Palestinian National Liberation Movement (FATAH) Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filistini 

Origins

Fatah , a large political movement including several armed groups and militias, was formed in Kuwait in 1957 by members of the Palestinian resistance affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood, notably Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar), Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), Muhammad Yussef al-Najjar (Abu Yussef), Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Khaled al-Hassan (Abu Said) . Due to the repression on the Muslim Brotherhood, they decided to create a new movement with the objective of the liberation of Palestine, through armed struggle, but without embracing Islamic ideology. While Fatah officially appeared on 10 October 1959 in Kuwait, it was not until January 1965 that it carried out its first armed action.
In the aftermath of the Arab defeat during the 1967 war which found Israel fighting Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria, Fatah was able to take control of the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter “PLO”) in 1968. Fatah has maintained its control over the PLO ever since.
Additionally, Fatah controlled the Palestinian Authority created pursuant to the 1993 Oslo accords without any serious challenge until the January 2006 parliamentary elections, when Hamas won those elections in the Gaza Strip. Fatah’s control over the Palestinian Authority’s institutions is explained because its leaders, who returned to the Occupied Palestinian territories during the 1990s, have held the highest posts within those institutions, including the security forces, since their arrival.

 

Location / Main area of operation

For this purpose, it is relevant to distinguish between the leadership on the one hand, and the armed groups and militia affiliated to Fatah, on the other hand.
Fatah’s leadership has often moved since its creation. From Kuwait, it first moved to Jordan, later to Lebanon and, following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, to Tunis, and finally, to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Fatah-affiliated armed groups and militia are located in the occupied Palestinian territories and in some Arab states. These armed groups can be divided in three categories:

The first category is constituted by Fatah’s affiliated armed groups located in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Within these armed groups is Tanzim, which provides the military and political base of the Palestinian Authority’s rule. In particular, it is reported that the Tanzim provides the cadres for the Palestinian Authority’s security forces. However, Tanzim also represents, to a certain extent, the Fatah “old guard” opposition. This had led certain analysts to conclude that the Tanzim has a contradictory character.
In addition to Tanzim, there are three other smaller groups affiliated to Fatah located in the Gaza Strip: Abu al-Rich Brigades, Fatah’s Hawk, and Jenin Martyrs Brigades.

The second category is made of three Palestinian Authority’s security services: the Preventive Security, the General Intelligence, and the Presidential Security Service or Force 17. These three Palestinian security services are considered a part of Fatah because they, in some instances, actively participated in fights against Israel, particularly during the second Intifada, and were involved in the power struggle with Hamas in the Gaza Strip in June 2007.  The close links between the Preventive Security Service and Fatah have even been recognised by a former leader of the Preventive Security Service.
In this respect, it must be noted that the Palestinian security forces, which were gave formal status by the May 1994 Cairo Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, are made of ten security and intelligence services plus two other security organizations.
The last category of armed groups considered as belonging to Fatah is made of those groups linked to the PLO which were initially located in various Arab countries but which later returned to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pursuant to the 1993 Oslo agreements. Before 1993, the following armed groups linked to the PLO were located in various Arab countries: Badr brigade in Jordan; al-Aqsa in Iraq; Sabra and Chatila in Yemen; Ajnadin in Algeria; al-Qods in Libya; Ain Jalout in Egypt; and Kadisiya in Sudan. After the 1993 Oslo agreements, several of those armed groups returned to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to be incorporated into the Palestinian security services. While it is unclear which of these armed groups still remain in foreign Arab countries, it is known that, as of the beginning of 2007, at least the Badr brigade, made of 2,000 men, was based in Jordan. Hundreds of members of the Palestinian National Liberation Army, which had between 5,000 and 8,000 actives in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen,  also joined the Palestinian security services after the Oslo agreements. Furthermore, Fatah still has militias in the Palestinian refugee camps of Lebanon, where the militias are responsible for the security and the police services.
Finally, the nature of the links between Fatah and some armed groups is rather unclear. For instance, even though several analysts present al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (hereinafter “AMB”) as closely linked to Fatah, an authoritative source states that Fatah, as an organisation, never controlled AMB; however, the same source adds that certain local Fatah leaders and individuals in the Palestinian Authority did exercise some control over AMB on the basis of the financial and material aid they provided.

