Sendero Luminoso (SL); (Shining Path)
Origins
It was formed in the late 1960’s by former university professor Abimael Guzman as a militant Maoist group. For a decade and a half, it focused on spreading militant Maoist ideas through regular talks mainly addressed to high school and university students. It was not until 1980 that SL took up arms, the same year that military rule ended and electoral politics returned to Peru. This has puzzled many analysts as it contradicts traditional theories that electoral politics are a disincentive for armed struggle; the actions of SL differed sharply with the turn of most leftist movements in Peru who moved toward participation in electoral politics.
Location / Main area of operation
SL carries out, as of 2006-2007, its armed incursions and operations mainly in rural areas of Peru, notably in Upper Huallaga and Ene river valleys; in particular, the Department of Ayacucho, SL’s area of origin, has been an important battleground for both SL and the Peruvian government. It must be noted, however, that at the beginning of the 1990’s, SL carried out violent acts through much of Peru’s territory.
Objectives
SL’s objectives are, according to the group itself, to overthrow the Peruvian government and replace it with a communist state based on Maoist ideology, as well as to eliminate the involvement of foreign governments in Peru. Sources consider the control of Peru’s coca-producing regions as another SL’s objective, although this has not been declared by the group.
In regards to the ideological stand of the group, several analysts consider SL as an armed group that embraces a strict dogmatism of, inter alia, waging a “popular war” as its only goal and considering several social practices and cultural values of peasants as impediments to its objective. In this respect, it is worth noting that although its leadership was made of urban middle-class intellectuals, in its early years the SL enjoyed wide support among peasants and communities in the territories it operated since those communities identified themselves with the group’s policies of removing corrupt authorities and punishing thieves and adulterers. However, this support soon disappeared as SL imposed a very hierarchical structure to these communities, placing the SL’s leadership at the top and the peasant masses at the bottom. SL's support from the rural communities was even further reduced following the organization's fierce armed campaign which resulted in many abuses against the local, poor population.
Number of Members
In contrast to its estimated 10,000 members in 1990, most sources consider that SL has, as of 2007, an estimate of 400 to 500 armed militants. As explained below, its strength has been considerable reduced by the arrests and desertions of many of its members, but certain analysts suggest that the number of its members could be growing due to its involvement in narcotics trafficking.
Type : National
SL is a national non-state armed group since its armed operations have been largely limited to the territory of Peru.
Conflict Status : Active
Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, who in 1992 suspended the 1979 Constitution, dissolved Congress, and compromised the independency of the judiciary, waged a hard-line campaign against SL and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) that resulted in the capture of most of their leaders. As recognised by several experts, the turning point in SL's decline was the capture of its top leader, Abimael Guzman, in September 1992; that same year, another 18 SL leaders were also captured. An additional factor that led to the weakening of SL was the organized resistance against that armed group formed by peasants as a result of their alienation from the SL’s political means and aims.
In 1994, the call by Abimael Guzman and other SL leaders in jail for a “peace accord” resulted in the split of the movement into two factions, one called as the Gonzalists, made up of the followers of Guzman and supportive of a peace deal on one hand, and the Red Sendero on the other hand, which rejected the peace initiative and continued to carry out occasional violent acts, mainly in rural areas - notably the Apurimac-Ene River Valleys. Most of the members of the Red Sendero faction ceased their armed actions and several demobilized under the Repentance Law of 1993 (Ley de Arrepentimiento), which offered leniency to SL’s members who become informers.
However, in the Gonzalists’ faction, the group led by the regional leader in the Huallaga Valley, Artemio, opposed giving up their weapons; and in late 2004, the faction decided to return to the armed struggle after the expiration of an ultimatum made to the government for pursuing negotiations in April 2004. In 2005, the Red Sendero and Gonzalist factions reunified.
From Fujimori's removal from office in the second semester of 2001 to July 2003, SL was largely inactive, save for periodic raids in remote rural areas and several violent encounters with the Peruvian armed forces. One serious incident, however, took place in March 2002, just days before a visit of U.S. President George W. Bush to Peru, when a powerful car bomb exploded in a shopping arcade across from the U.S. embassy in Lima. U.S. and Peruvian officials said the bombing, which killed nine people and injured thirty others, was similar to those carried out by SL in the past. Additionally, in June 2003, SL released a document entitled 'Low Intensity Warfare,' in which it denied that it had been defeated and declared the start of a bloody and prolonged people's war. About a month later, 50 members of the SL ambushed an elite commando unit of the Peruvian Army sent into the mountainous area of Ayacucho, killing five marines and two guides, as well as wounding ten others.
From the beginning of 2004 until November 2005, SL was mainly inactive. In December 2005, it dramatically increased its armed actions; in December alone, eight policemen were killed in an ambush on the highway between Tingo María and Aucayacu by SL combatants, which triggered the declaration of a State of Emergency in several provinces, notably Marañón, Huacaybamba, Leoncio Prado, and Huamalíes in the region of Huánuco, Tocache in San Martín, and Padre Abad in Ucayali. The State of Emergency was extended on 20 April and again on 17 June 2006. During the next six months, January-June 2006, the conflict between the Peruvian government and SL continued at a relatively low intensity.
