Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (HAMAS) 

Origins

Hamas  is a Palestinian Islamic Sunni movement which was created during the outbreak of the first Intifada in December 1987 by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, 'Abdul 'Aziz al-Rantissi, Salah Shehadeh, Muhammad Sham'ah, 'Isa al-Nashshar, 'Abdel Fattah Dukhan and Ibrahim al-Yazuri.
The formation of Hamas has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine and, as sstated in the Hamas Charter, claims to the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, created by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928 with the objective of encouraging a social renewal based on Islam and the original Islamic society of Muhammad, has been actively present in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since the end of World War II. Specifically, the rise of political Islam seen in the Middle East after the 1973 October war between Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq manifested in Palestine by the increased influence of the Brotherhood through a front organization called al-Mujamma’ al-Islami (the Islamic Society) created in Gaza in 1973. Fourteen years later in 1987, the founders of al-Mujamma’ al-Islami formed Hamas movement.
While Hamas’ military operations started only during the first Intifada in 1987, its core organization, al-Mujamma’ al-Islami, had already created an armed militia in the Gaza Strip by 1982.

 

Location / Main area of operation

The main locations of Hamas’ members are the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Additionally, it must be mentioned that the external members of Hamas’ Political Bureau reside outside the occupied Palestinian territories, mainly in Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. For instance, the Chief of the Political Bureau of the movement, Khaled Mash'al, and his collaborator, Mussa Abu Marzouk, are currently in Damascus. Hamas also has representative offices in Qatar, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen. Nevertheless, the movement also has had differences with some of the neighbouring countries of the Palestinian territories countries; in 1999, Hamas “outside” leadership was expulsed from Jordan.
Additionally, Hamas has always limited its military operations to Mandatory Palestine, meaning Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.

 

Objectives

Hamas has three major objectives. First, and as a part of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has, since its creation, sought to re-Islamize the Palestinian society by social mobilization and the promotion of Islamic education.
Second, Hamas pursues the liberation of Palestine. Documents provided by Hamas emphasize a combination of both, the liberation of Palestine through Islam as the only way to create a Palestinian Islamic State. According to Hamas, the Arab defeat was caused by the “absence of the spirit of Islam” and thus, only the revival of Islam can lead to the liberation of Palestine.
Lastly, Hamas seeks the preservation of the well-being of the populations where it operates.
As analysed below, this objective has introduced a significant degree of flexibility and political pragmatism in Hamas’ policies. Since its formation, Hamas has invested considerable resources in providing social services through a well-established network of institutions and welfare services; these social services are considered fundamental to Hamas’ identity and objectives. In effect, Hamas’ charter expressly mentions social solidarity, though experts suggest that Hamas sees the creation and running of a large social network as a way to bring Islamic practices more into Palestinian society.
Currently, Hamas is, through its network of affiliated social welfare organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the most influential Palestinian political organization, including the Palestinian Authority, in the sector. Hamas dominates this field both in terms of size and efficiency. Authoritative sources report that Hamas-affiliated social welfare institutions are largely independent from the military and political activities of the movement. In regards to financing these institutions, it must be noted that while both Hamas and those organizations deny that Hamas funds the latter, authoritative sources report that Hamas plays an indirect role on financing such organizations since the receipt of funds from local and, in particular, foreign individuals, and charities by those Palestinian institutions appears to depend on the recommendation of Hamas activists and sympathisers.
Three additional concerns exist regarding the Hamas-affiliated social network. First, Islamic social welfare organizations in the Palestinian territories could serve to funnel money to Hamas’ military activities though, according to authoritative sources, this is generally not the case. Additionally, both Hamas and representatives of the charities have rejected this. Second, these organizations could be used as recruitment or incitement vehicles for Hamas’ armed activities. The claim regarding recruitment has been rejected by Hamas, Senior UN officials working in the occupied territories, and representative of NGOs. While there is concern that these organizations could be used as incitement vehicles for Hamas’ armed activities, it must be noted that while Hamas’ role in providing education is large and an intolerant interpretation of Islam makes an integral part of it, analysts maintain that such teachings do not significantly differ from those taught in many other educative institutions in the Palestinian occupied territories.
Lastly, and more generally, it has been said that these organizations could be used by Hamas to maintain and increase its political capital in the occupied territories. Analysts concur that this is the case, but only indirectly. Specifically, most experts agree that the good organization of Hamas’ affiliated-charity organizations contributes to cement the movements’ reputation of efficiency and accountability. This effect is maximized because of the large role played by Islamic charitable institutions in Palestinian life both in terms of the services provided – including education, assistance to low-income households, orphans and the disable, distribution of food, cash, clothe - and the population covered.
The role of Hamas’ social network has recently been enlarged because of the inability and ineffectiveness of the Provisional Authority (hereinafter “PA”) institutions to provide security and other public goods in the occupied territories. The weaknesses of the PA institutions in this respect are mainly due to the Israeli policy of carrying out direct armed attacks against these institutions; and the record of mismanagement and corruption inside the PA institutions. Another factor that has strengthened the role of Hamas’ social network has been the impact of Israeli sanctions against the West Bank and the Gaza Strip population.

