The Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) 

Origins

Asari Dobuko was elected as the president of the very influencial movement Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) in 1998. The IYC is an Ijaw organization formed in 1998 to push for greater resource control and environmental sustainability. It appears that Dobuko's leadership was considerably more radical than moderates in the IYC were comfortable with and he made a number of enemies who subsequently tried to oust him. Dobuko resigned as IYC president on 10 July 2003 amid pressures from senior IYC figures and, using his gained popularity and connections, subsequently created the NDPVF.
Dobuko named the NDPVF after the 1960s-era Ijaw revolutionary Isaac Boro’s Niger Delta Volunteer Force. Dobuko has claimed that, Isaac Boro is his model and his actions are heavily influenced by the latter's work in previous decades. The exact date of the creation of the NDPVF is unknown as Dobuko himself has said that “the date of the founding of the organization cannot be precise.” However, the general time frame of the group's creation is in late 2003.
 

Location / Main area of operation

The NDPVF operates primarily in Rivers State. Rivers State is one of the nine Nigerian states which comprise the Niger Delta, located in southern Nigeria. The region's oil accounts for approximately 90 percent of the value of Nigeria's exports, but the Niger Delta remains one of Nigeria's least developed regions.

 

Objectives

According to Dobuko, the creation of the NDPVF is an effort to achieve through force the demands issued in the Kaiama Declaration. In its first three article, the Kaiama Declaration states:

1. All land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory belong to Ijaw communities and are the basis of our survival.
2. We cease to recognize all undemocratic decrees that rob our peoples/communities of the right to ownership and control of our lives and resources, which were enacted without our participation and consent. These include the Land Use Decree and The Petroleum Decree etc.
3. We demand the immediate withdrawal from Ijawland of all military forces of occupation and repression by the Nigerian State. Any oil company that employs the services of the armed forces of the Nigerian State to "protect" its operations will be viewed as an enemy of the Ijaw people. Family members of military personnel stationed in Ijawland should appeal to their people to leave the Ijaw area alone.

The NDPVF is often linked with illegal oil bunkering, though this practice is widespread in the Niger Delta. However, according to Asari’s statement:
“I am not an illegal bunkerer. I am taking what belongs to my people and giving it back to them. How can petrol sell for 45 Naira in Abuja and Lagos and today in Buguma and Nembe [in the Niger Delta] it is sold at 200 Naira per litre? … I am refining it and selling 15 Naira per litre in the riverine areas. They are happy because I have emancipated them from Obasanjo and Odili’s slavery. I give oil, which belongs to the people, back to the people. Who amongst those accusing us about bunkering are not engaging in it from the highest level down?”
In announcing the “all-out war” against the Nigerian state, Asari demanded the total shutdown of all oil production in the Delta region and the evacuation of all foreigners working in the oil industry.

 

Number of Members

During 2004, the NDPVF in Rivers state was one of the largest and most violent non-state armed groups. In 2004, Asari claimed that his organization fronted a volunteer force of up to 168,000 fighters and more were joining every day. Experts later believed that his estimation was wildly exaggerated.

Type : National

The activities of the NDPVF are limited in their geographical scope and focus on operations in and around Rivers State; therefore, the armed group is considered as national.

 

Conflict Status : Active

In September 2004, the Federal Government of Nigeria commenced negotiations with several violent non-state actors. The aim of the peaceful dialogue was the disarmament of the rebel groups. On 1 October 2004, in a meeting between officials of the government and leaders of non-state actors, among which was the NDPVF in Abuja, Asari agreed to disband its militias and to totally disarm. He also agreed to an immediate ceasefire. Furthermore, the NDPVF leader pledged to support peace in the region and abide by the law. The government initiated the Arms-For-Cash Programme, to mop up arms in the effected areas. Monetary rewards and amnesty were granted to those who voluntarily returned their arms. Asari himself admitted in an interview: “We’re also getting a good price for the weapons. We can’t give them to the Nigerian state for free. We bought them with money.” However, the NDPVF leader accused the disarmament committee of intentionally miscalculating the arms submitted by the NDV. He claimed that the committee exaggerated the number of weapons, which were submitted by the NDV, to allow the NDV to retain its weapons and gain advantage in comparison to NDPVF. Due to those accusations, the peace deal ruptured on 3 November, 2004, when NDV stormed Port Harcourt and killed Minabo Fiberesima, who was said to be a member of the NDPVF. This was the most significant attempt for a ceasefire and it was unsuccessful.
In 2005, Asari was arrested but later freed in 2007 as a part of the president’s strategy to establish a peaceful dialogue with the armed groups in the Niger Delta. Since his release, the NDPVF leader has persisted in delivering harsh rhetoric against the Nigerian government. According to some analysts: “It is clear that Asari is hoping to preserve his role as a key ideological leader among the Ijaw and other delta inhabitants. The terms of his release preclude Asari from resuming his past militant activities, yet he maintains extensive contacts with delta militant groups, making him an asset to both the government and to the armed fighters. Since many of his former followers in the NDPVF are probably now operating in other armed factions, Asari's reach extends deep into the dizzying network of groups and sub-groups in the Niger Delta.”

 

Structure of the organization

No information available.

Leadership

Alhaji Mujahid Abubakar Asari Dokubo is the leader or the NDPVF. He was born on 1 June 1964 in Buguma, Rivers state.