Structure of the organization
As of 2006, it is reported that SL is organised into three main committees: the Provisional Metropolitan Committee based in Lima; the Principal Regional Committee based in the Apurímac-Ene river valleys (VRAE) in the Ayacucho department; and the Huallaga Regional Committee in the San Martin Department.
Leadership
Abimael Guzman, who founded and led the SL for several years, was captured in September 1992 ; as mentioned above, another 18 SL leaders were captured in the next months. Following the fractionalization of the group in 1994, followers of Guzman created the Gonzalists while the second faction, the Red Sendero, was led by Oscar Ramirez Durant and continued leading violent acts mainly in rural areas. In July 1999, Durant was captured; while in November 2003, Peruvian authorities arrested Jaime Zuñiga Cordova (alias Dalton), second in command of SL.
Camarada Artemio, provisionally identified as Filomeno Cerrón Cardoso or Julio Flores, is thought to be the highest-ranking SL’s leader still at–large and commands a 300-men division in the areas of Ayacucho and Junin.
As a result of the Peruvian Constitutional Court's dismissal of the military courts set up by Peru's former-president Fujimori as unconstitutional, Abimael Guzman and most leaders of SL in prison were given the possibility of retrial. After several suspensions in the retrial of Abimael Guzman, he was sentenced to life of imprisonment for terrorism by the Peruvian National Criminal Chamber of Terrorism in October 2006. Guzman’s partner and also leader of SL, Elena Iparraguirre, received the same sentence. Ten other leaders of SL, including Oscar Ramírez Durand, were condemned to serve between 25 and 35 years of imprisonment. In addition, the tribunal condemned the SL leaders to pay the equivalent to 1,118 million U.S. Dollars as compensation to the victims of their acts.
External aid/Third party involvement
Although most sources consider that SL has not received external aid, some analysts suggest that the organization is increasing its relationship with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) as well as with Colombian drug traffickers.
External effects of the NSAG's armed activities
There is no information in regards to any direct external effect of the SL’s armed actions.
Funding
According to several experts, in its early years, SL’s main sources of funding were bank robberies and kidnappings. Various sources also mention protection fees and “taxes” imposed on growers and traffickers of cocaine in areas under SL’s control as a source of the group’s funding.
Relationship with the international community
The U.S. State Department still identifies SL as a terrorist organization.
Books
• Stern, Steve J. (ed.) (1998), Shining and Other Paths, War and Society in Peru 1980-1995 (Durham: Duke University Press).
• Gorriti, Gustavo (1999), The Shining Path (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press).
Articles and Chapters
• Garcia C., Ernesto, “High Anxiety in the Andes: Peru’s decade of Living Dangerously," 12.2 Journal of Democracy (2001), at 46-58.
• Isbell, Billie Jean (1994), “Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho,” in David S. Palmer, The Shining Path of Peru 59 (New York: St. Martin’s Press), at 59-81.
• Kay, Bruce H., “Violent Opportunities: The Rise and Fall of “King Coca” and Shining Path," 41.3 Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (1999), at 97-127.
• McClintock, Cynthia, “The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case," 30.2/3 Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (1998), at 127-142.
• Obando, Enrique, “Peru’s Shining Path Survives Decimation to Return to the Fray,” 18 Jane’s Intelligence Review (March 2006), at 17
• Orin Starn, “Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path and the Refusal of History,” 27.2. Journal of Latin American Studies (1995), at 399-421.
• Ron, James, “Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation," 38.5 Journal of Peace Research (2001), at 569-592.
Reports and resolutions of intergovernmental organizations
Governmental reports
• Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru, Final Report issued on 28 August 2003, available at link See Specially Volumes VI and VII.
Reports of think tanks and non-governmental organizations
• Julia E. Sweig et al., Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region, Report of an Independent Commission (New York: Council on Foreign Relations), available at link
Press Information (in chronological order)
• “Au Pérou: le Sentier lumineux, Le Monde Diplomatique, available at link
• “Abimael Guzmán pasará el resto de su vida en prisión," El Comerio (Peru), 14 October, 2006, available at link# (last visited 16.10.06)
• “Condenado a cadena perpetua el fundador de Sendero Luminoso, Abimael Guzmán," El Pais (España), 14.10.06, available at link (last visited 16.10.06).
Interviews
Internet resources
• Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, Minorities at Risk Project, Assessment for Indigenous Highland Peoples in Peru, available at link
• Council on Foreign Relations, Shining Path, Tupac Amaru (Peru, leftists), available at link
• Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, Sendero Luminoso (SL) Shining Path, available at link
• Global Security.org, Sendero Luminoso (SL) Shining Path, available at link
• International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed Conflicts Database, Sendero Luminoso (SL) • Shining Path, available at link
• National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Shining Path, available at link
• Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru (SP support group) link
• International Emergency Committee to Defend the Life of Dr. Abimael Guzmán (Guzman’s support group) link
Statements of the armed group
Agreements involving armed groups