Palestinian Islamic Jihad or Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine(PIJ)(Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin)
Origins
The PIJ is a Palestinian Islamic Sunni movement created by Fathi Shiqaqi and Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Awda in 1980 in the Gaza Strip.
Before creating this movement, Shiqaqi and Awda were students in Egypt and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the 1967 war, they, along with other members of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, started to question the roles of Islam and of the Brotherhood in the liberation of Palestine. Whereas the Brotherhood focused on the spreading of Islam in the society and rejected armed attacks, these young Palestinians wanted a direct armed confrontation with Israel. Additionally, the Islamic Revolution in Iran provided a key impetus for Shiqaqi and Awda’s departure from the Muslim Brotherhood and the creation of PIJ. They then broke off from the Brotherhood and created the nucleus of Islamic Jihad in Egypt in the late 1970s and then formed PIJ in the Gaza Strip in 1980 after the expulsion of Shiqaqi and Awda from Egypt. It must, however, be noted that during the 1980s, Islamic Jihad was a generic label in Palestine, but the major group was the Islamic Jihad Movement of Shiqaqi and Awda. The PIJ compromised one of six total Islamic Jihad groups, including the Jerusalem Brigade led by Tamimi, the Islamic Jihad Battalions, and the Amar faction of the Islamic Jihad.
According to an authoritative source, from 1998 on, Fathi Shikaki attempted to form a merger with the Islamic Jihad Battalions. It was only in 1992, however, that the merger took place; the PIJ’s armed wing, the Jerusalem Battalions or the Saraya al-Quds, emerged to bring coherence to various armed groups operating individually under PIJ’s name.
Location / Main area of operation
PIJ has a presence throughout the West Bank and Gaza. It has its main strongholds in Gaza and the northern West Bank, especially in the Jenin dictrict and Tulkarem. This armed group also has networks in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. These networks were established, with Hizbollah’s support, after the deportation of the PIJ’s leadership there in 1988. Additionally, the political leadership of this armed group is currently based in Damascus, Syria.
PIJ carries out its armed operations in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Israel. This armed group also formerly -at least until November 1999 - to attack Israel from the South of Lebanon.
Lastly, PIJ has rarely attacked Israeli or Jewish targets abroad.
Objectives
As an Islamist Palestinian movement, PIJ has two main objectives: first, to tear down the state of Israel; and second, to create a Palestinian state made of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Israel, and organized as an Islamic theocracy inspired by Iran.
During the second Intifada in 2000, the PIJ’s current Secretary-General, Ramadan Shallah, stated that the group could, however, accept a temporary state in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. He made equally clear that this would not imply the recognition of the state of Israel.
PIJ sees itself as a revolutionary Islamic movement; thus, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, the does not insist on spreading Islam in the society before starting the armed struggle. The PIJ’s main priority historically has been to carry out military actions.
It is also worth mentioning the fact that while PIJ is a Sunni Muslim organisation, it has derived significant inspiration and support from Iran, combining Palestinian nationalism with Islamism and Ayatollah Khomeini’s teachings.
Although its armed operations have been directed solely against Israel, PIJ threatened U.S. interests in 2007 following the U.S. Department of State’s announcement of a USD $5 million reward for the PIJ’s leader, Shallah. Specifically, one of the movement's leaders said that even if the movement had never harmed U.S. interests in the region, it could do so if its leader is harmed or endangered.
PIJ has criticised the Arab states describing them as a security belt for Israel and a guardian for its security. Nevertheless, PIJ’s position in this respect has slightly changed.
Regarding the relationship between PIJ and other Palestinian groups, it is first worth mentioning that while the PIJ does not recognise the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), it has never sought to challenge it or the Fatah politically. The PIJ views Hamas as a rival, but has, on several occasions, cooperated with it.
