Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)/ United People's Front (CPN-M) 



Origins

Analysts agree that the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (hereinafter “the CPN-M”)was formed after a split in two fractions of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre) in 1994. In particular, the fraction led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Comrade Prachanda, and Baburam Bhattarai constituted the base for the formation of the CPN-M in 1995. Nevertheless, it was not until 13 February 1996 that the CPN-M launched a “people’s war,” carrying out its first armed attacks. Most analysts point out the following factors as being those most closely related to the CPN-M’s armed uprising: the exclusion of the Bhattarai-led faction of the United People’s Front Nepal (UPFN) from the general elections in 1994; the ideological radicalization of certain constituencies of the communist party; the erosion of authority resulting from permanent intra and inter political parties’ struggles under the 1990 political arrangement; as well as the revival of ethnic differences.
Other factors typically considered root causes of the conflict are economic, caste, ethnic, regional, and gender inequality, as well as poverty and corruption among state agents. The immediate reason given by the CPN-M itself to declare its intention to take up arms was the failure of the Nepalese Government to respond to that group’s demands for “nationalism, democracy and livelihood,” including the abolition of royal privileges and the adoption of a new constitution.”
 

Location / Main area of operation

The Maoists used to conduct military operations throughout Nepal, as well as exercise control over a large part of the country. Nevertheless, estimates of the extent of territory controlled by the CPN-M vary from approximately 40% to 80%. Sources cite a very strong CPN-M presence in the districts of Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, Salyan, Pyuthan and Kalikot in mid-western Nepal to the point that the government was present only in the district capitals, with the remaining territory being under the control of the CPN-M. In some areas, the CPN-M used to run administrations in parallel with those of the government. As regards the CPN-M’s current areas of operation and status, please see the section “Conflict Status.”


Objectives

The main objective of the CPN-M is to overthrow the monarchy in order to establish a naulo janbad (“new people’s democracy”) following a Marxist-Leninism-Maoism ideology. However, analysts consider that since the 2003 peace talks there has been an ideological shift in the CPN-M as its leaders have not ruled out the possibility of obtaining the changes sought in the Nepalese society through electoral politics. As described below, this shift appears to have been confirmed by the conclusion of the November 2006 Peace Agreement.

 

Number of Members


The estimates of the number of the CPN-M’s armed combatants differ considerably, ranging from 4,000 to 10,000. The higher number was released by the CPN-M itself, corresponding closely to figures provided by the Nepalese armed forces and it has been accepted by several close observers.  
Additionally, it is worth noting that several sources report that women have had a significant presence within the CPN-M; estimates indicate that one-fifth to one-third of the members of the group may be women. As to the geographical distribution of the CPN-M’s members, analysts suggest that this armed group has more support in rural areas than urban areas as people in the latter prefer to work with political parties.  
 

Type : National

CPN-M is a national NSAG as its armed actions have been carried out exclusively in Nepalese territory.

Conflict Status : StatuQuo

From 1996 to 1999, the attacks by the CPN-M remained at a low intensity and were directed mainly against state agents. From 2000, the Maoists started attacking Nepalese police forces and, in 2001, army contingents.  
After the killing of King Birendra and nine other members of the royal family on 1 June 2001, the country suffered from increased instability. On 4 June 2001, Birendra’s surviving brother Gyanendra Bikram Shah Dev was proclaimed King. From this point forward, the armed conflict escalated; with armed attacks being carried out also in the Nepalese capital, Kathmandu. In addition, the weakness of the central government’s authority, the instability of the governments (changing twelve times during the period 1990-2002), together with the increasing powers exercised by the Monarchy over the army and other key elements of the Nepalese government exacerbated the Nepalese conflict.
Despite this complex situation, two ceasefires and rounds of peace talks were held between the Nepalese government and the CPN-M. The first ceasefire was declared on 25 July 2001 and the second one on 29 January 2003. The latter round of peace talks was broken due a disagreement between the parties over the possibility of Nepalese people to elect representatives for a constitutional assembly.
The situation turned even more instable on 1 February 2005, when the King Gyanendra assumed absolute powers after he removed from power the elected Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, placed the government under house arrest, declared the State of Emergency and deployed the army in Kathmandu.
This coup d’état by the Monarch prompted major demonstrations and a general strike in the country in April 2005. In May of the same year, seven opposition parties formed a coalition, called the seven party alliance (hereinafter “the SPA”), pursuing the end of the absolute rule by the King, and the restoration of civil liberties. In mid-2005, secret negotiations were held between the CPN-M and the SPA in New Delhi. As a result of these negotiations, the SPA and the CPN-M worked together in the April 2006 mass movement that put an end to King Guyanendra’s dictatorship and led to the restoration of the parliament. Subsequently, peace negotiations were conducted between the SPA-led Nepalese government and the CPN-M. On 16 June 2006, the Nepalese government and the CPN-M signed an agreement to request the UN to monitor their arms and armies and decided to dissolve both the parliament and the CPN-M parallel governmental institutions with the aim to establish an interim legislature until the adoption of a new constitution. This agreement facilitated further negotiations as the management of arms and armies was seen by both parties as a critical matter.

