Bakassi Boys 

Origins

The Bakassi Boys were established in 1999 by disparate groups of traders and concerned citizens to combat increasing violence, crime, and armed robberies in their home states. The citizen militias were united in their mistrust and disappointment in the Nigerian government for being unwilling or unable to provide security for the states of Abia, Anambra, and Imo; thus the Bakassi Boys were heralded at their inception.
The name ‘Bakassi Boys’ is applied to several distinct groups with similar objectives and was coined after the Bakassi marketplace where several local shoe traders confronted a group of criminals called ‘Maf’ who had been harassing and intimidating the cobblers. Thus, the name symbolizes the group’s reason for existing. For example, the Bakassi Boys of Anambra State evolved from a group who, “allegedly coming from Abia State,” formed to confront the Onitsha Traders Association’s perceived incompetence in dealing with armed robberies in the Onitsha marketplace.
The Bakassi Boys enjoyed immense popular support during the first several years of their existence, which was based on the idea that the Bakassi were not an ethnic militia, but were committed to public interests and were honest, effective, and thorough.  Popular support diminished within a few years’ time as a result of “political hijacking,” of the group by politicians and other interested parties. The group nevertheless grew in power, size, and influence after some south-eastern governors, notably those from the Imo, Abia, and Anambra states, endorsed them as a non-governmental police force. The Anambra State House of Assembly officially established the Bakassi Boys, under the name of the Anambra Vigilante Services in August 2000. However, in doing so, the Anambra branch of the group was placed under the control of a committee dominated by appointees of the governor.  Gradually, the governor replaced the ‘original’ Bakassi Boys operating in his State with “more compliant local recruits,” which, reportedly, dramatically shifted their crime-fighting role into a tool for political muscle for the governor.
Also in 2000, the Imo State House of Assembly passed a bill creating a Bakassi Branch known as the IMO Vigilante Services, though the State governor resisted signing the bill into law, so the group faced legitimacy problems and thus, were less effective than other Bakassi units.  A similar pattern occurred in Ebonyi State, where the Assembly passed a bill allowing for an official Bakassi vigilante branch, but the Ebonyi governor also resisted signing the law.
At the federal level, the government remained relatively silent and even passively supportive while the Bakassi Boys retained high levels of popularity. However, amid “increasing brutality, declining popularity [and] mounting protests” from civil society, the federal government ordered the disbandment of the group in 2002. Abia State responded by producing a bill to legalise the group again, though the governor waited until 2006 to sign it into law. Retaliation by the federal government then constituted branding the Bakassi Boys as a ‘terrorist organisation’ and sending military patrols to Abia State to ensure their disbandment.   
The occult dimension of the Bakassi Boys must also be mentioned as it is seen, by local observers, as an essential part of their mission.. Those who support and pay for their protection insist that their fight against crime is also fighting against the invisible forces of evil.

 

Location / Main area of operation

 The Igbo-speaking, south-east states of Abia, Anambra, and Imo.

Objectives

Originally, created by traders to fight rampant crime in the large market towns of Aba, in Abia State, then in Onitsha, in Anambra State, the Bakassi Boys have since extended their operations across other parts of Abia, Anambra, and Imo states, with the active support of state governments.
However, as the strict code of conduct which regulated the group in fulfilling these objectives became less effective, the groups began to operate as vigilantes which have been “accused of carrying out extrajudicial executions, perpetrating acts of torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of alleged criminals, and illegal detention.”

(a) The difference between the Bakassi Boys and other vigilante groups lies in their purported non-concern for ethnic interest. They were not perceived as acting only on behalf of the Igbo, but protecting all people living in a state from a soaring criminality, while the OPC in Lagos is seen as serving Yoruba interest only.
The Bakassi initially enjoyed considerable popular support for their role in maintaining law and order, but the group was later denounced for numerous acts of murder and torture and was disbanded by the federal government in 2002.

 

Number of Members

The exact size of the Bakassi Boys is unknown. According to Williams, “initially about 500 youth, young and middle-aged person abandoned their normal occupations as traders to become full-time members of the Bakassi Boys, and the group has since increased its numerical strength to about 3,500 across all eastern states of Nigeria.”

Type : National

National

 

Conflict Status : Active

The Bakassi Boys were disbanded in 2002, but their activities were not entirely arrested. The Bakassi Boys have been reconstituted in Abia State and have operated from 2004 to 2006 under the auspices of the state government. After the murder of 20 people near the Ariaria market and other abuses, the Bakassi Boys were declared a “terrorist organization” by the Federal government and definitively banned.