International response to Hamas-affiliated social network has varied. While the U.S. seeks to ban all assistance to Hamas-affiliated organizations, the majority of Western States distinguish between support for Hamas’ legitimate and illegitimate activity. Several Arab states allow funds to be raised on their territory for both Islamic social welfare and Islamist militant organizations.
As mentioned above, the inclusion of social goals within Hamas’ objectives has introduced an important degree of flexibility and political pragmatism in its policies. In particular, Hamas has faced serious dilemmas as result of its sometimes competing objectives: to gain control of all Palestine through violence on the one hand; and that of preserving the well-being of the communities where it operates, on the other hand. Faced with this dilemma, Hamas appears to have predominantly opted for political pragmatism, rather than dogmatism, being driven by its objective to defend communal interests. According to analysts, the prevalence of political pragmatism has been reflected in Hamas’ acceptance of ceasefires and periods of calm vis-à-vis Israel; its will, in some instances, to find some accommodation with Fatah; and with respect to its objective for the creation of a Palestinian State, to the distinction between its short term objective – the creation of a Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank following the pre-1967 borders - and its long-term objective - the establishment of an Islamic State covering all of Mandatory Palestine, including Israel.
Several experts also suggest that there has been an important shift on Hamas’ view of the conflict with Israel. While during its first four years of existence, a religious-doctrinal perspective of the conflict prevailed – i.e. the fight against Israel was seen as a conflict between Islam and Judaism, since then a political perspective is preferred; thus the notion of liberating the land has prevailed over Islamist tenets. This shift toward moderation and the downplayed role of religion is illustrated by Hamas’ electoral platform for the 2006 legislative elections and its draft program for a coalition government.

 

Number of Members

Analysts disagree on the number of fighters in Hamas’ military wing. The main cause of this is Hamas’ expansion of its military capacity in the Gaza Strip since the withdrawal of the Israeli Occupation Forces in August 2005. Estimates of the members of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, go from 10,000 to 17,000 armed men.

Additionally, the Hamas-led government created a new security force of about 5,000 men, called the Executive Force, within the framework of the Palestinian Authority. Most analysts consider the creation of this force as Hamas’ response to the supply of money and training to Fatah by the US, Egypt, and Jordan for creating a new special militia made of 3,500 men that would be under the control of Abbas; and the reversal by Abbas of the reforms introduced in the security sector aimed at putting security forces under the control of the Prime Minister. For its part, Fatah accuses Hamas of using this Force in order to be a cover for their military wing.
Lastly, it is reported that Israel has considerable weakened the capabilities of Hamas over the past years through the arrest or killing of important Hamas’ military and political leaders.

 

Type : Transnational

Hamas is a transnational non-state armed group since its armed operations take place both in the Palestinian occupied territories and Israel. Despite its presence in other Middle Eastern countries - particularly in refugee camps in Lebanon, Hamas does not carry out armed operations there; the declared purpose of the presence of some of its members there being to carry out only political and informative activities.  

