Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 

Origins

JI was founded in 1995 by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in Malaysia. However, its origins relate back to the Darul Islam (DI) movement, which began in 1948 with a regional rebellion in West Java, led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo. Independently, other rebellions, also named Darul Islam, broke out in regions throughout Indonesia. Although different factors led to the rebellions, all leaders agreed in one common aim, the establishment of “the Islamic State of Indonesia” (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII). In order to achieve this goal, they formed a united front with Kartosoewirjo as their first imam. In 1962, however, Kartosoewirjo was captured and “the Indonesian army persuaded 32 of his top lieutenants to pledge allegiance to the government in exchange for amnesty.” Thus, DI became leaderless and seemed to have been defeated. In 1966, with Suharto coming into power, General Ali Moertopo tried to reactivate DI, but this, and several other attempts, failed to revive the DI movement.  However, in 1974 Darul Islam re-emerged; three leaders of Aceh, Java and South Sulawesi met in Jalan Mahoni, in Tnajung Priok, Jakarta, and re-established a simply structured DI, led by Daud Beureueh as imam and Gaos Taufik as military commander. Since then, DI keeps continues to pursue its aim of an Islamic state of Indonesia, however, it has ceased to be violent. This movement produced various splinter groups, including the Komando Jihad (KJ) and, later on, JI. In 1976, Gaos Taufik and Danu Mohamed Hassan formed KJ in order to launch a revolution against the Indonesian government. They started operations in May 1976 in the provinces of North, South and West Sumatra and Lampung by launching grenades and bombs until the arrest of Gaos Taufik in mid-1977 and of Timsar Zubil and several others, who were in charge of the operations. Among the detained were the later founders of JI: Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. On 28 March 1981, five members of KJ launched a high-profile hijacking but Indonesian commandos eventually overcame the hijackers; four were killed and one was imprisoned. This led to the break-up of KJ.
Following these events, Sungkar and Ba’asyr established a radical organisation, known from 1995 on as Al Jemaah Al Islamiyah.  They received financial help from Malaysian businessmen, who supported the idea of an Islamic state. Moreover, JI created contacts with the mujahideen in Afghanistan, where they received military training and were encouraged to follow the ideology of armed jihad.   Sungkar and Ba’asyir established the structure and published a book entitled “Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jamaah al-Islamiya” (General Guidelines for the Jemaah Islamiyah Struggle).   

 

Location / Main area of operation

JI operates across Southeast Asia.  Indonesian JI is part of a larger regional network including Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

Objectives

Jemaah Islamiyah pursues the aim to establish a pan-Islamic state (Daulah Islamiyah) comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and governed by Sharia law. Its activities and doctrine are directed against Christians and Western ideologies. Until his death, Sungkar was the ideological leader of JI; he preached that “a non-Islamic political system will contaminate the umma (Muslim Community).”    According to his teachings, in order to pursue its objectives, the organisation will need military and spiritual strength, which can only be achieved by recruitment, education, obedience and jihad (i.e. holy war).

Number of Members

While exact numbers are unknown, according to some sources, the number of JI’s members is estimated to be more than 500.   Other sources cite membership varying from several hundred to a few thousand JI members. JI mainly recruits from pesantrens, Islamic boarding schools led by religious teachers with ties to the Darul Islam or to Pondok Ngruki.  

Type : Transnational

Jemaah Islamiyah is a transnational non-state armed group with cells in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Although it is mainly operating in Indonesia, JI also carries out armed operations in Malaysia, Singapore and possibly in the Philippines. Inter alia, a December 2000 series of bombings that took place in Manila/Philippines killing 22 people was allegedly the responsibility of JI; moreover, JI has been linked to planned attacks against U.S., British, and Australian embassies in Singapore, as well allegedly attacking or plotting against U.S. and Western targets in Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines. Certain sources specifically report that JI operated in 2004 and 2005 in the Philippines. Furthermore, according to some sources, JI supports al-Qaeda’s activities logistically and operationally in Afghanistan and elsewhere, including the 9/11 attacks on U.S. soil, where JI hosted two of the pilots in Kuala Lumpur. Finally, it is reported that JI members are trained in Malaysia, Afghanistan and Singapore.