 

Objectives

Initially, Fatah pursued a two-fold objective: first, to free all historical Palestine, including Israel, by military means; thus, Fatah initially rejected Zionism. Additionally, Fatah sought the creation of a single State for Christians, Jews, and Muslims over the integrity of what was Mandate Palestine.
Later, Fatah’s objectives evolved. Since the end of the 1970’s – although formally only since 1988 - Fatah espoused a two-state solution, meaning the establishment of a Palestinian State alongside Israel; the former made of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem following the borders existent prior to 5 June 1967. This led to the official recognition by the Fatah-controlled PLO of Israel in the 1993 Oslo Accords. In 1988, Fatah also officially renounced the use of violence vis-à-vis Israel. While this latter policy has since been maintained, authoritative sources report that, particularly in 2001 during the second Intifada, Yasser Arafat, the top Fatah leader, gave leeway to certain members of the Palestinian Authority’ security forces to participate actively in the conflict between Palestinian and Israeli forces. Additionally, it is reported that several militias were created in 2000, with Arafat's approval, to defend Palestinian-controlled towns from Israeli army and settler violence. In order to maintain and increase support on a broad scale, Fatah has only focused on the liberation of Palestine and has not espoused Communist, Socialist, Pan-Arabic or Islamic ideologies.

 

Number of Members

The current strength of Fatah’s alleged militias inside the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, i.e. Tanzim, Abu al-Rich Brigades, Fatah’s Hawk, and Jenin Martyrs Brigades, are unknown.
Additionally, and regarding the security services considered to be part of Fatah, the most up-to-date numbers are the following: the General Intelligence is estimated to have 4,200 members, the Presidential Security, or Force 17, about 2,500 members, and the Preventive Security about 5,500 members.
Finally, and with respect to Fatah-affiliated armed groups outside the occupied Palestinian territories, it is worth mentioning that authoritative sources report that, as of the beginning of 2007, the Badr brigade, based in Jordan, has 2,000 armed men.

 

Type : Transnational

Fatah is a transnational non-state armed group because its affiliated armed groups carry out their armed operations in Israel, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
Despite the presence of Fatah’s affiliated armed groups in other Arab States - especially in the refugee camps of Lebanon -, they do not carry out armed operations in those countries.

 

