O'odua People's Congress (OPC)
Origins
The OPC traces its origins to August 1994, two months after the cancellation of the June elections following the supposed win of Moshood Abiola, a chief of the Yoruba clan - one of the largest ethnic groups in Nigeria. As a result, the Yorubas in the southwest of Nigeria felt economically oppressed and deprived of leadership in the federal government. The OPC rose naturally as a result of these sentiments and quickly established itself as a broadly supported movement among the Yoruba clans, both Christian and Muslim. The name O’odua is derived from Oduduwa, the folk progenitor of the Yoruba ethnic group; the group is occasionally referred to as the Oduduwa Peoples' Congress.
In his bibliography, Frederick Fasehun, the founder of the OPC, explains the origins of the group: “From inception, the OPC set out to right the wrongs of the annulment of June 12. It also went on to concomitantly agitate for a Sovereign National Conference (SNC), as a vehicle for, among other things: restructuring the country, writing the people’s Constitution, institutionalising an economic derivation principle fair to the peripheral and central powers in the spirit of true federalism system that will ensure the continued existence of Nigeria."
In 1999, the group split into two opposing factions: the moderates loyal to Dr. Frederick Fasehun, and a more radical wing led by the younger Gani Adams. This militant wing was less willing to compromise, objected to the OPC playing any part in Nigeria’s program of political transition, and consisted mainly of young supporters. The wing of the Gani Adams' faction is known as “Eso.”
Location / Main area of operation
The OPC is located primarily in Lagos State and the south-west region, including Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Osun Ekiti, and Kwara States. The group generates more support in "‘less-urban’ areas because of their neighbourhood security functions.”
Objectives
Initially, the OPC opposed Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha, and was at the forefront of the political struggle to restore democracy to Nigeria following the 1994 election annulment.
In its constitution, the group states its objectives:
1.To gather all the descendants of Oduduwa all over the earth especially in Africa, the Caribbean, South America and North America for a most profound, all embracing and
absolutely unflinching UNITY;
2. To identify with our historical and cultural origin with a view of re-living the glory of our past for the purpose of posterity;
3. To educate and mobilise the descendants of Oduduwa for the purpose of the above;
4. To integrate the aspirations and values of all the descendants of Oduduwa into a collective platform of an O'odua entity
5. To monitor the various interests of descendants of Oduduwa, by whatever name called, anywhere on the face of the earth and struggle for the protection of these interests;
6. To ensure maximum self-determination of the people of O'odua;
7. To further the progress of O'odua civilisation by protecting and promoting our values, mores and the inter-generational transmission of same;
8. To locate a bearing for an O'odua worldview and establish its place in the world;
9. To mobilise the people of O'odua for the National Cause.
However, by 1999, the OPC changed its fundamental objective from seeking self-determination for the Yoruba people to crime-fighting activities and the settlement of personal disputes. According to Human Rights Watch, it is not entirely clear what prompted this shift in direction, other than a desire to boost the organization's popularity. Some observers have linked it to the surge in popularity experienced by self-appointed vigilante groups in other parts of the country, notably the Bakassi Boys, a vigilante group active in the southeast of Nigeria. The success of Bakassi Boys may have partly inspired the OPC to take on a similar role in the southwest. The decision to take on vigilante work does not appear to have been clearly formalized within the OPC, and there are contradictions between the statements of OPC leaders and the day-to-day reality.
Since 1999, the group has operated within two spheres of activity: ethnic militancy and vigilantism. This split of activity is an accurate representation of the types of organizations popular in Nigeria: those which advocate for the specific interests of their particular ethnic, regional, or religious group in a broadly political context, and those which have taken on the task of fighting crime, without an explicit political agenda of their own.
Number of Members
The OPC claims a membership of more than five million Nigerians at home and abroad, though there “is a distinction between those who are registered members, thought by OPC officials to be no more than one million, and a greater number of sympathizers who join OPC activities at various times." In contrast, only a small percentage of registered members actively engage in the armed activities of the group; this armed faction of the OPC is estimated to have approximately 4,000 members.
There are at least 20 OPC ‘zonal commanders’, each claiming to lead 200 armed men. It also claims to have members in Benin, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Brazil, Germany, Jamaica, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
Type : National
The OPC is a national non-state armed group.
Conflict Status : Active
The government placed a ban on the OPC in 1999, forcing the group to go underground in some areas; however, it continues to operate in collaboration with local authorities. Furthermore, Dr. Fredrick Fasheun and Chief Gani Adams, two of the OPC leaders, are regular participants in Yoruba political leadership platforms. Although reports claim that by early 2003, military actions by OPC had declined, the armed group remains "active and visible." While in 2004, incidents of violence by and against the OPC have decreased, in 2006, the rival OPC leaders, Fasheun and Adams, were detained and charged with managing an illegal organization. The two leaders were eventually released from prison and the OPC is currently considered active.