Conflict Status : Active

In order to determine the status of Hamas’ armed actions, several distinctions must be drawn. First is the difference between Hamas’ armed actions against Fatah on one hand, and those against Israel on the other hand.
The status of Hamas’ armed actions against Fatah is active because those two groups continue being regularly involved in armed clashes. Since the end of the 1980s, Hamas has challenged Fatah’s dominance of the political life in the occupied Palestinian territories. Fatah’s response to this challenge consisted in carrying out a crackdown on Hamas between 1996 and 1999. Despite this, Hamas continued gaining space in the Palestinian political scene. In particular, Hamas became a central political player during the second Intifada which started in September 2000. In this respect, several analysts maintains that the destruction of the security infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority by Israel between 2000 and 2002 led to a security vacuum that was filled by various armed groups, such as Hamas’ military wing and the Al-Quds Battalions that started to complementing their military activities with law-and-order functions.
The turning point of Hamas’ advance in the Palestinian political scene was its victory of the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections. Following these elections, many armed clashes between Fatah and Hamas arose. Despite these clashes, Hamas and Fatah agreed to create a unity government in February 2007. However, this government soon failed due mainly to four factors: first, the appointment of Mohammed Dahlan, feared by Hamas for his prominent role in the Palestinian Authority’s suppression of the latter in the mid-1990’s, as Abbas’ presidential security advisor. Some reports claim that subsequent to the appointment, the security forces under Dahlan's control continued to carry out armed operations against Hamas. Second, the supply of money and training to Fatah by the US, Egypt, and Jordan for creating a new special militia made of 3,500 men that would be under the control of Abbas. Third, the supply, with the consent of Israel, of heavy weapons to Fatah in early June 2007. Lastly, the reversal by Abbas of the reforms introduced in the security sector aimed at putting security forces under the control of the Prime Minister. As a result of this, the Fatah-dominated security organisations were brought to the control of the President.
In June 2007 open fighting between Hamas and Fatah took place; eventually, and following five days of intense combats, Hamas gained control over the Gaza Strip. Hamas claims that by doing so, it pre-empted a coup d’état against its led-government.
In respose to Hamas’ military victory in the Gaza Strip, Fatah declared a state of emergency, dissolving the unity government and appointing a new prime minister. Additionally, it is reported that Fatah’s affiliated militias in the West Bank carried out acts of revenge against Hamas’ militants.
Following these tragic events, Hamas’ representatives have stated that the movement is open to dialogue with Fatah and that its dislike is only regarding certain Fatah members, particularly Mohammed Dahlan. Specifically, Hamas’ leaders maintain that their armed actions are against the Fatah militia under the control of Mohammed Dahlan.
As regards the status of Hamas’ armed actions against Israel, it first must be noted that Hamas was in a phase of official tahdi’a (lull) with Israel between about early 2005 to June 2007. This lull was officially only applicable in the Gaza Strip. However, and following Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, relations between Hamas and Israel deteriorated because of the prohibition imposed by Israel on imports and exports to that region, except for goods for humanitarian purposes, and a nearly total restriction on the circulation of persons, as well as the rockets launched by militants against Israel from Gaza.
A cease-fire agreement concluded between Hamas and Israel entered into force on 19 June 2008. Pursuant to the agreement, the restrictions imposed by Israel on the circulation of goods and persons from and to the Gaza Strip will be eased.

 

Structure of the organization

The two top bodies within the structure of Hamas are the Political Bureau and the Advisory Committee.
While the role of the Advisory Committee is to determine general policies and to approve plans and budgets, the Political Bureau operates as the executive body of the movement. The latter comprises:
- The Political office;
- The Information office;
- The Military wing: Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. They are responsible for the military operations. They are organised in a network of semi-autonomous cells in Gaza and the West Bank; their leadership is based inside the occupied territories.
- The security apparatus: Jihaz al Amn. It is responsible for the security of the top leaders; it monitors the activities of Hamas and other Palestinian groups, as well as undertakes the surveillance of Palestinian suspected of collaboration with Israel.
- The department for the affairs of the homeland;
- The department of organization and mass mobilisation; and
- The official spokesman.

Additionally, there is unit in charge of Islamic preaching (da'wa). Its main task is to spread Islam among the communities through social mobilisation and religious preaching.