Conflict Status : Active

Jemaah Islamiyah has allegedly been responsible for a sequence of major bombings.  On 24 December 2000, bombs exploded in eleven different Indonesian cities.  On 12 October 2002, nearly 200 people were killed in three Bali bombings and up to 300 wounded. On 5 August 2003, a car bomb exploded in front of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta where twelve people were killed. On 9 September 2004, JI car bombs exploded outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta, resulting in 9 deaths and over 150 wounded; JI claimed responsibility for the act. Moreover, the explosives used were identical to the material used at the Bali bombings of 2002 and the car bomb in front of the J.W. Mariott hotel. Further attacks took place in May 2005 in Ceram/Maluku and Tentena/Poso, killing 28 persons. The most recent major incident occurred on 1 October 2005, in Bali, Indonesia where, through a series of explosions, in Jimbaran and Kuta, 20 people and 3 bombers were killed.  
Since the Bali bombings of 2002, more than 300 members of the JI have been arrested by the Indonesian Government, however, JI has not ceased its operations.  The group was particularly active from 2003 until 2006 in Poso/Central Sulawesi, until the identities of the active members became known and some arrested. The jihad violence in Poso was originally dismissed as common criminal acts, ranging from armed robbery, beheadings, and murder to bombings. However, the Indonesian police forces finally discovered that the criminal acts were most likely the responsibility of the JI network. In May 2007, several bombs exploded in Indonesia, killing and wounding approximately 70 people. The Indonesian government suspects that these bombings are related to JI activities.
 

Structure of the organization

At the top of JI sits the amir, a position which had been held first by Abdullah Sungkar, then in 1999, by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir until he was replaced in 2002 by Thoriquddin (alias Abu Rusdan), who was arrested shortly thereafter; his former secretary, Abu Dujana then became the new amir.
Beneath the amir are four councils: a Governing Council (majelis qiyadah), a regional Advisory Council (majelis syuro) consisting of five members; a fatwa (legal opinion) Council; and a Disciplinary Council (majelis hisbah). The members of all these councils are appointed by the amir and are under his control. The governing council in turn is headed by a central command (qiyadah markaziyah), which controls the leaders of the four mantiqis and the heads of wakalahs.
Mantiqi I comprises the mainland Malaysia and Singapore and is responsible for fund-raising.  Mantiqi II consists of Java, Sumatra and other islands of Indonesia and is mainly focused on the establishment of a sharia state in Indonesia, as well as pursuing jihad. The Mantiqi III, which is located in the Philippines, Borneo and Sulawesi, is responsible for the training of the JI fighters. Mantiqi IV is based in Australia and responsible for fund-raising.   
Each Mantiqi is headed by one senior leader, responsible for running the daily activities. According to Wayne Turnbull, “[t]he Wakalah represents an intermediate level of authority that provides command and control for JI operatives active in specific locations or regions.”  
However, after the 2002 Bali bombings, where 200 civilians were killed, many members split with the organisation, and Indonesian authorities arrested more than 300 JI militants.
JI was weakened by this loss of members, however, it remains active.  Moreover, since then, several factions emerged from the JI.    First, there is the most radical faction lead by Malaysian Noordin Top with the main goal to attack Western targets. Second, there is the faction of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, who was released from jail in June 2006.   The third emerging faction is located on Indonesian Sulawesi Island, fighting specifically in the district of Poso. Moreover, after the anti-terror police’s Detachment 88 arrested several commanders in 2006, former JI leader Abu Dujana founded the new wing of the Jemaah Islamiyah called the Sariyah, with him as a leader.  On 8 April 2007, it became known that Sariyah has apparently formed a new military wing with up to 100 trained operatives in Indonesia.  The police forces found charts indicating the structure of Jemaah Islamiyah signed by Abu Dujana.  The suspicion that Sariyah is an organised group was confirmed when additional photocopies of the charts were found in raids in Indonesia.