Conflict Status : Active

In order to determine the status of Fatah’s armed actions, distinctions must be made between the group's campaign against Israel as opposed to the campaign against Hamas.
Currently, it appears that Fatah does not carry out armed actions against Israel. This appears to be the case regarding both Fatah’s militias inside the occupied Palestinian territories and those abroad, i.e. in the Arab States. While it is reported that in 2001 during the second Intifada, Yasser Arafat, Fatah’s then-top leader, sponsored certain Palestinian militias and gave leeway to some of the Palestinian Authority’s security forces to participate actively in fighting against Israeli forces, no similar claims have recently been made. However, several analysts affirm that Fatah continues to carry out armed operations against Israel through “allies” armed groups such as al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Nevertheless, and as noted above, authoritative sources report that Fatah as an organisation never controlled al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, although certain local Fatah leaders and individuals in the Palestinian Authority exercised some control over al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.
On the contrary, the status of Fatah’s armed actions against Hamas is active since these two groups continuously involved in armed clashes. Since the end of the 1980s, Fatah’s political dominance in the Occupied Palestinian Territories has been challenged by Hamas, which has attempted to counter the insecurity among Palestinians in these territories since the establishment of the Fatah-led Palestinian Provisional Authority.
Hamas’ advance in the Palestinian political scene reached its turning point with its victory of the January 2006 parliamentary elections. While different views arose within Fatah on how to respond to this victory, in the end, Fatah’s hard-liners headed by Muhammad Dahlan, Fatah’s then-military head in Gaza, imposed numerous armed operations against Hamas; in particular, attacks on Hamas ministries, the Hamas-controlled parliament, and other Hamas-led institutions.
Despite increasing armed clashes between Fatah and Hamas, they agreed to create a unity government in February 2007. However, this government was short-lived. Four factors led to the failure of this agreement: first, the appointment of Mohammed Dahlan, feared by Hamas for his prominent role in the Palestinian Authority’s suppression of the latter in the mid-1990’s, as Abbas’ presidential security advisor. It is reported that, subsequent to the appointment, the security forces under Dahlan control continued to carry out armed operations against Hamas. A second factor that contributed to the failure of the unity government was the supply of money and training to Fatah by the US, Egypt, and Jordan for creating a new special militia made of 3,500 men that would be under the control of Abbas. The third factor was the supply, with the consent of Israel, of heavy weapons to Fatah in early June 2007. The last factor that contributed was the reversal by Abbas of the reforms introduced in the security sector aimed at putting security forces under the control of the Prime Minister. As a result, the Fatah-dominated security organisations were brought to the control of the President. In response, the Hamas-led government created a 5,000 man new security unit named Executive Force.
Fighting between Fatah and Hamas forces reached its peak in June 2007, when, after five days of intense combat, Hamas gained control over the Gaza Strip. Hamas maintains that by doing so, it pre-empted a coup d’état against its government.
Fatah responded to Hamas’ military victory in the Gaza Strip with a declaration of a State of Emergency, the dissolution of the unity government, and the appointment of a new Prime Minister. In addition, several reports state that Fatah’s affiliated militias in the West Bank carried out acts of revenge against Hamas’ militants.
For its part, Israel’s response to Hamas’ military victory in the Gaza Strip consisted of imposing a prohibition on imports and exports to that region, except for goods for humanitarian purposes, and a nearly total restriction on the circulation of persons. Press sources report that these restrictions will be eased pursuant to the cease-fire agreement concluded between Hamas and Israel in June 2008 and which entered into force on 19 June 2008.
Lastly, it must be noted that Hamas’ representatives have stated that the movement is open to dialogue with Fatah and that its dislike is only regarding certain Fatah members, particularly Mohammed Dahlan; therefore, Hamas’ leaders maintain that their armed actions are against the Fatah militia under the control of the National Security Adviser, Mohammed Dahlan.

 

Structure of the organization

According to Fatah’s constitution and the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, the structure of Fatah is the following:
- A Central Committee: In charge of all the movement’s activities and acts as the executive instrument of the General Congress.
- A Revolutionary Council: The supreme authority between sessions of the Congress.
- A General Congress: _The supreme authority of the movement.
- A General Council: Convenes on decision of the Central Committee and approval of the Revolutionary Council. Currently, it is not in function.
- A Higher Committee: In charge of the Occupied Territories affairs.
- Regional Committees
- Military Forces

Despite the formal existence of all these bodies, experts concur that the structure of the Palestinian Provisional Authority and Fatah since the return of the OLP leadership in exile to the occupied territories in the mid-1990s until Yasser Arafat’s death was characterised by the nepotism of the latter.
Additionally, there is also a considerable degree of fragmentation within Fatah. The two main factions consist of the Fatah “old guard” and the “new guard.” The former is made of the Fatah’s leadership who returned from exile with Arafat in 1994 pursuant to the Oslo accords and dominated the Palestinian authorities at least until the January 2006; it is represented by Abbas.
The Fatah’s “new guard” is composed of those born and raised in the West-Bank and the Gaza Strip and who actively participated in the first Palestinian intifada in 1987-1993. Their political power remains very limited. Its top leader is Marwan Barghoutin, currently held in an Israeli prison.
Certain experts add a third faction, the “young toughs” made of those who rose to local prominence with the second intifada of 2000-2005; the level of control exercised by the two other Fatah factions over this third faction is very limited.
While frictions among these factions have existed since the Oslo accords, they have been wider since the death of Yasser Arafat. These frictions were particularly serious during 2005, when infighting, assaults on rival politicians, and attacks by militants on public property took place. In the beginning of 2007, Marwan Barghouti, the top leader of Fatah’s “new guard” and currently held in an Israeli prison, called upon Abbas to replace the leadership of the security services, making reference to Dahlan, Shubak and Musharawi.