 

Leadership

The political leadership of Hamas is divided between the leadership located inside Palestine, known as the “internal” leadership, and the leadership based outside those territories, the “external” leadership.
The origins of the divide and, in particular of the “external leadership,” relate to the move abroad of several Hamas’ leaders after 1989 to obtain freedom of action and minimise its exposure to Israeli attacks. Several divergences exist between the two camps. While the “outside” leadership is identified with radical positions and military activism, the “inside” leadership appears more concerned with the local population’s needs. Additionally, the “outside” leadership prefers a formal and hierarchical structure.
Following Arafat’s death, divergences between the two groups became more apparent, particularly with respect to the possibility of cooperation with the PA and the use of violence against Israel. While the “inside” leadership was keen to cooperate with the PA on a complete suspension of violence, the “outside” leadership rejected this. As a result, in March 2005, Hamas on agreed on unofficial “calm” (tahdi’a), understood as a low level of commitment to abstain from violence. There were also divergences among the two camps regarding whether to create a political party and to participate in elections.
After Hamas’ victory in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, the split between the “outside” and “inside” leadership continued. Specifically, the “outside” leadership reportedly attempted to minimise the presence of “inside” leadership within the Hamas-led government, preferring independent persons and technocrats. For its part, the “inside” leadership was in favour of the formation of a national coalition government, including Fatah.
It also must be mentioned that Israel has arrested or killed several Hamas’ military and political leaders. Notably, the prominent historic leaders of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, 'Abdul 'Aziz al-Rantissi and Salah Shehadeh have all been killed by Israel in the past few years. Hence, after the death of Rantissi, who replaced Yassin as Hamas’ top leader, the movement has decided not to tell the name of its new leader, even if the name of Mahmoud al-Zahar has been reported.
There are currently several senior members within Hamas. The first one is Khaled Mash'al who is the head of the Political Bureau of Hamas in Damascus. Some sources report that he may be the top leader of the movement. He is considered to be a hard-liner.
Another Hamas’ leader is Isma'il Haniyeh who was appointed head of the legislative electoral list and then Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority in February 2006 and in March 2007. He is considered to be a moderate within the movement. Both Mash'al and Haniyeh are always involved in high level talks; for example, those between Hamas and Fatah and those concerning the exchange of Palestinian prisoners against the Israeli soldier detained by Hamas.

Another leader of Hamas is Mahmoud Al-Zahar, who was already a high ranking figure of the movement during the first Intifada. He has been the top figure of Hamas in the Gaza Strip since the killing of Yassin and Rantissi in March and April 2004. He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the first Hamas-led government and is currently said to be against any ideological change in Hamas and against concession with Fatah.
It is reported that the military wing of Hamas is led by Muhammad Deif since the killing of Salah Shehada in 2002. However, Deif was critically injured on 11 July 2006 by an Israeli attack and his current status is unclear.

 

External aid/Third party involvement

Iran
Iran has expressed a strong support of the Palestinian cause since the Islamic revolution of 1979. For instance, Iran replaced the Israeli embassy with Palestine's, created institutions for the collection of donations to the Palestinians, and has regularly expressed its concern over Palestinian issues.
More specifically, Iran Islamic agenda and opposition to the US policy in the Middle East have made it a strategic ally of Hamas. Iran’s support is officially of a mere political nature; it maintains that its assistance is moral and humanitarian and it does not intend to encourage “terrorism." However, various sources report a strong financial support. The US government concur with this latest assertion and states that Iran provides Palestinian groups, including Hamas, with extensive funding, training and weapons, and has a role in the planning of terrorist acts. Israeli sources add that Hamas militants are currently being trained in Iran.

Recently, after the victory of Hamas in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, Iran was one of the first countries to offer financial support to the new Hamas-led government and also has expressed political support.

Syria
Syria is the second major ally of Hamas. Its support is mainly political, in favour of the resistance of the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation. For instance, Syria encouraged the formation of the Alliance of Palestinian Forces, a coalition of the Palestinian factions, including Hamas, opposed to the peace process and partisan of the armed struggle against Israel. Syria also hosts Hamas representatives in Damascus, maintaining that the purpose of that presence is only for political and informational activities.
After the victory of Hamas in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, Syria has supported the Hamas-led government, even after Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007.