Leadership

Anshori, Abdullah (alias: Abu Faith, Ibnu Thoyib), native of Pacitan, East Java, taught at Pondok Ngruki and helped organise Ring Condet (network of usroh   groups) in Jakarta 1984-1985. He was sentenced to nine years in prison and following his release in 1993, he became leader of JI’s Mantiqi II for several years until 2000. His current whereabouts are unknown.

Bashir, Abu Bakar (alias: Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Abdus Samad), born 1938 in Jombang, East Java.  Along with Abdullah Sungkar, he co-founded Pondok Ngruki (Pesantren al-Mukmin) in 1973.  In 1978, these two men would be imprisoned as suspected members of the Komando Jihad group. Following their arrest, imprisonment and eventual release in Indonesia, Bashir and Sungkar fled Indonesia for Johor, Malaysia. In 1995, they formed the Jemaah Islamiyah.  Upon Sungkar’s death in 1999, Bashir took over as JI’s spiritual leader but was quickly ousted from power by younger JI members who considered him too weak and moderate. Bashir also formed the International Mujahidin Council (Rabitatul Mujahidin) in 1999 and Indonesia (MMI) in August of 2000, an organisation set up in order to constitute a political front for all groups working to establish Islamic law. The MMI is intended to be an organisation which pulls together various Islamic Groups within Indonesia; an ad-hoc coalition with up to 50,000 members.   
In 2002, Bashir was arrested for connections to a number of terrorist attacks and a failed assassination plot against Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, and has served jail terms for minor immigration violations.  He was arrested again shortly after the Bali bombing in 2002 on suspicion of involvement in these attacks as well as the August 2003 bombing of the Marriott hotel in Jakarta, for which al-Qaeda was believed to be responsible. In March 2005, Bashir was acquitted of involvement in the Marriott attack, but although he had not been involved in the Bali attacks directly, he was convicted for giving his approval.  For being part of an "evil conspiracy", he was given a 30-month term in prison. After his sentence was reduced for good behaviour, Bashir was released from jail in June 2006.

bin Hir, Zulkifli (alias: Marwan, Musa, Musa Abdul Hir), alleged leader of Runda Kumpalan Kecil (RKK) and a suspected member of JI.  Zulkifli bin Hir is an American-trained engineer and is currently believed to be in the Philippines, allegedly training Abu Sayyaf operatives in bomb-making. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is a non-state armed group from the Philippines, which seeks an independent Islamic state, centred in Mindanao/Philippines. The United States government is offering a five million dollar reward for information leading to bin Hir's capture.  

bin Husin, Azahari, Malaysian national, JI member. He had been identified by Indonesian officials as Jemaah Islamiyah's chief bomb maker.  A mechanical engineer and former professor at the University of Technology, Malaysia (UTM), he is being sought in connection with Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Batam as well as the Bali, Marriott, and Australian embassy bombings. On November 10, 2005, bin Husin apparently killed himself in an explosion as Indonesian police closed in on his hideout.  His death is expected to be a severe blow to the operational capabilities of Jemaah Islamiya.

bin Isomoddin, Nurjaman Riduan (Alias: Hambali) became leader of JI's Mantiqi I  in the late 1990s following in leadership the group's co-founder and original leader, Abu Bakar Bashir. In addition to being the JI leader, bin Isomoddin was allegedly “al-Qaeda's Operations Chief for Southeast Asia”. On 11 August 2003, Hambali was arrested by the  CIA in Thailand for being involved in all major bombings undertaken by the JI as well as for connections to the 9/11 attackers. Since then, he has been imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

However, on 14 April 2007, he denied to maintain any relations to al-Qaeda and claimed to have left JI two years before the 2002 Bali bombing that he is accused of having planned.