In addition, there have also been frictions between several of the security services of the Palestinian Authority; these frictions arose as a result of the competitive relationship promoted by Arafat among them.

 

Leadership

Mahmoud Abbas
The current Secretary General, also known as Abu Mazen. Abbas is one of the founding members of Fatah and is currently the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). He had not been a well-known figure of the movement until his nomination as the first Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority in April 2003.  After the death of Yasser Arafat on 11 November 2004, he was appointed chairman of Fatah and, in January 2005, elected president of the Palestinian Authority. He opposes the use of violence against Israel and condemned the military option adopted in 2000 by most of the Palestinian armed groups.

Muhammad Dahlan
A high ranking figure of Fatah in the Gaza Strip, Dahlan is from the “young guard” of Fatah which participated in the 1987 first Intifada. At that time, he was arrested eleven times by the Israeli police and deported in 1988. He is the former chief of the Preventive Security, considered to be one of the most powerful Palestinian security services, and still has significant influence within the service. While in office, he organized the repression of Hamas in 1996 and since then has had very tense relations with the movement. For example, during the fights between Fatah and Hamas at the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007, Hamas accused Dahlan of organizing the violence. For his part, Dahlan stated that Hamas wanted to kill him and that he would retaliate against Hamas in case of any aggression showed towards members of Fatah. His relations with Arafat were also very strained since they viewed each other as competitors. He has also been accused of having very close relations with the Israeli security forces and the CIA. Relations with his mentor, Abu Mazen, also deteriorated in 2007.

Farouk Qaddoumi
The second-most important figure of the Fatah’s movement, Qaddoumi is at the head of the Central Committee of the movement and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PLO. He has refused to accept the 1993 Oslo Agreements and, since then, has preferred to stay in Tunis. While Qaddoumi has been accused of plotting against Abbas jointly with Hamas, he was, nonetheless, appointed head of Fatah in 2004.

Marwan Barghouti
Barghouti is a very popular figure in Fatah from the “young guard” of the movement. He has been in the Fatah’s Revolutionary Council since 1989 and also held the position of General Secretary of the movement. Additionally, he was elected as a member of the Palestinian parliament in the 1996 legislative elections.
In domestic politics, he was loyal to Arafat, but asked for transparency and accountability in Fatah and the Palestinian Authority.
Barghouti supports a more direct confrontation with Israel; in particular, he saw the second Intifada in the form of mass demonstration and armed struggle against Israel as a key tool to push Israel to negotiate the final status of the Palestinian territories. As such, during the second Intifada, he played a major role in the confrontation against Israel. He was arrested by the Israeli army in April 2002 and accused of being the leader of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and blamed for suicide bombings against Israelis. Barghouti is currently in jail in Israel.
The popular support he enjoys has made him a potential future president of Palestine. For instance, he was about to participate in the 2005 Palestinian presidential election before withdrawing on 12 December 2004.

 

External aid/Third party involvement

As noted above,  it is reported that during the power struggle between Fatah and Hamas during the first six months of 2007, the US, Egypt, and Jordan supplied money and training to Fatah for the creation of a new special militia made of 3,500 men that would be under the control of Abbas. It is also reported that in early June 2007, heavy weapons were supplied to Fatah supply with the consent of Israel.
Additionally, and according to authoritative sources, some local branches of Fatah receive funding and political support from regional powers.
Finally, it is reported that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided funding to Fatah until 1991, when Arafat aligned with Saddam Hussein following the latter invasion of Kuwait. China, the USSR, and North Korea are also said to have provided material aid to Fatah.

 

External effects of the NSAG's armed activities

The Palestinian conflict, which has had Fatah as a key actor, has had numerous - direct and indirect - external effects. Among the direct external effects, three of note include: the millions of Palestinian refugees in neighbouring countries; the numerous armed conflicts between Israel and various Arab countries that had occurred; and the various resolutions issued by the principal bodies of the United Nations regarding this conflict.  

