Chin National Organization in 1957. The first uprising occurred in 1961 and gained strength in 1963 after government repression of pro-federalist Chin leaders. A military coup took place in 1962, and two years later, when it became clear that the Panglong agreement had broken down, the Chin National Organization went underground and in 1971, the Chin Democracy Party was formed. 

The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) or Government of Myanmar (formerly the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) came into power by force in 1988, as a military reaction to the ongoing pro-democracy demonstrations. The democratic uprising gave the new military regime a justification to respond by occupying Chin State with military troops. Thousands of Chins fled from Chin State, resulting in the existence of a large community-in-exile of Chin people. In this political context, the CNF was formed 20 March 1988, while the military branch of the CNF, the CNA, was formed in November 1988, a few months after the foundation of the CNF.

 

Location / Main area of operation

The CNF/CNA operates and has bases in the same areas in which the Chins are present.  It is particularly active along the Indian-Burma border and regularly crosses this frontier. According to reports, the group, which does not “control” territory in the traditional sense,  still has influence with the people in its territory of operation and has its bases inside India. Nevertheless, it has been facing greater resistance on behalf of both Indian and Burmese authorities during the last years. It has been argued, however, that the CNF/CNA still maintains some bases in Chin State.
The border between Burma/Myanmar and Mizoram Stat in India is long and largely unmonitored. When Chin refugees started flowing into Mizoram following the 1988 military crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in Burma/Myanmar, Mizoram became host to about 40,000 Chins. Within the fleeing population, there were also cadres of CNF/CNA, who set up bases on Indian territory. In 1997, the CNF/CNA allegedly had established a base in the Southern Mizoram Province of India and in 2002 they had based their operations at “Camp Victoria” in a part of Mizoram province accessible only through Burma. CNF/CNA allegedly also has representatives in Bangladesh, India, Thailand, and in the United States.
 

Objectives

The CNF/CNA’s main aim, according to the group’s official webpage, is “securing the self-determination of the Chin people and to establish [a] federal Union of Burma based on democracy and freedom.”   For this purpose, the CNF/CNA argues that the military regime needs to be overthrown with any available means, but “without prejudicing the law of civilized nations.”
Consequently, the group accepts the concept of a federal state, which would be reached through a “Tripartite Dialogue.” As its name indicates, the Tripartite Dialogue would involve three key actors “the Burman Democratic Forces, the Burmese Military and the Non-Burman Democratic Forces.” Nevertheless, the CNF/CNA appears to insist on that the right of the national states “of secession must be included in the federal constitution” (as recognized in the 1947 Panglong Agreement).
The group also strives to build stronger unity among the entire Chin nations and the people of Chinland. As a people, the Chins are extremely diverse, having among them a number of sub-ethnic tribes and dialects. Indeed, they have been labelled “the most diverse ethnic minority in Burma,” with over forty sub-groupings. Although most Chins are Christians, the CNF/CNA has stated that the CNF/CNA does not have a religious basis.

 

Number of Members

Most sources focus on the membership of the armed wing of the CNF, the CNA. The number of sources is limited, however, and mostly tend to go back to a 2002 Human Rights Watch report, which estimated the number of CNA combatants to around 500. Nevertheless, one 2005 source gives more diversified estimations: about 800 to 1,000 cadres, including some 500 actual combatants. Some sources have specified that there was a growth from the initial around 200 combatants in 1988, to some 800 CNA members in 2004.
The CNF/CNA recruits its cadres among the Chin population. The CNA has no women combatants and discourages the recruitment of women.
No information has been found on whether the splits suffered (for instance in 1999) have severely affected the membership of the organization.

 

Type : National

The CNF/CNA is a national armed group opposing the Burmese armed forces; however, though it has militarily activities principally in Burma/Myanmar, it primarily has its military camps in India. These bases have been attacked by Indian forces, but on these occasions it appears that the CNF/CNA cadres have mainly opted for leaving the camps rather than confronting the Indian armed forces.