Dujana, Abu (Alias: Ainal Bahri, Yusrun Ahmahmud, Mahfud), leader of JI until 2006.  Born in Cianjur, West Java, Indonesia in 1969 or 1970, Dujana was raised in Central Java.  From 1988 to 1991, Dujana was in Afghanistan, undergoing basic training at the Afghanistan Mujahideen Military Academy.  This experience, and his fluency in Arabic, resulted in close high-level contacts with the current al-Qaeda leadership. According to Zachary Abuza, he had personal contacts with Osama bin Laden and trained with bin Isomoddin (Hambali), another member of both al-Qaeda and JI. In the early 1990s, Dujana was a teacher at Lukmanul Hakiem, a JI-established Islamic boarding school in Johor, Malaysia.  He then became an instructor at a JI camp in Mindanao before becoming then-JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir’s personal secretary.  When Bashir was arrested in March 2000, Dujana continued the work as personal secretary to the new head of JI, Abu Rusdan, and participated actively in mission planning, logistics, and other JI management activities.  In 2003, when Rusdan was arrested, Dujana overtook command of JI. In 2006, he was forced to restructure the group after the anti-terror police’s Detachment 88 arrested several commanders.  Dujana is believed to be the head of the new wing , the Sariyah.   However, on 9 June 2007, Dujuana was arrested by Indonesian police forces in Kebarongan Kemrajenan, Banyumas Regency, Central Java province.  DNA tests enabled his identification.

Dulmatin (Alias: Djoko, Muktarmar, Noval, Pitono, Abdul Matin, Amar Usman, Joko Pitoyo, Joko Pitono), born in Indonesia in the early 1970s; he is an explosives and electronics expert and one of JI's senior figures.  He is suspected to have played a major role in planning the October 2002 Bali bombings. He is considered to be one of JI's best bomb makers and trainers and is known to have attended terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Since 2002, he has been fleeing from the Indonesian government; additionally, the U.S. government has placed a $10 million bounty on his capture. Due to the fact that the Philippine’s military troops discovered him travelling with members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), it is alleged that he created ties to Islamic terrorist groups, such as the ASG. On 9 April 2007, Dulmatin, in company with Umar Patek, evaded capture during an early morning raid on the southern Philippine island of Jolo. On 11 May 2007, he managed again to elude capture during a raid by government forces on his safe house on Simunul Island.   However, his children were taken in custody.

Kastari, Mas Selamat (Alias: Edy Heriyanto, John Wong), a Singaporean national and commander for JI in Singapore before his capture in Indonesia in February 2006.  He is best known for being behind a plot to crash hijacked airplanes into Singapore's international airport.  

Patek, Umar (Alias: Daud), Jemaah Islamiyah member who has worked with Dulmatin in Mindanao.  He has supposedly played a leading role in JI's 2002 bombing in Bali. Patek is suspected to be hiding in the southern Philippines, protected by the leaders from the Abu Sayyaf Group. The U.S. government has placed a bounty of $1 million on his capture. ]]

Rifki, Taufik, Indonesian national, regional leader of Jemaah Islamiya in the Philippines before his capture in October 2003.  He is believed to have been a treasurer for the group in addition to his militant activities.

Rusdan, Abu (Alias: Thoriquddin), was amir of JI Mantiqi II from 2000 until 2003, succeeding Abu Bakar Bashir.

Sungkar, Abdullah, Muslim cleric, born in 1937 in a well-known family of batrik traders of Yemeni descent.  Together with Abu Bakar Bashir, he co-founded Pondok Ngruki in 1973, and was imprisoned as a suspected member of Komando Jihad in 1978.  Abdullah Sungkar was also co-founder and leader of Jemaah Islamiyah.  Sungkar died of natural causes in November 1999 in Bogor/Indonesia.  