Negotiations continued and ultimately led to the acceptance by all parties of a peace agreement, called the Comprehensive Peace Accord (hereinafter “the PCA”), on 21 November 2006. The PCA includes 1) a declaration to end the civil war; 2) the decision to organize elections for a constitutional assembly; 3) the inclusion of the CPN-M in the interim government and electoral politics; 4) the containment of the CPN-M combatants to cantonments and the storage of their arms, and likewise, the confinement of the Nepalese army to the barracks and the storage of a similar number of arms to those of the CPN-M, all while under the supervision of the UN; 5) an understanding between the parties that “no rights on the state administration would remain with the King” and the confiscation of his property; 6) the decision that the interim cabinet will adopt and implement a democratization plan of the Nepali Army, including the incorporation of the CPN-M members; and 7) a request to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to monitor the human rights provisions included in the PCA.

Pursuant to the PCA, on 1 April 2007, five former CPN-M members were sworn in as ministers in the interim Nepalese government; and the group gained 83 of the 330 seats in the interim Parliament, which was formed on 2 February 2007.

Nevertheless, the CPN-M withdrew from the interim government in September 2007 reportedly based on disagreements with the other political parties over fresh demands to introduce full proportional representation and abolish the monarchy prior to the elections.

These disagreements led to the postponement of the elections for a constitutional assembly originally scheduled for April 2007. On 23 December 2006, the CPN-M and the other political parties of the interim government reached an agreement resulting in the CPN-M rejoining the government on 31 December 2007.

In addition to these political developments, it is worth mentioning that ethnic tensions and violence, particularly in the southern region of Terai, took place throughout 2007. This violence mainly involved groups formed by people of Madhesi origins and certain Maoist groups, particularly the Young Communist League (YCL). Several armed groups made up of people of Madhesi origins were formed while other groups, already present in the region of Terai (the Terai Democratic Liberation Front or JTMM), broke apart.

Concerns regarding the CPN-M's relationship with the Young Communist League (YCL), a Maoist youth group, have arisen but the CPN-M's leadership denies having any control over the group and, more generally, has strongly reaffirmed its commitment towards a political solution. Despite these statements, the Nepalese press has reported cases of money extortions of businessmen and other people in the Nepalese capital, harassment of certain Indian nationals, and threats of journalists by certain CPN-M members.

 

Structure of the organization

The CPN-M follows for the most part a typical communist party structure, composed of three bodies: The Party, the Army and the United front. The Party, which controls the Army and sets the policy lines of the group, is hierarchically structured; it is made from top to down of the Standing Committee, the Politburo, the Central Committee, the divisional commands, the regional and sub-regional bureaus, and district, area and cell committees. The most important decisions within the CPN-M are taken by the Standing Committee. The Politburo is also responsible for creating the political and military strategies of the group. Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Comrade Prachanda, is the Chairman of the Standing Committee.
The army, known as the People’s Liberation Army, is responsible for carrying out all the military operations of the CPN-M. It is also hierarchically structured with the power flowing from the general headquarters, the divisions, the brigades, the battalion, the companies, the platoons and then to the squads. The Army reportedly has six battalions, each led by its respective chief commanders. The deployment of the army is decided by the central military commission, which is led by the Party chairman, Comrade Prachanda. Analysts concur that the CPN-M has a generally effective chain of command.
In addition to the army, there are also the militias but which barely take part in military activities and whose major role is to provide support to the army.
It is reported that the United People’s Front was replaced in February 2002 by the joint people’s committees that constitute parallel governmental bodies, in particular at the local and regional levels. In addition, the CPN-M has created several support organizations, including regional, ethnic and class fronts.