 

External aid/Third party involvement

The NDPVF exchanges illegal bunkered oil for stolen weapons. Weapons are captured or seized from local stocks or bought from corrupt individuals. These include arms captured from (or sold by) the Nigeria Mobile Police and Nigerian army personnel; those captured or bought from Cameroonian soldiers stationed in the Bakassi peninsula (whose jurisdiction is disputed between Nigeria and Cameroon); and those purchased from ex-Nigerian soldiers also deployed to the same region.

External effects of the NSAG's armed activities

Due to the violence in the Niger Delta, oil production has dropped by 25 percent. On 9 January 2007, the Finance Minister, Nenadi Usman, told reporters that oil production had decreased by as much as 600,000 barrels per day in the previous year, resulting in a $4.4 billion loss in oil revenue. A significant amount of the hostility in Rivers state, leading to the losses in the profit of oil, has been associated with the NDPVF.

Funding

Most of the funding for the NDPVF is supplied by large scale oil thefts (bunkering) via barges and flow stations for the international markets. The NDPVF is suspected to have received funding as an exchange for political protection. State government officials have vehemently denied their sponsorship of this group, but the activities of some officials have been documented by Human Rights Watch, Nigerian civil society groups, and journalists.
Asari draws support from the Kalabari ethnic group and the cult Dey Gbam. He also claims to receive generous donations from Ijaws, the largest ethnic population in Rivers state, and residents of Port Harcourt, noting, for example, that in one week alone he received 20 million naira (about USD 155,000) from public donations.
Another source of income for the NDPVF is kidnapping foreign oil workers. After kidnapping the individuals, the group issues a list of requests, normally involving large sums of cash and other luxuries. More than 200 foreign oil workers were taken hostage in and around Port Harcourt in 2007. They were freed only after paying large ransoms.
 

Relationship with the international community

In 2003 and 2004, severe fighting broke out over the control of territory and oil bunkering between the NDPVF and the NDV (Niger Delta Vigilante) causing the deaths of hundreds of people and the displacement of tens of thousands in and around Port Harcourt. Due to the conflicts in the region, 40 percent of Nigeria's oil output was, for a brief time, ceased. The situation calmed down in late September 2004 only after the NDPVF leader threatened to launch an all-out war unless the Nigerian government granted greater control of the region’s oil resources to the Ijaw people. This attracted international attention, particularly in the oil industry and resulted in an internal security mission, launched by the Nigerian government. The mission was code-named “Operation Hakusi”.

Books

Articles and Chapters

• “A New Year Offensive”, 47.2 Africa Confidential, (2006), at 1-2, available at link
• Marquardt, Erich, “Mujahid Dokubo-Asari: the Niger Delta’s Ijaw Leader”, 5.15 Terrorist Monitor (2007), at 1-4, available at link
• Yomi Oruwari, Youth in Urban Violence in Nigeria: A Case Study of Urban Gangs from Port Harcourt, Working Paper No. 14, available at link
  
   

Reports and resolutions of intergovernmental organizations

Governmental reports

Reports of think tanks and non-governmental organizations

• Human Rights Watch, Case Study C: Rivers State, October 2007, at link#_ftnref285
• Human Rights Watch. Violence in Nigeria’s Oil Rich Rivers state in 2004, Briefing Paper, February 2005, available at link
• International Crisis Group, Nigeria: Ending Unrest in the Niger Delta, Africa Report N°135, 5 December 2007, available at link
• International Crisis Group, Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis Crisis Group Africa Report N°118, 28 September 2006, available at : link. Accessed on August 2008.
• Small Arms Survey (2005), Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the Ecowas Region (Geneva: Small Arms Survey).
• Terrorism Monitor, Erich Marquardt, Mujahid Dokubo-Asari : The Niger Delta’sIjaw Leader, Volume V, Issue 15, August 2 2007, available at : link. Accessed on August 2008.
• The Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Nigerian 2007 Election: A Guide for Journalists and Commentators., Africa Programme Briefing Note, AFP BN 07/01, February 2007, available at link
• United States Institute of Peace, Strategies for Peace in the Niger Delta, December 2005, available at link

 

Press Information (in chronological order)

• “Nigeria: Crime Pays”, Leadership, 7 January, 2008, available at link
• “Our Links with Biafra,” The News, 20 September, 2004.
• “The Niger Delta Rebellion: Why We Are Fighting,”Newswatch, 20 September, 2004,
• “Caging The Ateke Monster”, The Guradian, 20 January, 2008,available at link.

 

Interviews

Internet resources

• United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, NIGERIA: No shortage of Niger Delta youth ready to join militias, 1 February 2008, available at link
• United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, NIGERIA: Curfew in Port Harcourt makes life safer but harder, 13 September 2007, available at link.
• United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, NIGERIA: Lull in Port Harcourt fighting is likely to be temporary, 20 August 2007, available at link.
• United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, NIGERIA: Militia leader puts freeze on voluntary disarmament, 16 November 2004, available at link
• United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, NIGERIA: Fresh militia attack kills two, threatens truce in oil region, 05 November 2004, available at link and link
• United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, NIGERIA: Obasanjo pledges to stem tide of militancy in oil-rich Delta, 1 October 2004, available at link
• United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, NIGERIA: Over 100 killed in month of violence in Port Harcourt, 10 September 2004, available at link
   

Statements of the armed group

Agreements involving armed groups

• United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, NIGERIA: Niger Delta militia surrendering weapons for cash, 29 October 2004, available at link and link