Funding

In order to understand the sources of funding of Fatah, it is first worth recalling that Fatah has controlled the PLO since 1968. Likewise, Fatah mastered the Palestinian Authority’s institutions created pursuant to the 1993 Oslo accords at least until the January 2006 parliamentary elections.
According to press information, during the 40 years prior to the Oslo accords, the Fatah-led PLO collected massive funds, even if there is not official estimation. Some report that the funds have been dilapidated; others that the PLO still has billions of dollars.
After the creation of the Palestinian Authority pursuant to the 1993 Oslo agreements, Fatah gained the control of this new entity and received foreign funds from the European Union, the Arab States and the U.S., as well as obtained the taxes collected by Israel. In particular, the fact that Fatah’s leaders have held the highest posts within the Palestinian Authority at least until January 2006 and that many of its cadres were recruited in the Authority’s security forces has meant that money is distributed to Fatah members through their employment. Additionally, it is reported that Fatah membership fees are deducted from the salary of the employees of the Palestinian Authority who are also members of the movement.
Furthermore, the U.S. has also recently been named of funding Fatah in order to strengthen it against its challenger, Hamas. According to media reports, the U.S. provided funds to Fatah during the January 2006 legislative elections, and later in the framework of the 2006 U.S campaign to support Palestinian groups capable of “democratic building." More importantly, authoritative sources report that during the power struggle between Fatah and Hamas that took in 2007 the US, Egypt and Jordan supplied money to Fatah for creating a new special militia made of 3,500 men that would be under the control of Fatah’s leader, Abbas.  
Additionally, it is reported that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided funding to Fatah until 1991, when Yasser Arafat aligned Fatah with Saddam Hussein following the latter invasion of Kuwait. China, the USSR, and North Korea are also said to have provided material aid to Fatah.

 

Relationship with the international community

Fatah has in general enjoyed good relations with most States and international organizations. This is mainly due to the fact that Fatah has since 1968 led the PLO, which enjoys a wide recognition within the international community. For instance, the United Nations General Assembly recognised the PLO to be the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." Additionally, Fatah is not considered by any intergovernmental organisation or foreign governments as a terrorist organization.

 

Books

• Atkins, Stephen E. (2004), Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), available at link.
• Baud, Jacques (2003), Encyclopédie des terrorismes et violences politiques (Paris: Lavauzelle).
• Cordesman, Anthony H. (2005), The Israeli-Palestinian War: Escalating to Nowhere (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), available at link.
• Hroub, Khaled (2002), Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies).
• Rashid Khalidi (2007), Palestine: Histoire d’un Etat introuvable (Arles: Actes Sud)
• Sayigh, Yezid (1999), Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (New York: Oxford University Press).

 