 

Leadership

As seen above, the top leader of the CPN-M Maoists is Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Comrade Prachanda, who is the Chairman of the Central Committee and the highest commander of the group’s army. Baburam Bhattarai is the co-founder of the CPN-M with Comrade Prachanda and has been the group's ideologue throughout its existence.
Ram Bahadur Thapa, alias Badal, is a member of the group’s Politburo and Standing Committee and represented the group in the peace-talks held in 2003. Krishna Bahadur Mahara also represented the CPN-M in the 2003 peace-talks and is reportedly that group’s spokesperson.
 

External aid/Third party involvement

Currently, the CPN-M does not receive any external aid. Nevertheless, there have been claims in the past that certain states, in particular India, did not prevent the CPN-M from using its territory to hide and prepare its armed actions in Nepal. It must, however, be noted that the cooperation between India and Nepal in the fight against the CPN-M increased in 2003 leading to the arrest of several of the group's members in India.
Additionally, it has been reported that the CPN-M has received equipment and other supplies from sympathetic armed groups in India, including the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M), the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), and the Kaptapur Liberation Organisation (KLO). In addition, there have been reports of further links with other armed groups throughout India.

 

External effects of the NSAG's armed activities

According to the UNHCR, the number of refugees and asylum-seekers from Nepal considerably increased from 1999 to 2005; the years 2003 to 2005 being those with the highest numbers – more than 1,000 in 2003 and 2004. and 2,065 in 2005. It must, however, be noted that exact number of refugees from Nepal appears to be considerably higher that those reported because many refugees are not registered due to the porous border between Nepal and India; additionally, it is difficult to distinguish between refugees and those Nepalese who moved to India for economic reasons, which historically have been many.

Additionally, and despite the fact that the exact numbers of IDPS put forward differ, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated that from 1996 to 2007, there were approximately between 100,000 – 200,000 IDPs in Nepal. It is worth mentioning that international organisations and analysts have dismissed the roughly 8,000 IDPs according to the government’s statistics on the ground that the latter registration process only covers those IDPs who wish to declare themselves officially as victims of the CPN-M and hence, by definition, excludes the victims of state violence. Mr. Walter Källin, the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, stated that as of 2005 there was “a widespread pattern of conflict-induced displacement in Nepal.”
 

Funding

The CPN-M’s alleged major sources of funding were- prior to the PCA - bank robbery, protection money, “taxes” taken from the areas where it exercised control, and donations from Nepalese emigrants principally in India.

Relationship with the international community

Since the mid-2005 negotiations with the SPA held in New Delhi, the CPN-M has increased its relationships with the international community. These relationships were further enhanced following the conclusion of the Peace Agreement on 21 November 2006 and the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies on 28 November of 2006. As mentioned above, these agreements grant important powers to UN bodies, such as the supervision of the confinement of the armies of the CPN-M and the government, and the storage of their arms, as well as the monitoring of the human rights provisions included in the CPA

Books

  • Atkins, Stephen E. (2004), Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups, “Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-Maoist) (Nepal)” (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), available at link
  • Balencie, Jean-Marc and De La Grange, Arnaud (2005), Les Nouveaux Mondes rebelles, (Paris: éditions Michalon).
  • Thapa, Deepak & Sijapati, Bandita (2003), A Kingdom under siege: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2004 (Kathmandu: The Printhouse).
     