Saudi Arabia
Some sources report that Saudi Arabia has provided funds to Hamas since Yasser Arafat decided to be on the side of Iraq during the first Iraqi War. As a response, it is said Saudi Arabia decided to reassign part of the money it was giving to the PLO to Hamas.
Saudi Arabia has also played a major role during the negotiations between Fatah and Hamas aimed at forming a unity government after Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006. According to some analysts, the Saudis were willing to do so in order to stop the growing Iranian influence on Hamas.

 

External effects of the NSAG's armed activities

The prohibition imposed by Israel on imports and exports to the Gaza Strip that lasted from Hamas’ takeover of that territory in June 2007 to at least June 2008 created a very difficult humanitarian situation in that region. 

Funding

The funding of Hamas comes from various sources :
- The donations collected in the occupied Palestinian territories (according to the five pillars of Islam, Muslims have to make charity donations each year, this is called “zakat”);
- Islamic movements abroad;
- Donations from Muslims in Europe, the Arab and Islamic world, and North America;
- Foreign Governments such as Iran and, according to Israeli authorities , the Gulf Cooperation Council States (whose membership is made of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates); and
-Investments in various projects; for instance, sewing and weaving center.

According to authoritative sources, however, there is a strict separation in Hamas between funds used for military operations and those used for political, social or other activities. While it is reported that Iran is the largest provider of funding for Hamas’ military activities –about US $ 3 million per year, political and social activities are funded by non-governmental organisations from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.

 

Relationship with the international community

Arab Countries
Arab countries have official contacts with Hamas, even if the type of relation is not the same for all of them. For instance, while countries such as Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are willing to moderate Hamas' stance, others such as Syria protect its leaders and maintain their political support for its armed resistance.

The European Union
Hamas is on the list of foreign terrorist organizations of the EU, thus direct contacts are officially avoided. However, informal meetings with members of Hamas are regularly organized directly or via third parties; these informal meeting have been confirmed by Hamas leaders on several occasions.
Concerning cooperation with Hamas-led municipalities, the funding has been stopped or in some cases the municipalities’ intervention has been bypassed.

Furthermore, EU-Member States have declared that there will officially be no contacts with Hamas lawmakers or ministers until Hamas accept the Quartet conditions, i.e. to recognize Israel and the previous agreements between Israel and the PLO, and to stop the use of violence. However, following the February 2007 Mecca Agreement between Fatah and Hamas on the formation of a unity government, some countries such as France have expressed the need to cooperate with the new coalition, but the issue of direct contacts with Hamas ministers remains unsolved.

Russia
Unlike the European Union and the USA, Russia does not consider Hamas as a terrorist organization. Thus, after the success of Hamas in the Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006, Russia invited its leaders to Moscow. While this move was criticized by Israeli officials, Russian authorities insisted that the purpose of the offer was to open a door for negotiations with the group, for getting its recognition of Israel and prior agreements, and its renunciation of violence. After the Mecca Agreement between Fatah and Hamas for the formation of a coalition government in March 2007, Russia reiterated the invitation.

USA
The USA had talks with Hamas in January and February 1993 in order to know their positions about the peace process. Due to pressure from Israel, the US finally broke off the talks and Hamas was put on the list of foreign terrorist organizations of the U.S. Department of State in April 1993. Hamas is still considered as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government.
Currently the official position of the US administration is to forbid any contact with Hamas members until Hamas renounce violence, recognize Israel and the previous agreements between the PLO and Israel.
In regards to cooperation with Hamas-led municipalities, USAID current position is to continue only the projects already started.

 

Books

• Abu Amr, Ziad (1994), Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).
• Baud, Jacques (2003), Encyclopédie des terrorismes et violences politiques (Paris: Lavauzelle).
• Cordesman, Anthony H (2005), The Israeli-Palestinian War: Escalating to Nowhere (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), available at link
• Cordesman Anthony H. (2003), Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Political, Foreign Policy, Economic, and Energy Dimensions (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), available at link
• Gunning, Jeroen (2007), Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence (London: Hurst & Company).
• Hroub, Khaled (2002), Hamas : Political Thought and Practice (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies)
• Khalidi, Rashid (2007), Palestine: Histoire d’un Etat introuvable (Arles: Actes Sud).
• Milton-Edwards, Beverley (1996), Islamic Politics in Palestine (New York: IB Tauris).
• Mishal, Shaul and Avraham Sela (2006), The Palestinian Hamas (New York: Columbia University Press).
• Muslih, Muhammad (1999), The Foreign Policy of Hamas (New York: Council on Foreign Relations).
• Nusse, Agnès (2002), Muslim Palestine: the ideology of Hamas (London: Routledge/Curzon).
• Tamini, Azzam (2007), Hamas: Unwritten Chapters (London: Hurst).