Structure of the organization
OPC is one of the most organized armed groups in Nigeria. According to the group's leaders and individuals close to them, the organization has a strict hierarchical structure, chain of command, and an efficient system of communication. Its leaders have created structures and executive committees at state and national levels, with the Annual National Conference as its supreme decision-making body, and the National Executive Council as its governing body.
Both the OPC’s leadership and membership is “overwhelmingly” comprised of youth and as well as women who actively participate in “frontline combat” activities.
However, there has been an increase in fractions within the group between "rebellious youths” and adults which is diminishing the group's effectiveness and principled motivations. Beginning in 2003, there were two parallel, competing structures within the OPC as a result of this fractionalization. These parallel structures mean that, for example, at the local level, there are two OPC chairmen, one for each faction.
Leadership
Dr. Frederick Fasheun was one of the OPC’s founding members and was initially universally recognized as its leader. Other founding or leading members included a “number of highly skilled professionals and intellectuals, including, several activists involved in the struggle for democracy and human rights.” After a division within the group, Fasheun continued to lead the more moderate faction, while, since 1999, Gani Adams leads the more radical, militant wing.
External aid/Third party involvement
Recently the OPC and a number of other groups have come together to form a network of Yoruba self-determination organizations. The first coalition was formed in January 2000, and 2002 saw the official creation of the Coalition of O’odua Self-Determination Groups(COSEG). Additionally, the OPC, “enjoys close relations with state government authorities and even the explicit support of some governors,” which may offer the group some “protection” from the federal retaliation against its actions.
External effects of the NSAG's armed activities
No information is available on this matter.
Funding
Due to its widespread community support, the OPC are funded largely by its members. Fees are also charged when the OPC provides security at the private residences of some state government officials or high profile events, such as parties or other social functions. Leading Yoruba politicians, eager to be identified with a group which they perceive as widely popular, donate significant sums of money to the OPC, while state government authorities, including the 2003 governor of Lagos State, provide patronage. Local governments in Lagos State additionally require each household to pay 500 naira a month, directly to the OPC, for security and salaries.
Relationship with the international community
None.
Books
• Wunsch, James (2003), Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press ), retrieved in February 2008, from Praeger Security International Online database: link
• Szajkowski, Bogdan (ed) (2004), Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World (London: John Harper Publishing)
Articles and Chapters
• Nolte, Insa, “Ethnic Vigilantes and the State: The Oodua People's Congress in South-Western Nigeria," 21.2 International Relations (2007), at 217-235, available at link. Accessed on 20 February 2008.
• Jennifer M. Hazen with Jonas Horner. Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007, available at link
Reports and resolutions of intergovernmental organizations
Governmental reports
• Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Nigeria Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2005, March 8, 2006, available at link (last visited 18 February, 2006)
• Nigerian Public Communications Unit, Ethnic Militia Groups of Nigerian Societies, Nigeriafirst, April 9 2003, available at link (last visited 20 February, 2008)
Reports of think tanks and non-governmental organizations
• Human Rights Watch (2007), Vol.19. N°16(A), Criminal Politics Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria, available at link. Accessed on 18 February 2008.
• Small Arms Survey (2005), Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the Ecowas Region (Geneva: Small Arms Survey).
• Human Rights Watch (2003), Vol.15.N°19 (A), Nigeria: Renewed crackdown on freedom of Expression, available at link. Accessed on 20 February 2008.
• Human Rights Watch (2003), Vol.15.N°4 (A), Nigeria: The O'odua People's Congress: Fighting Violence with Violence (New York: Human Rights Watch), available at link on 20 February 2008.
• Human Rights Watch (2002), Vol.15.N°4 (A), The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and Torture, available at link. Accessed on 20 February 2008
• International Crisis Group, Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment, Africa Report No. 119, 25 October 2006, available at link
• Centre for Development and Conflict Management Studies, Sesay, Amadu, Ukeje, Charles, Aina, Olabisi, and Odebiyi, Adetanwa (eds), (2003) Ethnic Militias and the future of Democracy in Nigeria., available at : link
• Centre for Democracy and Development, Mohammed Ibrahim,Children and Youth in Organised Armed Violence: An Empirical Survey of Children and Youth in Organised Armed Violence in Nigeria: Egbesu Boys, OPC and Bakassi Boys as a Case Study (COAV). 30 May 2005.
Press Information (in chronological order)
Interviews
Internet resources
• Praeger Security International Online Database, Nigeria Ethnic Conflict in Multinational West Africa (James Wunsch), available at link. Accessed on 21 February 2008.
• The International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed Conflict Database, Non State Armed Groups, Nga, available at link
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Base, O’odua People’s Congress Group Profile, available at www.tkb.org
• GlobalSecurity.org, Oodua People’s Congress, Oodua Liberation Movement and Revolutionary Council of Nigeria, available at www.GlobalSecurity.org
Statements of the armed group
Agreements involving armed groups
• “Arewa politicians are to blame for riots in Nigeria - OPC's chief speaks out in Germany," The African Courier, January 27, 2001, available at link Accessed on 15 February 2008.
• Fasehun, Frederick I. (2002), F Fasehun: The Son of Oodua, Lagos: Inspired Communications, 245