Conflict Status : Active

In early 2008, the CNF/CNA was one of the four main ethnic armed opposition forces not to have cease-fires with the government.  Nevertheless, there appears to be little fighting in Chin State as compared to many other parts of Burma, though it has previously been documented that the fighting in Chin State is underreported. The SPDC (or Government of Burma/Myanmar) is still sending troops and is continuing to launch military offensives in the area. In response to these attacks, according to an expert quoted in a U.S. government report, the CNA has opted to operate “largely as an intelligence-gathering underground resistance, with limited ambush-type attacks against Burma Army forces.”  Consequently, the CNA is still active in Chin State, maintaining an active army and engaging in sporadic clashes with the military. Indian local state security forces have also attacked CNF/CNA camps located in India’s Mizoram State as part of an agreement between Burma/Myanmar and India.
The CNF/CNA has stated that its policy is that there should be no cease-fire with the Burmese military regime if there are no prospects for dialogue on political issues. In January 1997, however, top leaders from the Peace and Tranquillity Committee, comprised of Chin Christian pastors and leaders, proposed to the CNF/CNA to agree on a cease-fire. Since then, the Committee has been strongly encouraging the parties to initiate talks. Finally, after repeated offers from the government to talk, in March 2007 the Committee succeeded in bringing the parties together for tentative discussions. A second round of the government-CNF/CNA talks were scheduled in mid-2007, but did not take place and a cease-fire still has to be been reached.

 

Structure of the organization

The CNF (or “the party”) and the CNA are the political, respectively military wings of the movement. Though it is not totally clear how these wings collaborate or how the hierarchy is organized between them, it has also been underlined by the Chief of Staff of the CNA that “the CNA was formed as the Armed Wing of the CNF, and operated under its umbrella.”
Like many armed opposition groups in Burma/Myanmar today, the CNF’s military activities have become overshadowed by its political activities. As stated above, observers have stated that the CNF/CNA has become more of “an intelligence-gathering resistance group” than a classical rebel army. Consequently, it is possible that the power balance has been further shifted towards the political wing. In this context it is important to note that at the 2007 peace talks, the CNF delegation included commanders from the can but the delegation was led by a CNF member.
Little information is available on the decision-making process of the CNF/CNA. Important policy decisions appear to be made by the Central Committee of the CNF and by the Party Conference,  and authority rests with the Chairman of the CNF and the Chief of Staff of the CNA. The CNA’s Chief of Staff is also a Central Committee member of the CNF.
The CNA compromised of a central command and regional commands. Its combatants are organized in brigades divided into battalions; according to CNA sources, disciplinary measures are taken against fighters who commit or cause civilian damage or deaths or who do not behave according to the rules.
In 1993, the CNF held its first Party Conference in the General Headquarters of the CNF, during which “the Government of Chinland” was formed.  No information has been found about the duties or functioning of “the Government of Chinland.”

In terms of civil structure, the CNF/CNA claims to have for instance a network of women’s organizations. The CNF has always worked on increasing its international relations through external political presence. Allegedly the CNF works externally for instance through political offices, such as in Mizoram State in India, where an office was established in 1995.
 

Leadership

There is limited information available on the leadership of the CNF/CNA. It has been argued that the present leadership is made up mostly of former students and graduates that where among those who fled Chin State in 1988.
Since 1997, the CNF has been led by its Chairman Thomas Thangnou. The CNA is led by the Chief of Staff Colonel Ral Hnin  who has also acted as a Central Committee Member of the CNF since 1995.
CNF External Affairs Secretary and Joint General Secretary is Dr. Sui Khar. Dr. Khar has an important role in external relations and was the leader of the negotiation team in the March 2007 peace talks. He also often acts as spokesperson of the group.
Pu Zing Cung is Vice Chairman of the CNF.  Paul Sitha, (second team leader at the 2007 peace negotiation), also acts as one of the organization’s spokesperson. Other important personalities include CNF Central Committee members Mr. Khua Uk Lian and Mr. Solomon, who also acts as Vice Chief of Staff of the CNA.
 