Articles and Chapters

• Asseburg, Muriel, ‘Hamastan vs. Fatahland,' German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comments, July 2007.
• Friedrich, Roland and Arnold Luethold (2007), “Introduction," in Roland Friedrich and Arnold Luethold (eds.), Entry Points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform (Geneva: DCAF), at 14-44.
• Glenn, Robinson, “The Fragmentation of Palestine," 106.704 Current History (2007), at 421-426.
• Hammami, Rema and Hilal, Jamil, “An uprising at a Crossroads," 219 Middle East Report (2001), at 2-7.
• Hammami, Rema and Tamari, Salim, “Anatomy of Another Rebellion," 217 Middle East Report (2000), at 2-15.
• Hammami, Rema and Tamari, Salim, “The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning," 30.2 Journal of Palestine Studies (2001), at 5-25.
• Hussein, Ahmad (2007), “Reconstructing the PNA Security Organisations," in Roland Friedrich and Arnold Luethold (eds.), Entry Points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform (Geneva: DCAF), at 45-70.
• Karmi, Omar, “Fatah’s Fatigue," 19.8 Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 2007, at 26-31.
• Luft, Gal, “The Palestinian Security Services: Between Police and Army," 3.2 Middle East Review of International Affairs (1999), at 47-63.
• Najib, Mohammad and Roland Friedrich (2007), “Non-Statutory Armed Groups and Security Sector Governance," in Roland Friedrich and Arnold Luethold (eds.), Entry Points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform (Geneva: DCAF), at 103-130.
• Rabbani, Mouin, “Rocks and Rockets: Oslo’s Inevitable Conclusion," 30.3 Journal of Palestine Studies (2001), at 68-81.
• Rabbani, Mouin, “Towards a War of Attrition in Palestine," 218 Middle East Report (2001), at 6-7.
• Sayigh, Rosemary, “Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future," 25.1 Journal of Palestine Studies (1995), at 37-53.
• Suleiman, Jaber, “Report From Lebanon: The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon," 29.1 Journal of Palestine Studies (1999), at 66-80.
• Tamari, Salim, “Who Rules Palestine ?," 31.4 Journal of Palestine Studies (2002), at 102-113.
• Usher, Graham, “Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On," 32.2 Journal of Palestine Studies (2003), at 21-40.
• Usher, Graham, “The Politics of Internal Security: The PA’s New Intelligence Services," 25.2 Journal of Palestine Studies (1996), at 21-34.
• Graham Usher, “Fatah's Tanzim: Origins and Politics," 217 Middle East Report (2000), at 6-7.
• Weinberger, Naomi, “The Palestinian National Security Debate," 24.3 Journal of Palestine Studies (1995), at 16-30.

 

Reports and resolutions of intergovernmental organizations

• EU Council, Common Position 2006/380/CFSP of 29 May 2006, Official Journal of the European Communities L 144/25, 31.5.2006.
• Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, EU funding to the Palestinian Authority: Commissioner Patten responds to a letter from Mr. Laschet, MEP, Brussel, 21 January 2003, available at link.
• League of Arab States, Resolution on Palestine, 28 October 1974, available at link
• UN General Assembly, Res. 3236, 22 November 1974, UN Doc. A/RES/3236.

 

Governmental reports

• Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, U.S. Policy Toward the Palestinians in the Post-Arafat Era, Washington DC, 9 March, 2005, available at link
• CRS Report for Congress, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, Washington DC, 25 August, 2006, available at link
• Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Israel vs Marwan Barghouti- Ruling by Judge Zvi Gurfinkel, 12 December 2002, available at link
• Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism, Washington DC, 28 April 2006, available at link
• U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Fact Sheet Office of Counterterrorism, Washington, DC, 11 October 2005, available at link

 

Reports of think tanks and non-governmental organizations

• International Crisis Group, After Arafat? Challenges and Prospects, Middle East Briefing N°16, 23 December 2004, available at link
• International Crisis Group, Who Governs the West Bank? Palestinian Administration under Israeli Occupation, Middle East Report N°32, 28 September 2004, available at link
• International Transition Assistance Group-Strategic Assessments Initiative (2005), Planning Considerations for International Involvement in the Palestinian Security Sector: An Operational Assessment (ITAG-SAI: Jerusalem), at 45.
• The Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF) and the Graduate Institute for Development Studies (2006), Government Change and Security Sector Governance: Palestinian Public Perceptions, available at link

 

Press Information (in chronological order)