Articles and Chapters

  • Shrestha, Bandana and Niroula, Som, “Internally Displaced Persons in Nepal”, 1.2 Peace and Democracy in South Asia (2005), at 44- 55.
  • Curtis, Tim (2004), “Nepal,” in Bogdan Szajkowski (ed), Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World 344 (London: John Harper Publishing).
  • Mishra, Chaitanya (2006), “Locating the “structural causes” of the Maoist Struggle,” in Shambhu R. Simkhada and Fabio Oliva (eds), The Maoist Insurgence in Nepal: A Monograph 19 (Geneva: The Graduate Institute of International Studies).
  • Shan, Saubhagya (2004), “A himalayan red herring? in Nepal”, in Hutt, Michael, Himalayan “People’s War” 192 (London: Hurst & Company).
  • Sharma, Sudheer (2004), “The Maoist Movement: an Evolutionary Perspective in Nepal”, in Hutt, Michael, Himalayan “People’s War” 38 (London: Hurst & Company).
  • Shrestha, Bandana and Niroula, Som, “Internally Displaced Persons in Nepal”, 1.2 Peace and Democracy in South Asia (2005), at 44- 55.
  • Thapa, Deepak (2004), “Radicalism and the Emergence of the Maoists, in Nepal,” in Hutt, Michael, Himalayan “People’s War” 1 (London: Hurst & Company).
  • “Nepal’s Insurgents Play Peace Card From Position of Strength”, 17.12 Jane’s Intelligence Review 16, December 2005.
  • “Maoist Insurgents Strengthen Hold on Rural Nepal,” 18.5 Jane’s Intelligence Review 12, May 2006.
  • “Nepal’s Long Road to Peace,” 18.9 Jane’s Intelligence Review 16, September 2006.
  • “Vying for Position: Nepal’s Former Rebels Struggle to Enter the Fold,” 19.5 Jane’s Intelligence Review 32, May 2007.
  • Simkhada, Shambhu R. et al, Causes of National Conflicts and Means to Resolve Them, Nepal: a case study, PSIO Occasional Paper 3/2004 (Geneva: The Graduate Institute of International Studies).

 

Reports and resolutions of intergovernmental organizations

  • Inter Agency of UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOHA; OHCHR, and NRC, Final Report Joint Inter Agency Mission to Mid-Western Region: Nepal, February 2006.
  • United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook Country Data Sheet - Nepal, available at link.
  • UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), Inter-Agency Thematic Report: The Internally Displaced Persons – Current Status, 18 July 2007.
  • UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace process, 9 January 2007, UN Doc. S/2007/7.
  • UN Security Council, Resolution No. 1740, 23 January 2007, UN Doc. S/2007/7.

 

Governmental reports

  • U.S. Department of State, 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report, April 2004, Appendix C, “Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)/ United People’s Front”, at 143, available at link

Reports of think tanks and non-governmental organizations

  • Geneva Call (2005), Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines, (Geneva: Geneva Call and PSIO), Vol. I.
  • International Crisis Group, Nepal’s Maoists: Their aims, structure and strategy, Asia Report N°104, 27 October 2005, available at link.
  • International Crisis Group, Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it work, Asia Report N°126, 15 December 2006, available link.


 

Press Information (in chronological order)

  • “The Future Lies in Democracy”, Time Magazine, 26 June 2004, available at link
  • “Internally Displaced in Nepal Overlooked and Neglected, UN Expert Says”, UN Information Service, 22 April 2005, available at link.
  • Oliva, Fabio, “Power-sharing is perhaps the best formula for interim institutions and any decision-making body”, The Weekly Mirror, 25 January 2007.
  • “L’ONU incite le Népal à juger les auteurs des violations des droits de l’homme durant le conflit armé”, Le Monde, 26 January 2007, at 6.
  • “Les maoïstes entrent au gouvernement au Népal,” Le Monde, 30 March 2007.
  • “Au Népal, les maoïstes entrent au Parlement,” Le Monde, 30 March 2007.
  • “Nepal to Delay Elections,” The New York Times, 5 October 2007.
     

Interviews

Internet resources

  • Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Applying the UN IDP definition: who are the displaced in Nepal? (2007), available at link
  • IISS Armed Conflict Database, Nepal (CPN(M)), Annual Update 2005, available at available at link.
  • IISS Armed Conflict Database, Nepal (CPN(M)), Annual Update 2007, available at link
  • South Asia Terrorism Portal, Nepal Terrorist Groups - Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist”, available at link#.
  • South Asia Terrorism Portal, Nepal Assessment 2007, available at link
  • Website of the CPN-M, available at link
  • www.hilmag.com
  • www.nepaltimes.com
     

Statements of the armed group

  • Comprehensive Peace Agreement held between Government of Nepal and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (2006). English version provided by the Nepalese government available at link
     

Agreements involving armed groups