Number of Members
Recent estimates by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) put the numbers of the PIJ’s military wing, the Jerusalem Battalions, at 1,000-2,000, with “most estimates put[ting] its strength at around 1,600.” However, PIJ’s extremely secretive nature makes it difficult to accurately estimate its number of members.
Most PIJ’s members are refugees from rural areas, save in Gaza. During the second Intifada, this armed group was successful at recruiting a high number of new cadres from Fatah and members of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces, mostly in the northern West Bank. PIJ has not benefited from the current DDR-amnesty program offered to al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’ cadres; according to Palestinian political analysts, the reason for this is that Fatah prefers to retain an armed PIJ as a rival to Hamas.
Type : Transnational
PIJ is a transnational non-state armed group since it regularly carries out its armed operations in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Israel. In addition, the PIJ also carried out attacks, at least until November 1999, against Israel from the South of Lebanon.
It must be noted that although PIJ’s members are also currently present in Lebanon and Syria, they do not carry out armed operations in those countries.
Conflict Status : Active
Historically, PIJ has focused its strategies on military operations, and has not had any significant social or political involvement in the Palestinian society. However, since at least 2005, the PIJ has been re-evaluating its military-centric approach to consider engaging politically and socially. Moves in this regard include its acceptance of the Cairo Declaration on 17 March 2005, by which Palestinian armed groups agreed on a tahdi’a [calm] with Israel. Nonetheless, its messages have been mixed in this regard, with PIJ claiming responsibility for attacks during periods of the agreed-upon tahdi’a. PIJ has maintained that these attacks are retaliations against Israeli violations of the tahdi’a, in particular attacks, on Palestinian civilians. Nevertheless, PIJ’s leadership has several times expressed its willingness to reach an agreement with Israel, which has to be “comprehensive, concurrent and reciprocal”.
According to other accounts, however, PIJ’s armed attacks against Israel would also be motivated by the competitive relations between PIJ and Hamas. In particular, it has been suggested that the PIJ may see some advantage in pursuing armed attacks against Israel while Hamas declares adherence to tahdi’a. PIJ should be aware that Palestinian approval of armed attacks currently runs at approximately 70% of the population, and this number goes up after specific incidents of Palestinian armed resistance.
Structure of the organization
PIJ is viewed as the “intellectual” Palestinian Islamist movement, and is mainly a middle-class vanguard movement.
PIJ’s political leadership is composed of the Secretary-General, Ramadan Shallah, and a policy-making Shura Council based in Damascus. Inside Palestine, there is less political infrastructure, which is represented by spokesman Khaled al-Batsh.
PIJ has a military wing called the Saraya al-Quds (Jerusalem Battalions) created in 1992. The Jerusalem Battalions operate on a small cell structure without central command.
Estimates of PIJ’s command-and-control capacity vary, with some sources stating that the Syrian-based leadership exercises considerable control, and others putting a question mark on the political wing’s level of command and control over the military cells.
Leadership
The current Secretary-General of the movement is Ramadan Shallah. He replaced Fathi Shiqaqi after the latter's assassination in Malta in 1995 by alleged Israeli agents. Shallah is currently in Damascus and is wanted by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The other founding member of PIJ, Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Awda, is also currently in Damascus and is also wanted by the FBI. Another historical figure of the PIJ, Sheikh Asaad Bayoud al-Tamimi is currently detained in an Israeli jail.
External aid/Third party involvement
Iran is seen by the PIJ as a true ally of the Palestinian cause. Unlike other Palestinian groups, PIJ has a close ideological link with the country. Thus, one of PIJ’s doctrinal sources is Khomeini himself and the 1979 Islamic Iranian revolution is often perceived as an example for the Palestinians (even if the Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a Sunni movement).
Furthermore, Iran is reported to be the PIJ’s main funding provider, by giving about $2 million annually. In 1994, Shiqaqi recognised Iran's financial contributions, but he maintained that the money was given to families of Palestinian “martyrs” and detainees, as well as used in some social and health services.