 

Articles and Chapters

• Abu-Amr, Ziad, “Hamas: A Historical and Political Background," 22.5 Journal of Palestine Studies (1993), at 5-19.
• Gambill, Gary C., "Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Hamas," 4.10 Middle East Intelligence Bulletin (2002), available at link
• Glenn, Robinson, “The Fragmentation of Palestine," 106.704 Current History (2007), at 421-426.
• Friedrich, Roland, and Arnold Luethold (2007), “Introduction,” in Roland Friedrich and Arnold Luethold (eds.), Entry Points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform (Geneva: DCAF), at 13-29.
• Hooglund, Eric, "Iranian Views of the Arab-Israeli Conflict," 25.1 Journal of Palestine Studies (1995), at 86-95.
• Hroub Khaled, “A ‘New Hamas’ through its new Documents," 35.4 Journal of Palestine Studies (2006), at 6-27, available at link
• Karmi, Omar, “Fatah’s Fatigue,"19.8 Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 2007, at 26-31.
• Katzman, Kenneth, “Hamas's Foreign Benefactors," Middle East Quarterly (1995), available at link
• Milton-Edwards, Beverley, “The Concept of Jihad and the Palestinian Islamic Movement: A Comparison of Ideas and Techniques," 19.1 British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (1992), at 48-53.
• Najib, Mohammad and Roland Friedrich (2007), “Non-Statutory Armed Groups and Security Sector Governance,” in Roland Friedrich and Arnold Luethold (eds.), Entry Points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform (Geneva: DCAF), at 103-130.
• Strindberg, Anders, “The Damascus-Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces: A Primer," 29.3 Journal of Palestine Studies (2000), at 60-76.
• Youssef H, Aboul-Enein, “Hamas, Understanding the Organization," 83.4 Military Review (2003), available at link.

 

Reports and resolutions of intergovernmental organizations

• EU Council, Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, Doc. No. 2001/931/CFSP, Official Journal of the European Communities L 344/93, 28.12.2001.
• EU Council, Common Position 2006/380/CFSP of 29 May 2006, Official Journal of the European Communities L 144/25, 31.5.2006.

 

Governmental reports

• CRS Report for Congress, The Organizations, Goals and Tactics of a Militant Palestinian Organization, Washington DC, 14 October 1993, available at link.
• CRS Report for Congress, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, Washington DC, 25 August, 2006, available at link
• Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The financial Sources of the Hamas Terror Organization -July 2003, July 30, 2003, available at link.
• Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism, Washington DC, April 28 2006, available at link
• U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Fact Sheet Office of Counterterrorism, Washington, DC, October 11, 2005, available at link

 

Reports of think tanks and non-governmental organizations

• International Crisis Group, After Mecca: Engaging Hamas, Middle East Report N°62, 28 February 2007, available at link
• International Crisis Group, Dealing with Hamas, Middle East Report N°21, 26 January 2004, available at link
• International Crisis Group, Enter Hamas: the Challenges of Political Integration, Middle East Report N°49, 18 January 2006, available at link
• International Crisis Group (2003), Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: A Legitimate Target?, ICG Middle East Report No. 13, 2 April 2003, available at link
• The Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF) and the Graduate Institute for Development Studies (2006), Government Change and Security Sector Governance: Palestinian Public Perceptions, available at link

 

Press Information (in chronological order)