External aid/Third party involvement

The CNF/CNF has a significant base of support among the Chin people, primarily among “young, educated Chins, who often furnish non-military support and information to the CNF/CNA or distribute CNF printed materials, and are at severe risk for that reason.” Since some of the CNF/CNA supporters reside abroad, and the Chin diaspora is well organized, the CNF/CNA receives various kinds of support also from the Chin living abroad.
Some sources have alleged that the CNF/CNA have received (indirect) support from India through the Research and Analysis Wing, India’s external intelligence service from 1988 to 1992, for instance in procuring arms available from Khmer Rouge rebels. This Indian policy changed in 1993, however, when the Indian government began collaborating with the Burmese army in its fight against the CNF/CNA.
There is a long history of supporting and renouncing each others’ NSAGs – the Chin and Mizo, respectively - between the governments of Burma/Myanmar and India. Nevertheless, the arrangements tend to be short-lived. From 1992-1995, the Indian and Burmese governments initiated a joint operation, which was ended by a political dispute between the two governments. Nevertheless, in 1996, several joint Indian-Burma military operations were again organized against CNF/CNA positions. In addition to the crackdown on the insurgency in border areas by Indian security forces, collaboration has involved arrests and handing over of CNF/CNA leaders to the Burma/Myanmar government.  In 2005, following a new agreement between the two governments, Indian local state security forces again increased efforts to crack down on the CNF/CNA in Mizoram State, notably with attacks on its camps.
In terms of collaboration with foreign NSAGs, some experts have argued that there is no evidence of that the CNF/CNA would have contacts with NSAGs in India or Bangladesh, although they clearly recognize the “ties to the ethnically related Mizos.”  The Mizos also have an armed movement, the Mizo National Front, which entered a peace accord with the Government of India in 1986. There have also been allegations that the CNF/CNA provides weapons to NSAGs operating in northeast India through its alleged trafficking network but the CNF/CNA has denied these reports.
In terms of collaboration with national NSAGs, observers have indicated that many Chin soldiers have received training from the Kachin Independence Army. Allegedly this training started in 1989 and contributed to an initial period of success and expansion of the newly founded group.
Other collaboration with Burmese NSAGs seems to be mainly political. On 1 June 1999, the CNF/CNA joined the Military Alliance, which was originally formed by the Karen National Union (KNU), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) and Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) on 13 March 1999. This alliance was confirmed in June 2007 when representatives from the six major armed ethnic groups in the Military Alliance that continue to oppose the Burmese government agreed to recognize the Burmese army as a common enemy, to conduct joint training sessions, and to engage in information-sharing.
The CNF is also a member of the National Democratic Front (NDF) - comprised of non-Burman nationalities, the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) – made up of all pro-democracy forces, and the National Council of the Union of Burma (an alliance of the mentioned two organizations and the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and National League for Democracy). All the above organizations have the stated objective of restoring democracy, freedom, and establishing a genuine federal union. In 2001, the NDF, CNF, KNU, KNPP and other armed groups formed part of the Ethnic Nationalities Council (originally the “Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee”), which was formed in August 2001 to rebuild the relations with cease-fire groups.
 

External effects of the NSAG's armed activities

The conflict between the military junta and the CNF/CNA has caused a great deal of displacement within Burma/Myanmar as well as waves of Chin refugees. Some of the individual reasons for fleeing include: getting caught in crossfire, suffering government or CNF/CNA abuse, etc. As a measurement of the impact of the conflict, it has been indicated that the price of housing in Chin State has fallen by 50%, as more and more people are migrating to other countries.
Many Chin have fled to Canada, India, Malaysia, and the U.S., among other countries. Given its geographic proximity, most Chins have settled in India; as a result, the country has been directly affected by the CNF/CNA-government conflict as clashes often take place along Indian borders. Though some ethnic minority Chins have been in India since the 1960s, most of the Chin refugees arrived after the 1988 crack-down on the pro-democracy movement. An estimated 40,000 to 50,000 Chins now live in Mizoram alone.  The hardship of the Chin refugees in India, including abuse, lack of relief and opportunities, etc., has been reported by NGOs and think-tanks.
Recently, many refugees from Chin State have had difficulties gaining entry in the U.S. because of anti-terrorism legislation  which bars those who are said to have lent “material support” to any NSAGs from entering the country. Consequently, numerous Chins were not granted asylum because of this broad legislation. In October 2006 this legislation was modified to remove legal barriers imposed on Chin refugees applying for political asylum.

 