Top, Noordin Mohammed, Malaysian national, member of the JI division in Malaysia and Singapore.  He is a former student of Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, and the former director (until 2001) of the school Luqmanul Hakiem pesantren in Malaysia, the headquarters of Mantiqi I. He trained in Mindanao and went to Ambon; several sources give him responsibility for a series of bombings in recent years, specifically, the 2003 Marriott bombing, the 2004 Australian embassy bombing and the October 2005 Bali bombings.

Zulkarnaen, Indonesian citizen, has reportedly taken over as Jemaah Islamiyah’s operations chief, following the arrest Abu Bakr Bashir Zulkarnaen.  

 

External aid/Third party involvement

JI has extensive links to other local sympathetic Islamic groups. In Malaysia, JI and KMM (Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia) have very close ties as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir is a co-founder of KMM. In turn, KMM has close ties to Laskar Jihad. Moreover, the JI is linked to the al-Qaeda network; nearly all JI members who are or were active on the operational management level of the organisation have been trained in the late 80s/beginning of 90s in Afghanistan, where they created ties to al-Qaeda. These connections have been used for both logistical and operational collaborations. However, JI has insisted on its strategic independence. Some analysts treat it even as the “Southeast Asian associate of Al Qaeda.”
It is reported that from the mid-nineties on, the recruitment and training of JI members took place mainly in Egypt, Yemen, and Pakistan. From 1996 to 2000, training camps were used by JI in co-operation with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the South Philippines. It has been stated that weakened from arrests of leading members, JI decided in 2002 to create closer ties to the re-emerging ASG and invited them to their MILF-joint training camps in Mindanao/South Philippines. Indonesian Government officials alleged, that the JI committed in March and April 2003 bombings on the airport of Davao and Sasa Wharf (Mindanao), with the support of the ASG and the MILF, which left 48 persons dead and 204 wounded.

 

External effects of the NSAG's armed activities

There is no information on direct external effects of JI’s armed operations.

Funding

JI raises funds from various sources. First, and this is the main financial source, it receives money through charity (zakat) – Muslims are obliged to spend 2.5% of their income on charity as charity “is one of the five pillars of Islam”. Without knowing the exact destination, money for charity passes through NGOs which reportedly “provide cover for the dispersal of funds to terrorist causes.” Some sources report that non-governmental groups such as the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) transfer parts of their funds to JI and other non-state armed groups.   
A second, often-used method of fundraising by this armed group is the hawala (trust) system which consists of hawala dealers around the world.  One dealer receives money from the donor and based on the trust between the dealers, he informs the corresponding dealer in the country of destination, and this dealer in turn, delivers money to the recipient from its own resources. This system needs no physical transfer of money as the “accounts are balanced over time as transactions flow both ways”.  
A third source of funding is JI's financial links to national and international businesses. Similarly, according to some sources, JI receives financial support from its contacts and organisations in South East Asia and Middle East. In addition, some sources claim that al-Qaeda has financed some JI activities.
 

Relationship with the international community

Since 2002 Jemaah Islamiyah has been designated as a terrorist organisation with links to al-Qaeda by the United States of America Government, as well as by the United Nations Security Council. Additionally, the European Union imposed “certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban,” which includes the following members of JI: Abdullah Anshori, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Taufik Rifki.

 