During the 1980s, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was against the Arab states, including the Syrian government. However, the situation changed when former-Syrian president Hafez al-Assad welcomed some of the PIJ’s leaders in Damascus following their deportation from Palestine in 1989. Since then, the PIJ’s headquarters have been located in Damascus and the cooperation between the group and Syria has been maintained. The official purposes of the group’s headquarters in Damascus are informative activities; however, certain analysts consider Syria to be a “protective umbrella” for the PIJ under which the movement can plan operations in Israel. Specifically, Israeli sources claim that the Syrian headquarters are responsible for military operations against Israel.
As noted above, there are, however, different accounts regarding the political leadership’s level of command and control over the military cells.
Lastly, an authoritative source report that Hizbollah provides training, armament, and logistical support to the PIJ.
External effects of the NSAG's armed activities
There is no information available in this respect.
Funding
As mentioned above, Iran is reported to be the PIJ’s main funding provider, by giving about $2 million annually. In a 1999 interview, Ramadan Shallah, while denying any “official assistance from Iran,” recognised that charity from the people of Muslim nations, including Iran, was among the group’s sources of funding. Shallah also mentioned donations from members of the PIJ, the public, and private charitable institutions as other sources of funding.
Relationship with the international community
The Palestinian Islamic Jihad is listed as a terrorist organization by both the European Union and the United States.
Books
• Abu Amr, Ziad (1994), Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).
• Baud, Jacques (2003), Encyclopédie des terrorismes et violences politiques (Paris: Lavauzelle).
• Cordesman, Anthony H. (2005), The Israeli-Palestinian War: Escalating to Nowhere (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), available at link
• Milton-Edwards, Beverley (1996), Islamic Politics in Palestine (New York: IB Tauris)
Articles and Chapters
• Abu-Amr, Ziad, “Hamas: A Historical and Political Background”, 22.5 Journal of Palestine Studies (1993), at 5-19.
• al-‘Ayid, Khalid and Shallah, Ramadan ‘Abdallah, “The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process”, 28.4 Journal of Palestine Studies (1999), at 61-73.
• Barghouti, Iyad and Hajjar, Lisa, “The Islamist Movements in the Occupied Territories: An Interview with Iyad Barghouti”, 183 Middle East Report (1993), at 9-12.
• al-Ghazali, Sa’id, “Islamic Movement versus National Liberation”, 17.2 Journal of Palestine Studies (1988), at 176-180.
• Milton-Edwards, Beverley, “The Concept of Jihad and the Palestinian Islamic Movement: A Comparison of Ideas and Techniques”, 19.1 British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (1992), at 48-53.
• Najib, Mohammad and Roland Friedrich (2007), “Non-Statutory Armed Groups and Security Sector Governance,” in Roland Friedrich and Arnold Luethold (eds.), Entry Points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform, (Geneva: DCAF), at 103-130.
• Strindberg, Anders, “The Damascus-Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces: A Primer”, 29.3 Journal of Palestine Studies (2000), at 60-76
• Suleiman, Jaber, “Report From Lebanon: The Current Political, Organizational, And Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon”, 29.1 Journal of Palestine Studies (1999), at 66-80.
Reports and resolutions of intergovernmental organizations
• EU Council, Common Position 2006/380/CFSP of 29 May 2006, Official Journal of the European Communities L 144/25, 31.5.2006.
Governmental reports
• CRS Report for Congress, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, Washington DC, 25 August, 2006, available at link
• Federal Bureau of Investigation, ABD AL AZIZ AWDA, available at link .
• Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ramadan Abdullah Mohammad Shallah, available at link
• Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism, Washington DC, 28 April 2006, available at link
• U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Fact Sheet Office of Counterterrorism, Washington, DC, 11 October, 2005, available at link
Reports of think tanks and non-governmental organizations
• International Transition Assistance Group-Strategic Assessments Initiative (2005), Planning Considerations for International Involvement in the Palestinian Security Sector: An Operational Assessment (ITAG-SAI: Jerusalem).