Funding

To finance its struggle, the CNF/CNA has admitted that it collects tax from the Chin people. In 2002, according to the CNF/CNA tax policy (which they say to be valid for all Chin nationals except for disabled persons) the CNF “collects a reasonable amount of tax from the Chin people. For example, every household must pay 1,000 Kyats per year to the CNF. 1,000 Kyats is less than 2 dollars in market rate of exchange.”
In 2000, the CNF/CNA was accused by Indian authorities of collecting taxes from transporters, businessmen, and people living in India’s Mizoram State. Other sources, including the CNF/CNA itself, have confirmed tax collections in Mizoram. A CNF/CNA commander allegedly even admitted that the group punished those who refused to pay by, for example, burning their trucks and goods.
Some experts have stated that the support for the CNF/CNA is widespread and that non-military support and information is hence provided.  It is thus also possible that some financial contributions are voluntary. Nevertheless, there are allegations that some CNA soldiers may have committed various human rights abuses when threatening civilians in order to collect taxes.
The CNF/CNA has also been accused of being involved in the production and sale of narcotics, teakwood, and precious stones. They are reported to have an extensive trafficking network with links to Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, for both drugs and arms, providing such goods to NSAGs operating in India’s northeast. Citing official sources in Mizoram, a 2001 news report said that trafficking in heroin from neighbouring Burma to Mizoram had increased and that there was evidence that militants from CNF/CNA were involved.
The CNF/CNA has denied these accusations, stating that it “is not involved in any arms and drug trafficking activities in the Indo-Burma border areas.” A U.S. Department of State representative has indicated that the allegations of drug and arms trafficking by the CNF/CNA are unsubstantiated.

 

Relationship with the international community

As of January 2008, the CNF/CNA is not listed as a terrorist organization by either the European Union or the U.S. A 2006 document of the U.S. Department of State clarifies that providing material support to the CNF/CNA does not preclude Chin refugees from applying to the U.S. Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Program.

The CNF has focused its strategy on raising international awareness and support for its cause. The group is very well organized to operate on political matters outside of Burma. During the past years, CNF leaders have been travelling extensively, including to the U.S., Canada, the countries of the EU and Asia. It has been actively participating and lobbying at fora of international and regional bodies particularly the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations Working Groups for Indigenous Peoples, and the Asia Indigenous Peoples’ Pact. The main purpose of the CNF’s lobbying has been to impose economic, diplomatic, and military sanctions on the SPDC.

In 2001, the CNF became a member of the UNPO, representing the Chin people. During the October 2007 VII General Assembly of the UNPO in Taiwan, the CNF and other UNPO members successfully promoted the adoption a landmine ban resolution by the UNPO. This can be seen as a follow up to a commitment undertaken by the CNF/CNA on 31 July 2006 to ban these weapons by signing the Deed of Commitment under the NGO Geneva Call.

In addition, the CNF has maintained contacts with international actors such as religious organizations and human rights groups, who have played a major role in raising awareness of the Chin issue. This has particularly been the case with the U.S., given that American Christian missionaries have had a presence in Chin State since the late 19th century. The CNF/CNA also receives and collaborates with humanitarian and other missions that go to Chin State with the purpose of collecting information about the situation of the Chin people.

Books

• Balencie, Jean-Marc and de la Grange, Arnaud (2001), Mondes rebelles: guerillas, milices, groupes terroristes. Encyclopédie des acteurs, conflits & violences politiques (Paris: Michalon).
• Lintner, Bertil (1999), Burma in Revolt: Opium and insurgency since 1948 (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books).
• Smith, Martin (1999), Burma: Insurgence and the Politics of Ethnicity (Dhaka: The University Press).

 

Articles and Chapters

• Aung, Thin Thin and Myint, Soe, “India Burma Relations,” in International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses (2001).
• Bedi, Rahul, “Turf Wars Muddy the Waters of Indian Intelligence,” 11.3 Jane’s Intelligence Review (1999).
• Khaing Soe Naing Aung. 2000. A Brief history of the National Democratic Movement of Ethnic Nationalities. National Democratic Front.
• Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua, “Myanmar’s Forgotten Minefields,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (2000), October, at 38-42.
• Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua, “Seeds of Destruction,” 7.4 Burma Debate (2000), available at www.burmaproject.org.
• Prasad Routray, Bibhu, “Belated Adventures,” 4.9 South Asia Intelligence Review (2005).
• Selth, Andrew, Landmines in Burma: the Military Dimension. Working paper No. 32, Strategic Defense Studies Centre of the Australian National University (2000).
• Than, Tin Maung Maung, “Burma/Myanmar in 2001: a Year of Waiting.” 42 Asian Survey (2001), at 115-123.
   