• “Reopened pages from PLO's past," The Washington Times, 13 February 1990.
• “Arafat’s PLO faces huge cash crisis," Evening Standard, 25 August 1993.
• “The secret state of Palestinian finances," The Jerusalem Post, 25 August 1993.
• “Giving foreign aid a bad name," The Washington Times, 18 July 1995.
• “Palestinian official denies British newspaper report on massive "secret funds"," Al-Sharq al-Awsat in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 December 1999.
• “The amazing rise of Marwan Barghouti," The Jerusalem Report, 25 February 2002.
• “Israelis arrest key leader of West Bank uprising: Sharon says troops will leave Jenin and Nablus within a week," Financial Times, 16 April 2002.
• “As Arafat critics close in, Deputies Vie in the Wings," The New York Times, 21 May 2002.
• “Arafat fight over Cabinet dashes peace hopes," The Times, 22 April 2003.
• “Profile: Mahmoud Abbas: Could This Man Bring Peace to the Middle East?," The Independent, 26 April 2003.
• “A Leader's Conflicting Impulses; Palestinian Is Known For Strong Views, but Shuns Confrontation," The Washington Post, 10 May 2003.
• “Palestinian Dahlan denies ultimatum to Arafat, urges reforms," Al-Sharq al-Awsat in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 13 August 2004.
• “Abbas Declares Victory in Vote by Palestinians," The New York Times, 10 January 2005.
• “Un jeu compliqué entre les diverses factions armées de Gaza: Mahmoud Abbas devra reprendre le contrôle face aux grands féodaux qui dirigent la dizaine de services de sécurité," Le Figaro, 11 January 2005.
• “Palestinians back away from suicide attacks," The Washington Times, 11 March 2005.
• “Backing Seen Weakening for Abbas," The Boston Globe, 5 April 2005.
• “US allegedly helping fund Fatah campaign," The Jerusalem Post, 24 January 2006.
• “Apre bataille de fonds entre Abbas et le Hamas," Le Figaro, 27 April 2006.
• “Fatah’s US saviour," Al Ahram Weekly, 19-25 October 2006, at link .
• “Jordan Considers Sending Troops to Areas," The Associated Press, 6 November 2006.
• “Mahmoud Abbas parvient à un accord de cessez le feu avec Israel," Le Temps, 27 November 2006.
• “Same old Fatah means victory for Hamas," The Jerusalem Post, 14 December 2006.
• “Hamas Rejects Plan by Abbas To Call Elections; Early Vote Would Include Presidency," The Washington Post, 17 December 2006.
• “Fatah's show of strength; Mohammed Dahlan, known as a tough guy, leads the Palestinian movement's battle with the radical Hamas," Los Angeles Times, 21 January 2007.
• “US allegedly helping fund Fatah campaign," The Jerusalem Post, 24 January 2006.
• “Hamas accuses Dahlan of being behind latest violence," The Jerusalem Post, 29 January 2007.
• “The Gazafication of the Gaza Strip is spreading to the West Bank," The Economist, 3 February 2007.
• “PA officials don’t want Barghouti out now," The Jerusalem Post, 10 April 2007.
• “Palestinian militants fire three rockets at Israeli targets," Ma'an News Agency in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 10 April 2007.
• “Hamas criticizes US financial aid to Palestinian presidential guard," Ma'an News Agency in BBC Monitoring Middle East, 11 April 2007.
• “World Briefing Middle East: Hamas Criticizes U.S. Security Aid for Abbas," The New York Times, 12 April 2007.
• “Al-Aqsa Brigades claims responsibility for wounding 4 Israelis near Ramallah," Ma’an News Agency, in BBC, 17 April 2007.
• “PA paying Schalit captors' families," The Jerusalem Post, 10 June 2007, at link.
• “Hamas on brink of Gaza takeover," The Guardian, 14 June 2007.
• “Hamas takes over Abbas compound," The Jerusalem Post, 14 June 2007.
• “Israel and Palestine: Cinderella at Annapolis," The Economist, 24-30 November 2007, at 27-29, available at link.
• “The Gaza Bombshell” (David Rose), Vanity Fair, April 2008, available at link.

 

Interviews

Internet resources

• MIFTAH, Fact Sheet: The Palestinian Authority’s Source of Funding, available at link
• Global Policy Forum, Oslo Accord, available at link
• National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, al-Fatah, available at link .
• National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Tanzim, available at link .
• Nativ online, From Clandestine Army to Guardians of Terror: The Palestinian Security Forces and the Second Intifada, available at link
• PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, Summary of Palestinian positions, available at link
• Palestine Facts, What is Fatah, available at link
• The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, Fateh –Palestinian National Liberation Movement, available at link

 

Statements of the armed group

• Fateh Net, Constitution, available at link

Agreements involving armed groups