Books

Articles and Chapters

• Abuza, Zachary (2006), Abu Dujana: Jemaah Islamiyah’s New al-Quaeda Linked Leader, The Jamestown Foundation, 3.13 Terrorism Focus, 4 April 2006, at 4-5, available at link.
• Abuza, Zachary (2005), Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2005, available at link.
• Abuza, Zachary (2006), Dulmatin, JI’s Top Technician, Trains a New Generation of Fighters, The Jamestown Foundation, 3.26 Terrorism Focus, 5 July 2006, available at link.
• Bruinessen, Martin van, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia”, 10.2 South East Asia Research (2002), at 117-154.
• Collins, Nancy-Amelia (2007), Southeast Asia Terrorist Group Splits, But Remains Islamic Militancy, Global Security, 28 February 2007, available at link 2007/ 02/sec-070228-voa01.htm.
• Gunaratna, Rohan (2005), Ideology in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Lessons from Combating Al Qaeda and Al Jemaah Al Islamiyah in South East Asia, Conflict Studies Research Centre Discussion Paper 05/42, September 2005, available at link.
• Gunaratna, Rohan (2005), “The Ideology of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiya”, in Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani and Eric Brown (eds), Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 68 (Washington, D.C: Kirby Lithographic Company, Inc.)
• Heiduk, Felix and Möller, Kay, “Bombenanschlag von Jakarta: Die Rückkehr der Jeamaah Islamiyah?“, 44 SWP-Aktuell (2004), at 1-4.
• Kumar Jha, Pankaj, “Indonesia’s Move against Terrorism”, Peace and Conflict Monitor (2006), available at link.
• Pavlova, Elena (2006), From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Working Paper No. 117, 14 November 2006, available at link.
• Turnbull, Wayne, “A Tangled Web of Southeast Asian Islamic Terrorism: The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network”, Monetary Institute of International Studies, 31 July 2003, available at link.

 

Reports and resolutions of intergovernmental organizations

• UN Security Council 1267 Committee, The list of individuals belonging to or associated with the Taliban, available at link.
• EU Commission, Commission Regulation of 28 April 2006, Doc. No. 674/2006, Official Journal of the European Communities L 116/59, 29 April 2006, available at link.

 

Governmental reports

• U.S. Department of State, Chapter 8: Foreign Terrorist Organizations, available at link. Accessed on 8 April 2008

 

Reports of think tanks and non-governmental organizations

• International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, Asia report No43, 11 December 2002, link.
• International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous, Asia Report No63, 26 August 2003, link.
• International Crisis Group, Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge, Asia Report No127, 24 January 2007, link.
• International Crisis Group, Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing, Asia Report No92, 22 February 2005, link.
• International Crisis Group, Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Network, Asia Report No114, 5 May 2006, link.
• International Crisis Group, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso, Asia Report N°103, 13 October 2005, link.

Press Information (in chronological order)

• “Profile: Abu Bakar Ba'asyir”, BBC News, 14 June 2006, available at link.
• “Indonesia Holds Extremist Leader”, BBC News International, 13 June 2007, available at link.

 

Interviews

Internet resources

• Council on Foreign Relations, Abu Bakar Bashir, available at link.
• Council on Foreign Relations, Jemaah Islamiyah, available at link#1.
• Global Security, Abdullah Anshori, available at link.
• Global Security, Paramilitary Groups, Jemaah Islamiyah, available at link.
• IISS Armed Conflict Database, Non State Armed Groups, Jemaah Islamiyah, available at link.
• Indonesia Matters, Sidney Jones on Jemaah Islamiyah, available at link sidney-jones-on-jemaah-islamiyah/
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Abdullah Anshori, available at link
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Abdullah Sungkar, available at link.
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Abu Bakar Bashir, available at link
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Abu Dujana, available at link
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Azahari bin Husin, available at link.
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Database, Dulmatin, available at link.
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Komando Jihad (Indonesian), available at link.
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Komando Jihad (Indonesian) attacked Airports & Airlines target (Mar. 28, 1981, Indonesia), available at link.
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Mas Selamat Kastari, available at link.
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Nurjaman Riduan bin Isomoddin, available at link.
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Rifki Taufik, available at link KeyLeader.jsp?memID=6385.
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Runda Kumpalan Kecil, at link.
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Zulkarnaen, available at link.
• Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, Zulkifli bi Hir, available at link
   

Statements of the armed group

• Jemaah Islamiyah’s Central Executive Council, Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah’ (‘The General Guide For Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah’). This document was obtained and translated by the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 2004.

Agreements involving armed groups