• The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Force and the Graduate Institute for Development Studies (2006), Government Change and Security Sector Governance: Palestinian Public Perceptions, available at link
Press Information (in chronological order)
• “A holy war of words”, The Jerusalem Report, 10 January, 1991.
• “Khomeinism in Gaza”, The Jerusalem Post, 11 January, 1991.
• “Islamic extremists play down Iran link”, The Jerusalem Post, 14 December, 1994.
• “Palestinian leader sentenced to death in Lebanon”, Beirut Times, 4 November, 1999.
• “Lebanon warns Jihad not to attack Israel”, The Jerusalem Post, 16 November, 1999.
• “Mideast. Islamic Jihad leader comments on refugee in Lebanon, Israeli pullout”, Al-Safir in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 6 April, 2000.
• “Palestinian Hamas, Jihad, Fronts deny closure of Damascus offices”, Al-Hayat al-Jadidah in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 6 May, 2003.
• “Iran and Mideast peace”, The Washington Times, 13 June, 2003.
• “Major Palestinian Militant Groups”, The Washington Post, 20 August, 2003.
• “The Hamas-Jihad Axis”, The Jerusalem Post, 17 November, 2003.
• “Palestinian Islamists view state within 1967 borders as temporary solution”, Al-Hayat in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 26 January, 2004.
• “Jihad can wait”, The Jerusalem Report, 27 December, 2004.
• “Court told PIJ pay sent to 4 at think tank”, St. Petersburg Times, 29 July, 2005.
• “Islamic Jihad steps out from Hamas shadow”, Christian Science Monitor, 28 October, 2005.
• “The man behind the Palestinians’ hard line”, St. Petersburg Times, 20 November, 2005.
• “Al-Jazeera airs programme on Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s armed wing”, Al-Jazeera TV in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 7 July, 2006.
• “Islamic Jihad defends attacks on Israel after truce declaration”, Al-Jazeera TV in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 26 November, 2006.
• “Palestinian PM meets faction leaders in Damascus”, Al-Jazeera in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 5 December, 2006.
• “Palestinian Islamic Jihad threaten US interests after threat to leader”, Ma’an News Agency in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 14 February, 2007.
• “Palestinian Islamic Jihad spokesman says no plans to hit Israelis via Egypt”, Ma’an News Agency in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 25 February, 2007.
• “Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader rejects expansion of “calm” to West Bank”, Ma’an News Agency in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 3 April, 2007.
• “Report reviews presents Palestinian stances on calm with Israel”, Ma’an News Agency in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 11 April, 2007.
• “Islamic Jihad. We are not halting Kassam attacks”, The Jerusalem Post, 19 April, 2007.
• “Palestinian Islamic Jihad denies agreement with president over rocket fire”, Al-Quds in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 20 April, 2007.
• “Islamic Jihad militants claim firing fire two rockets at southern Israel”, Ma’an News Agency in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 9 May, 2007.
• “Palestinian factions set terms for calm with Israel”, Ramattan News Agency in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 9 May, 2007.
Interviews
• Expert on Palestinian armed groups’ interview with a Palestinian political analyst, Palestine, 21 February 2008.
Internet resources
• Council on Foreign Relations (1999), The Foreign Policy of Hamas, available at link
• Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (C.S.S), Profile of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, perpetrator of a suicide bombing attack, 28 February 2005, available at link
• Jean-François Legrain, Internet et histoire : les Brigades des martyrs d'Al-Aqsa, Les pages Internet comme sources de l’histoire du temps présent, available at link
• National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Al-Quds Brigades, available at link
• National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), available at link
• Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, Palestine Facts –Personalities, avalaible at link
Statements of the armed group
• Sarayas Al-Quds (Jerusalem Battalions), available at link (available in Arabic)
Agreements involving armed groups