• “Profile: Hamas commander Mohammed Deif," BBC, September 26, 2002, available at link
• “Le Hamas décapité une deuxième fois," Le Figaro, April 19, 2004.
• “Leadership may have passed lo last founding member: Profile Doctor and writer believed to have reins," The Guardian, April 20, 2004.
• “Israel identifies new Hamas chief," The evening Standard, April 26, 2004.
• “Hamas 'in contact' with EU and US," BBC News, December 14, 2004, available at link
• “Israel protests European Union contacts with Hamas," The Associated Press, in USA TODAY, June 16, 2005, available at link
• “A l’approche des élections législatives, le Hamas divisé entre durs et pragmatiques," Le Figaro, October 21, 2005.
• “Profile: Hamas' Mahmoud Zahhar," BBC, January 27, 2006, available at link
• “Official defends Hamas relations with Arab countries," Al-Jazeera TV in BBC Monitoring Middle East, February 5, 2006.
• “Russia on defensive over Hamas talks," The New York Times, Reuters, Agence France-Press, in International Herald Tribune, February 10, 2006, available at link .
• “Un modéré à la tête du cabinet palestinien," Libération, February 17, 2006.
• “Israel stops payments to Palestinians," CNN, February 19, 2006, available at link
• “Un premier minister pragmatique," Le Figaro, February 20, 2006.
• “Hamas divided on Iranian role in PA," The Jerusalem Post, February 22, 2006.
• “Muhammad Deif presents: Hamas' military academy," Israel News, March 7, 2006, available at link .
• “Iran helped cultivate Mideast crisis, US says," Boston Globe, July 21, 2006.
• “Abbas, Hamas strike a deal," The Washington Times, June 28, 2006, available at link
• “Dissensions dans le movement islamiste," Le Figaro, June 29, 2006.
• “Israel goes after both Hamas leaderships," Christian Science Monitor, June 30, 2006.
• “Israelis Increase Pressure On Hamas," The Washington Post, July 1, 2006, available at link
• “Muhammad Deif wounded in IAF strike," The Jerusalem Post, July 11, 2006.
• “Les antagonismes parmi les islamistes," L’Humanité, October 12, 2006.
• “Russia lists terrorists, leaving off Hezbollah," The Associated Press, in The International Herald Tribune, October 28, 2006, available at link
• “Hamas chairman says international community should take up offer," Al-Safir in BBC Monitoring Midde East, December 5, 2006.
• “Profile: Hamas PM Ismail Haniya," BBC, December 14, 2006, available at link
• “Hamas defiant on 'illegal' force," BBC News, January 6, 2007, available at link .
• “Hamas leader acknowledges 'reality' of Israel," The Guardian, January 10, 2007, available at link
• “Haniyeh renews 10-year truce offer with Israel," The Jerusalem Post, 21 January 2007.
• “Israel Threatens to Ignore Abbas," The Associated Press, in “The Washington Post," February 20, 2007, available at link
• “Clouded horizons in Mecca accord; U.S. underestimates Saudi’s fight for influence over Hamas," The International Herald Tribune, February 22, 2007.
• “After Mecca / Hamas is still Hamas," Haaretz, February 28, 2007, available at link
• “Clash of Civilizations and a Lesson in Pluralism," Nezavisimaya Gazeta in BBC Monitoring International Reports, March 3, 2007.
• “Abbas, Haniyeh finalize PA unity government deal despite fresh clashes," Haaretz, March 5, 2007, available at link
• “La France veut réhabiliter l’Autorité Palestinienne," Le Figaro, March 9, 2007, available at link
• “Hamas faces split over Mecca accords," The Jerusalem Post, March 13, 2007, available at link
• “Shin Bet director: Hundreds of Hamas men being trained in Iran," Haaretz, March 13, 2007, available at link
• “Egypt says would-be Hamas suicide bomber arrested near Israeli border," Haaretz, March 19, 2007, available at link
• “Hamas stages first attacks on Israel since truce," The Irish Times, March 20, 2007.
• “British diplomat meets Palestinian prime minister of Hamas over kidnapped BBC journalist," The Associated Press, April 05, 2007.
• “Arab League states split on support for Abbas over Hamas," Haaretz, June 17, 2007, available at link
• “Abbas decisions deepen Palestinian political crisis," The Irish Times, June 18, 2007.

 

Interviews

Internet resources

• National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, HAMAS, available at link.
• Global Security, Hamas Funding, available at link

 

Statements of the armed group

• Hamas’ statements available in Arabic at Maktab al-‘alami (Information Office) at link
• Hamas’ statements available in English at link
• Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades’ statements: available at link

 

Agreements involving armed groups