 

Structure of the organization

Within the first few weeks of their existence, the Bakassi vigilantes had “developed a clear organizational structure, and code of conduct centred on responding to popular demands for security and the protection of property rights.” Their structure included appointing chairmen, secretaries, treasurers and generally resembled contemporary association models, and originally included an executive branch which was responsible for oversight, strategic and organizational decisions, and recruitment. Typically, the Bakassi Boys operated at the community level, so there were many separate groups with different territorial control. Nevertheless, they maintain the same organizational structure and objectives throughout the different groups. But unlike typical vigilantes that are composed of individuals from the local community or neighbourhood, the Bakassi Boys : “were an amorphous groups of obscure young men drawn from different local communities."
Nevertheless, the Bakassi Boys have been victims of their success. As stated by Meagher, the political capture of the Bakassi Boys in Abia and Anambra Sates prompted the spread of the Bakassi Boys to other Igbo States.
In December 2000, the Imo State House of Assembly passed a bill establishing a new branch of the Bakassi Boys known as the Imo Vigiliante Service.(IVS)
Similarly, a new branch of Bakassi Boys has been created in Ebonyi State.
In Anambra State, the Bakassi Boys was renamed “Anambra State Vigilante Services” (AVS). In Abia State, the Bakassi Boys became the “Abia State Vigilante Service under the control of the state government.

 

Leadership

The first chairman of the Bakassi Boys was Ezeji Oguikpe, who was also the former chairman of the Bakassi shoe production zone. He resigned from the zone's leadership to take up the chairmanship of the Bakassi Boys. Ezeji Oguikpe was arrested in 1999.
Gilbert Okoye was the AVS chairman of the Boys until his arrest in March of 2001.
With the split of the Bakassi Boys as well as the spread of the group in different regions, the leadership has been divided among the vigilante sub-groups. Camillus Ebekue was Chairman of the AVS between September and October 2001 and following his term, Chinwoke Mbadinuju, the Anambra state governor has had ‘considerable’ control over the AVS. Onwuchekwa Ulu has led the Abia State Vigilante Service, while the Imo State Police Commissioner Ahmed Abubakar has assumed control of the IVS.

 

External aid/Third party involvement

The Bakassi Boys were legitimized as the Anambra Vigilante Service (AVS) by the state governor, Chinwoke Mbadinuju, who used their enormous popularity as leverage against political opponents in his 2003 re-election campaign. His successor, Chris Ngige, also used the Bakassi Boys as security providers. In their role of AVS, licensing of small arms was conducted by the local police chief and the chairman of AVS, signifying again, government sanctioning and entrenchment of their activities. There was strong suspicion that the Abia State Vigilante Group, established by the Abia State Governor, Orji Kalu, was made up entirely of Bakassi Boys, though the governor denied such claims.  

External effects of the NSAG's armed activities

No information is available on this matter.

Funding

Given widespread community support, the Bakassi Boys are funded largely through community monetary contributions, especially from traders. They also collect “dues” from the areas in which they ‘provide security.’ According to a Human Rights Watch report: “Businesses, local governments, and other institutions are also all asked to contribute a tax towards the Bakassi Boys; many complain that this is exhorted under duress and intimidation. The levy varies from state to state. According to a source in Onitsha, in late 2001, the monthly levy requested for the local Bakassi Boys was 2,000 naira (approximately U.S.$15) for offices, 10,000 naira (approximately U.S.$76) for schools and hospitals, and 50,000 naira (approximately U.S.$385) for banks; okada (motorbike taxi) drivers had to pay 20 naira daily. Some businessmen in Anambra were also approached individually to contribute to the Bakassi Boys.”
Additionally, in the states where governors have legitimized the Boys, they are sponsored with some level of government funding, as well as salaries and material contributions such as office space, uniforms, vehicles, and weapons. Anambra State went as far as to introduce levies to support the group’s actions there, which forced businesses unwilling to voluntarily contribute into providing financial support.

 

Relationship with the international community

None. 

Books

Florquin, Nicolas and Berman, Eric G. (eds) (2005), Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region (Geneva: Small Arms Survey). 

Articles and Chapters

 

Reports and resolutions of intergovernmental organizations

Governmental reports

Reports of think tanks and non-governmental organizations

• Amnesty International, Nigeria: Vigilante violence in the south and south-east, 19 November 2002, available at link
• Centre for International Cooperation and Security at the University of Bradford. Jeremy Ginifer and Olawale Ismail Armed Violence and Poverty in Nigeria: Mini case study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative March 2005, available at link
• Human Rights Watch/Center for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN), Nigeria. The Bakassi Boys: the Legitimization of Murder and Torture, Vol. 14, No. 5 (A), May 2002, available at link
• International Crisis Group, Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment, Africa Report No. 119, 25 October 2006, available at link

 

Press Information (in chronological order)

Interviews

Internet resources

• The International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed Conflict Database, Non State Armed Groups, Nga, available at link

Statements of the armed group

Agreements involving armed groups