Reports and resolutions of intergovernmental organizations

• EU Council, Common Position 2006/380/CFSP of 29 May 2006, Official Journal of the European Communities L 144/25, 31 May 2006.
• United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Economic and Social Council, Discrimination against Indigenous Peoples: Study on Treaties, Agreements and Other Constructive Arrangements between States and Indigenous Populations. Second Progress Report Submitted by Mr. Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special Rapporteur, 31 July 1995, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/27, available at
• United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Economic and Social Council, Rapport sur la situation des droits de l’homme au Myanmar, présenté par Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Rapporteur Spécial de la Commission des droits de l’homme, en application de la résolution 2002/67 de la Commission, 27 December 2002. E/CN.4/2003/41.
• UN High Commissioner for Refugees, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Services Responses: Burma (Myanmar): Information on the Chin National Front / Chin National Army, available at link.

 

Governmental reports

• U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Burma Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000. Washington DC, 23 February 2001, available at link.
• U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Division, Drug Intelligence Brief, Burma Country Brief, Washington DC, May 2002, available at www.dea.gov.
• U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Fact Sheet Office of Counterterrorism, Washington DC, 11 October 2005, available at link.
• U.S. Department of State, Burma, Country Report on Human Rights Practices - 2006, Washington DC, 6 March 2007, available at link.
• U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Services Responses Burma (Myanmar): Information on the Chin National Front / Chin National Army, available at

 

Reports of think tanks and non-governmental organizations

• Amnesty International (2002), Report 2002-Myanmar (London: Amnesty International).
• Burma Alert (2003), The Burmese Democratic Movement 5.3 (Shawville-Quebec: Associates to Develop Democratic Burma Inc.).
• Geneva Call (2007), Engaging Armed Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban: The Geneva Call Progress Report (2000-2007) (Geneva: Geneva Call), available at link
• Daskal, Jennifer (2007), The Material Support Bar: Denying Refuge to the Persecuted?, Human Rights Watch, 19 September 2007, available at link.
• Garcia, Victoria (2004), State Department Reports on the Use of Child Soldiers, Center for Defense Information, Centre for Defense Information, 14 April 2004, available at link.
• Heppner, Kevin (2002), My Gun Was as Tall as Me: Child Soldiers in Burma, Human Rights Watch, October 2002, available at link.
• Human Rights Watch (2002), Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: Burma, available at link. Accessed on 15 April 2008.
• Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (2006), Visit to the Chin Peoples on the India-Burma Border, March 3-9 2006, available at link.
• International Crisis Group (2003), Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics. Asia Report N°52, 7 May 2003, available at link. Accessed on 15 April 2008.
• Karen Human Rights Group (1996), The Situation in the Northwestern Burma. (Chiang Mai: Karen Human Rights Group).
• Karen Human Rights Group (1997), SLORC Orders to Villages Set 97-A, Chin State (Chiang Mai: Karen Human Rights Group).
• Karen Human Rights Group (1997), SLORC Abuses in Chin State. (Chiang Mai: Karen Human Rights Group).
• Karen Human Rights Group (1998), All Quiet on the Western Front? The situation in the Chin State and Sagaing Division, Burma, (Chiang Mai: Karen Human Rights Group).
• National Coalition Government of Burma (2002), Human Rights Yearbook 2001-2002 Burma (Nonthaburi: Human Rights Documentation Unit).
• National Democratic Front (2000), A Brief history of the National Democratic Movement of Ethnic Nationalities, Khaing Soe Naing Aung.
• Project Maje (1997), A Chin Compendium, A Report by Project Maje, available at link.
• Project Maje (2001), Ashes and Tears, Interviews with Refugees from Burma on Guam, March 2001, available at link.
• Selth, Andrew (2000), Landmines in Burma: the Military Dimension, Strategic Defense Studies Centre, Australian National University, Working paper No. 352.
• Smith, Martin (2002), Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change, Minority Rights Group International, May 2002, available at www.minorityrights.org/download.php?id=133.

 

Press Information (in chronological order)

Interviews

Internet resources

Statements of the armed group

• “The Chin National Front Statement on Cease-Fire,” Burma Library, 13 July 1998, available at link.
• “Declaration of Chin National Front,” Chin National Front, 30 May 1999, available at link.
• “Statement of the ALP-CNF-KNPP-KNU-SSA on the Military Alliance 26 August 2002,” ALP-CNF-KNPP-KNU-SSA, 2002, available at www.chinland.org.
• “Statement on the 56th Anniversary of the Union Day in Burma by Chin National Front,” Chin National Front Central Executive Committee, 12 February 2003, available at www.chinland.org.
• “Chin National Front and State Peace and Development Council to Hold First Ever Peace Talk,” Chin National Front Press Release, 12 March 2007, available at link.
   

Agreements involving armed groups